03/03/2017

Sydney Weather: Summer Confirmed As City's Hottest For Days And Nights In 157 Years

Fairfax -  Peter Hannam

Sydney's record-breaking weather juggernaut rolls on, with summer confirmed as the city's hottest for both days and nights over records stretching back 157 years.
The average of days and nights in the Harbour City was 2.8 degrees warmer than the norm, beating the summer of 1990-91 as Sydney's warmest, the Bureau of Meteorology said in its seasonal report.
Dawn at Coogee on February 12, another day of record temperatures and the threat of bushfires amid catastrophic weather patterns across the country. Photo: Michele Mossop
The average of summer days and nights in the Harbour City was 2.8 degrees warmer than usual, beating the summer of 1990-91 as Sydney's warmest, the Bureau of Meteorology said in its seasonal report.
The record warm summer included the hottest ever month, in January, and built on Sydney's hottest year set in 2016. Of the other summer months, December was the city's second-warmest and February equal-second warmest, the bureau said.
Summer was marked by "both the lack of cold during the season and several significant heatwaves", said Acacia Pepler, a bureau climatologist, noting the pattern fitted in with climate change.
"The number of warm days are increasing across the country and the globe," she said.
Among the many highlights of the season were the most days on record above 35 degrees, with 11 such days compared with an average of two in a typical summer.
Almost a whole month endured days above 30 degrees, with 26 of them during the summer, or more than triple the nine usually recorded.


What drives heatwaves in Australia
The ins and outs of this sweltering weather phenomenon, as explained by Dr Sarah Perkins-Kirkpatrick. Produced in association with UNSWTV.

While Observatory Hill missed out on a 40-degree day during the summer, inland regions baked with Richmond posting a record of 11 summer days of at least 40 degrees. The city's hottest day was on January 31, with 39.4 degrees reached.

NSW and Australia
Statewide, it was also a record summer for both maximum and mean temperatures in NSW, with the heatwave that ran to February 11 among the most remarkable such events in Australian history, the bureau said in a recent report.
Across the state, area-averaged temperatures were 2.57 degrees warmer than normal, eclipsing the previous record set in 2005-06 by 0.13 degrees.
On February 11, the state's average maximum was 44 degrees, beating the previous record for the month prior to this year by a full two degrees. Moree's run of 54 days of at least 35 degrees also set a fresh record for NSW.
(See bureau chart below showing mean summer temperatures and how they compared with long-run averages.)
Nationally, it was Australia's fifth-hottest summer on record for minimum temperatures at 0.82 degrees above the 1961-90 average. Mean and maximum temperatures were also warmer than usual but with marked differences between the west and the east of the country.

Warm nights
Along with the warm days, Sydney had an unusually mild run of overnight temperatures. During summer, 58 nights had minimums of at least 20 degrees, almost triple the average of 22 such nights, and second only to the summer of 1990-91's tally of 64.
The mercury also stayed above 24 degrees on 10 nights, beating the previous record of six such nights, the bureau said.
With nights so mild, days often got off to a warm start. The 36.5 degree reading set at 9am on January 18 was the warmest for that time of day at Observatory Hill since such records began in 1955, the bureau said.
(Australia's roughly 1-degree warming over the past century is in line with global changes, with temperature increases particularly notable in the last four decades, as shown below.)

Rain check
Sydney had a relatively wet end to summer, with the damp conditions set to extend well into the first week of autumn.
Rainfall in February was 205 millimetres, or not far shy of double the average for the month, helping to make up below-average rain in December and January, the bureau said.
Sydney is likely to collect at least 100 millimetres of rain in the current wet spell, with about 10-20 mm likely each day until early next week, Jacob Cronje, a senior meteorologist with Weatherzone, said.
"We are dealing with a very unstable trough," he said, adding that Saturday looks likely to be the wettest of the days on current model predictions.
For the state, summer rainfall was about one-third below average, setting up NSW for an extended fire season.
Nationally, it was the fourth-wettest summer on record, with rainfall 49 per cent above average. (See bureau chart below showing how unusually wet central regions were compared with the east.) 

Autumn and El Nino
While parts of eastern Australia are looking at a few days of persistent rain, the Bureau of Meteorology says odds favour a drier and warmer than average autumn for most of the country.
Those conditions may extend further into the year if the bureau's latest updated information on a key driver of Australia's weather is any guide.
Earlier this week, the bureau said the chances of an El Nino event returning later this year have increased, with the probability of one placed at about 50 per cent.
While the autumn is typically a "predictability barrier", six of the eight global models used by the bureau now suggest an El Nino will form by July this year.  (See bureau chart below.)
El Ninos see the typically westward-blowing equatorial Pacific winds stall or reverse. One effect is that rainfall patterns tend to shift eastwards away from Australia and south-east Asia.
During such events, the Pacific Ocean also absorbs less heat, helping to add an extra boost to the background warming temperatures from climate change.
The 2015-16 El Nino, one of the three biggest on record, added 0.05 degrees and 0.12 degrees to global temperatures in 2015 and 2016, respectively, helping to propel both years to record annual highs, NASA said in January.

