The Diplomat - Quentin Buckholz*
Recent rhetoric notwithstanding, there is reason to be skeptical about Moscow's attitude to climate change.
The historic climate change mitigation agreement
reached in Paris
by 195 countries on December 12, 2015 was made possible by the
willingness of formerly recalcitrant actors like China, India and the
United States to agree to multilateral, binding emissions targets. To a
casual observer, Russia might appear to be a member of this group of
reformed skeptics. Moscow
submitted
an official climate action plan to the UN on May 31, 2015, well in
advance of the Paris Conference, surprising observers (including the
U.S. State Department's lead climate negotiator, Todd Stern) who were
mindful of Russia's
historically skeptical attitude
regarding the necessity of international action on climate change.
Russian President Vladimir Putin followed up the submission with a
forceful speech at the Paris conference,
declaring, "The quality of life of all people on this planet depends on… our ability to resolve the problem of climate."
However, this seemingly activist posture (likely designed to prevent
further international isolation after Russia's actions in Ukraine and
Syria have drawn Western sanctions and widespread condemnation) masks
the reality that there has been no substantive change in Russia's
attitude toward climate change or willingness to act decisively to
address the issue. While the climate action plan appeared to be a
positive development, analysts quickly
pointed out that Russia's submission, which calls for a 30 percent emissions reduction below 1990-levels, could actually allow Russia to
increase
its emissions, which are currently 35 percent below 1990-levels (due to
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of its
carbon-intensive economy). Climate activists also
called on
Moscow to clarify how Russia plans to use its vast forests, which act
as a "carbon sink," in its overall emissions accounting. These activists
have pointed out
that under an emissions accounting scheme that relies heavily on the
"carbon sink" effect of Russian forests, the country would have to
actually reduce its carbon emissions by even less than the nominal
targets outlined in the plan. Russian officials
have indicated
that they intend to rely heavily on the "carbon sink" effect on Russian
forests in order to reach the targets in the plan, meaning that the
practical effect of the plan is essentially negligible.
Accordingly, rhetorical shifts notwithstanding, there appears to have
been no significant change in Moscow's attitude toward climate change.
While Putin has recently paid
lip service
to the pressing urgency of action, Russia's climate action plan is
indicative of continued official insouciance about climate change. At a
time when most of the international community is increasingly unified
around the necessity of action to mitigate the worst effects of global
warming, Russia remains an outlying skeptic.
Why So Skeptical?
Moscow's reluctance to join the increasingly unified international
community in agreeing on meaningful emission reduction targets is
attributable to several factors. The official Russian posture of
skepticism toward the science underlying fears of climate change is
largely due the country's heavy reliance on fossil fuels. According to
the prominent Russian ecologist
Alexey Yablokov,
"We only think about drilling for more and more oil and selling it to
the West." Putin himself has acknowledged apparent changes in the
Earth's climate, but has dismissed the notion that human activity was to
blame and characterized the notion of anthropogenic global warming as a
"fraud." Russian reluctance to see the world phase out fossil
fuel-based energy likely explains Putin's skepticism and "devil may
care" attitude toward climate change (he once
scoffed
that Russians would have to spend less on fur coats in the future due
to global warming). Moscow's officially skeptical position mirrors that
of other oil-reliant economies,
including the states of the Persian Gulf, and has been
dutifully adopted by the Russian media.
Beyond Russia's wariness of any international action that might limit
demand for fossil fuels, however, the Kremlin also appears to see
potential benefits arising from climate change. According to some
projections, countries far north of the Equator, like Canada and Russia,
could benefit from warming temperatures, as enormous swathes of
perpetually frozen, barren territory are transformed into arable land
and the extraction of mineral resources farther north of the Arctic
Circle becomes possible. Russia has
aggressively staked
its claims in the Arctic territory in anticipation of further melting.
Putin has also repeatedly alluded to projections that Russian
agriculture could benefit from climate change,
remarking in 2003, "Agricultural specialists say our grain production will increase, and thank God for that." This prediction is
cited often by Russian officials seeking to downplay the potentially negative effects of climate change.
However, this limited and optimistic view appears misguided. It is
increasingly clear that climate change is likely to adversely affect
Russia in several ways, from severe weather events to territorial loss
to growing instability on the country's southern periphery and in its
major cities.
Mixed Effects on Agriculture
Notwithstanding the predictions of Putin's "agricultural
specialists," it is far from clear that the effect of climate change on
Russian farmers will be unambiguously positive. While historically
non-arable regions in Siberia could indeed see their agricultural
productivity increase, regions in the south and west of Russia that are
currently arable are likely to be increasingly affected by drought,
wildfire, and changing irrigation patterns, a process that is already
under way.