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Spinning Carbon Capture And Storage As Cheaper Than Renewables

Renew Economy - 

Supporters of carbon capture and storage (CCS) plants on coal power stations are audaciously seeking to sell the story they are cheaper than renewables – despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
An example of this genre of CCS spin was published early last week in the Australian Financial Review (AFR) which reported (paywall) that, according Julio Friedmann from the US Department of Energy, coal plants fitted with carbon capture and storage are one-third the cost of rooftop solar.
According to the AFR, Friedmann “cited findings from Lazard that put the levelised cost of energy … at US8¢-US12¢ [per kilowatt hour] for a new coal-fired plant fitted with CCS.”
“That easily beat rooftop solar at US18¢-30¢/kWh, offshore wind at US15¢ and nuclear at US10¢-18¢, although it fell short of utility-scale solar at US5¢,” wrote the AFR’s Angela MacDonald-Smith.
(Lazard, a global financial advisory firm, calculates the Levelised Coat of Energy (LCOE) as a way of comparing the costs of energy from different generation sources.)
In tune with the lead paragraph the article was headlined “Carbon capture far undercuts rooftop solar: expert”.

Coal wins hands down – or does it?
So, ignoring the fact that according to Friedmann utility scale solar is already cheaper than new coal, Lazard’s data suggests coal with CCS is the way to go for carbon dioxide abatement, right?
Not so fast.
Firstly, Lazard’s data refers only to costs in the US so, while of interest, has limited direct relevance to decisions elsewhere in the world.
Via Twitter Friedmann confirmed the data he was referring to was from Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis 10.0, which was published in December 2016, plus additional data from the US Department of Energy and his own analysis.
So what exactly were Lazard’s estimates for unsubsidised new power generation?
For an Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) plant with 90 per carbon and capture Lazard estimated (p. 13) it came in at US21¢ kWh. Importantly, the cost of transport and storage is not included in this cost estimate. (An IGCC plant, such as the almost-commissioned Kemper plant with CCS in Mississippi, gasifies coal which is then burnt in a gas-fired turbine.)
For a conventional coal plant with 90% carbon capture, Lazard estimated it would cost 14.3¢/kWh excluding the costs of transport and storage.
So Lazard’s range for CCS plants was at least US14.3¢/kWh to US21¢ kWh plus the cost of transport and storage.

Lazard LCOE for new US power generation
Source: Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis 10.0 
So what about those solar estimates?
For the utility scale projects Lazard estimated the range between US4.6¢ kWh to 6.1¢ kWh, with only marginal differences between the panel types.
So what about onshore wind, which is growing rapidly in the US but strangely went without mention in the AFR article?
Lazard put the cost at between just US3.2¢ kWh and 6.2¢ kWh.
So there it is: according to Lazard’s analysis onshore wind and utility solar come in at over a half to one-third the cost of an coal plant with CCS. Compared to coal plants with CCS, wind and utility scale solar wins hands down.
Even rooftop solar at the bottom of the cost range came in slightly cheaper than conventional coal with CCS. The most expensive rooftop solar came in only marginally more expensive than an IGCC plant with CCS.
To its credit, the AFR story did note Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) estimated the cost in Australia for electricity from a coal plant with CCS would cost about 35.2c/kWh (US25c/kWh). In comparison, BNEF estimated new wind at 6.1¢-11.8¢ cents per kWh (US5c-9c/kWh) and utility scale solar at 7.8¢-14¢ (US6c-11c/kWh)
Lazard and BNEF’s data both indicate wind and utility scale solar are far cheaper than coal with CCS, though the margins differ.
While Lazard’s LCOE estimates don’t allow for any integration costs with renewables it is equally important to note they do not include any transportation and storage costs for the carbon dioxide from the CCS plant.
Where exactly Friedmann’s low cost estimate for CCS came from is not clear but it certainly is not the most recent edition of Lazard’s annual cost estimates. An attempt to contact Friedmann to clarify the discrepancy between the figures quoted in the AFR article and Lazard’s 2016 analysis and the specific source of his data has so far been unsuccessful.