Analysts have suggested that the melting of permafrost in Russia's far north
could alter
river flow patterns sufficiently to create water shortages in Stavropol
and Krasnodar, historically the country's most productive agricultural
regions. Consequently, while Siberia becomes newly fertile, the
country's traditional breadbasket in the Volga River basin could become
arid. Additionally, the rising incidence of drought and wildfire
associated with climate change could be devastating for agricultural
production in western Russia. In 2010, unprecedented summer heat caused
massive wildfires that dramatically reduced agricultural output in
western Russia, destroying one third of the country's wheat harvest (the
resulting export ban on wheat may have
helped touch off the Arab Spring by raising food prices). The country experienced another major heat wave with a
devastating impact
on agricultural output in the summer of 2012, suggesting that this
pattern is likely to continue and intensify as global temperatures rise.
Accordingly, any gains in agricultural productivity farther north could
be offset by drought and wildfire in southern and western Russia and by
the effect of melting permafrost on the country's irrigation patterns,
confounding any hopes of increased grain production.
Second, Russia's proximity to the Arctic Circle and long northern
coastline make the country unusually vulnerable to rising sea levels and
consequent erosion. As the permafrost in northern Russia retreats and
sea levels rise, the country is
reportedly losing
468 square kilometers to erosion every year. This trend, worrying in
its own right, is likely to accelerate as global temperatures continue
to rise. Scientists have further
cautioned that the effect of climate change on the permafrost in Russia's northern territories could have
devastating effects
on regional ecological systems (including wildlife) and on crucial
infrastructure, including roads, rail lines, and oil and gas pipelines.
The potential harm resulting from melting permafrost in northern Russia
has been vividly illustrated by the
sudden appearance
of massive, unexplained craters in Siberia; scientists have concluded
that these craters formed as a result of subterranean permafrost melt
and the consequent collapse of underground geological formations.
A Southern Arc of Instability
Finally, Russia will be no less affected than any other country by
adverse climate-related developments beyond its borders. Changes in the
climate are likely to increase resource competition and conflict
throughout the world; many analysts
have pointed
to the Syrian Civil War, which was triggered by a drought-induced
humanitarian crisis, as an example of this phenomenon. Climate change is
expected to have particularly negative effects in South and Central
Asia, meaning that violence, instability, and mass refugee movements
along Russia's southern periphery could increase as global temperatures
rise.
The potential for climate change-related phenomena to spark conflict
and refugee movements along Russia's southern periphery should be a
cause for concern in Moscow. Russian officials clearly view instability
in Central Asia as a significant threat, not least due to
the possibility
that radical extremists could find safe haven in the weak states and
ungoverned spaces of the region. Moscow has warily eyed the possibility
of spillover from the war in Afghanistan, and
reacted to the Taliban capture of the northern city of Kunduz by
reinforcing the already considerable Russian
military presence in Tajikistan. Senior Kremlin officials have
referred repeatedly
to the danger of Islamist militant groups using Afghanistan as a base
to attack Russia and Central Asia. In short, Moscow is clearly concerned
that the war in Afghanistan is destabilizing surrounding states and
views any such instability as a threat to Russian interests.
Given this perception of the threat to Russia from an unstable
Central Asia, Russia's official attitude toward climate change is
perplexing. Several of the states of Central Asia are already
quite weak, and are routinely listed among the world's most unstable countries in
Foreign Policy's
Fragile States Index.
Scientific projections suggest that Central Asia could suffer
significantly from climate change. The region is already confronting a
significant
water scarcity problem,
which has been worsened by irresponsible policymakers; warming
temperatures will likely exacerbate this issue. Several studies
project
increased land degradation and diminished water supplies in Central
Asia if global temperatures continue to climb, both of which would
devastate agriculture and disproportionately affect the poorest segments
of the region's population. These trends could further destabilize weak
states like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, creating the
security vacuums and extremist safe havens that Moscow is so keen to
avoid.
Additionally, increased migration from Central Asia could
adversely affect Russia's internal social cohesion and stability. Recent years have seen an
ever-rising tide of chauvinistic nationalism in Russia, a trend that will
only accelerate as economic malaise deepens. Russian politicians
have portrayed
labor migrants from Central Asia as "parasites" and threats for years;
accordingly, an influx of migrants at a time of ongoing economic
stagnation and insecurity could be socially toxic and potentially
explosive.
Given Russia's ongoing reliance on fossil fuels (which has
only deepened in recent years despite
half-hearted attempts
at economic diversification) and the likelihood that Putin (not known
for his malleable opinions) will remain in power for the foreseeable
future, Moscow's fundamental attitude toward climate change appears
unlikely to shift. In light of the potential consequences of climate
change for Russia, the country's citizens should hope that the efforts
of other nations to address this most consequential international
problem are successful.
*Quentin Buckholz is an MIA candidate at Columbia University's
School of International and Public Affairs. He was previously a senior
analyst at a strategic risk advisory firm in Washington, D.C. His work
has also appeared in World Politics Review.
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