Do CCS costs matter?
Speaking to the AFR Friedmann opined that “the issue [with CCS] is not costs, it’s finance.”
Really?
There are three operational CCS plants attached to coal-fired power stations in the world: the SaskPower’s Boundary Dam plant in Saskatchewan, Canada, NRG Energy’s Terra Nova project at the Parish power station in Texas and Mississippi Power’s almost commissioned Kemper plant in Mississippi.
Citing his costs comment, I asked Friedmann via Twitter what his view of the Kemper CCS plant is – which is nudging up to US$7.1 billion for a 582 megawatt (MW) lignite-fired plant which will capture only 65% of its carbon dioxide emissions. The Kemper project has been plagued by technical problems, massive cost overruns, legal challenges and is under investigation by the US Securities and Exchange Commission. The Kemper project could fairly be described as a financial basket case.
Friedmann did not comment on Kemper but wrote that NRG Energy’s recently commissioned Petra Nova project in Texas and SaskPower’s Boundary Dam project in Saskatchewan “show that costs are competitive” and that both projects were completed “on time and on budget.”
A follow up question via Twitter seeking a response on what he thought of the Kemper project drew no response.
NRG Energy’s Petra Nova plant was recently commissioned but the cost was a staggering of US$1 billion to capture just 40 per cent of the flue gas from a 610 MW unit at the WA Parish power station in Texas.
SaskPower’s Boundary Dam project is another sorry story. The Canadian Parliamentary Budget Officer estimated (see p 40) just the CCS unit at the Boundary Dam plant cost C$917 (US$698) million when it was originally budgeted to cost C$800 (US$609) million.  The plant has also been plagued by major start-up problems causing numerous shut-downs since it was first commissioned with much fanfare.
With all the existing coal plant CCS units coming with big price tags and two out of the three suffering significant problems, the technology is fast becoming the orphan child of 1990’s coal utility thinking.
Lazard note the rapid fall over the last seven years in the unsubsidised costs of the dominant renewables technologies: 66 per cent for solar and 85 per cent for utility solar.

Lazard's LCOE for US coal & IGCC plants + CCS 
All costs in US cents per kilowatt hour. Assumes 90% CCS but excludes cost of transport and storage. All figures are the unsubsidised cost. Source: Lazard Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis versions 6 to 10
In contrast, Lazard’s data indicates the cost of energy from IGCC plants with CCS has climbed rapidly while the cost of conventional coal plants with CCS has plateaued.
Based on the trends in costs, renewables are once again winning hands down.
As for the lowest cost options for the abatement of carbon dioxide emissions, Lazarad is clear.
“An analysis” of carbon abatement options, the firm wrote, “suggests that policies designed to promote wind and utility-scale solar development could be a particularly cost-effective way of limiting carbon emissions.”
While Lazard described rooftop solar as expensive in comparison to wind and utility scale solar, CCS didn’t even get a look in. In the eyes of analysts, the staggering costs of CCS are the issue.

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How To Talk Climate Change Across The Aisle: Focus On Adaptive Solutions Rather Than Causes

The Conversation | 

Will talk of adapting to climate change be less polarizing politically? Faced with rising seas, Miami is adapting by raising its roads. AP Photo/Lynne Sladky
Conversations about climate change often derail into arguments about whether global warming exists, whether climate change is already happening, the extent to which human activity is a cause and which beliefs are based in evidence versus propaganda.
Can we have more productive discussions? We think the answer is yes, but like so many things, it depends.
Many have argued it’s better to focus on strategic solutions to climate change than on science or politics or pundits. Solutions directly affect our future, whereas past-oriented debates focus on who or what is to blame and who should pay, and thus are highly polarizing.
Breaking from the old, stale debates sounds appealing, but new debates lie ahead. The solutions to our climate challenges differ from one another not just technically (cutting emissions, carbon capture, planting trees, erecting seawalls and elevating roads and buildings), but also psychologically and behaviorally.
What will be the major disagreements, and agreements, of the future? Are there different psychological and behavioral roadblocks and paths to different climate solutions, and if so, what are they? We have some initial answers to these questions, as well as important questions for going forward.

Underlying psychologies
To begin solving the dilemmas of climate change, two primary strategic approaches require discussion: mitigation and adaptation.
For years, the primary option and a lightning rod for disagreement has been mitigation, or actions that cut the amounts of carbon and other greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere. For many, mitigation is essential; for many others, cutting emissions threatens industry, jobs, free markets and our quality of life.
Talking about climate change as a mitigation problem, where society needs to use less energy from driving and other daily uses, has failed to get broad public support. septim/flickr, CC BY-NC-ND
Now we are entering a period of adaptation, in which we must try to reduce the impact of the coming changes. Examples include changing agricultural practices, erecting seawalls, and new approaches to architecture and living arrangements.
In some ways it is a relief to articulate ways to adapt to climate change. More coping options are better than fewer, right? Well, not necessarily. Their costs and risks differ, their effects are uncertain and varied, and decisions that will drive their deployment can derive from radically different evaluations and judgments.
We should not choose between mitigation or adaptation because we need both. We cannot lose sight of this dual need. But we will continue to face very demanding decisions about how to allocate finite resources – money, time, effort and so on – across multiple strategic options. This is where tomorrow’s difficult conversations will unfold.
How will trade-offs be made, and what kinds of perceptions and biases will determine our choices? We will not be able to optimize our strategies, as objectively and effectively as humanly possible, without understanding the psychologies underlying them.
Research into the psychology of different climate solutions is in its infancy. A recent study showed how different political ideologies predict different levels of support for free market versus regulatory solutions for cutting carbon emissions.
Building on this foundation, we wanted to ascertain and test people’s differing perceptions of mitigation versus adaptation as climate solutions. Such differences, we presumed, will be crucial in shaping the nature of future conversations, decisions, and actions.
In surveys of two online samples in the United States, taken when temperatures around the country differed significantly, we asked respondents to describe their beliefs about global warming and climate change. We separated and defined mitigation and adaptation strategies, and asked how much people were willing to support these different types of climate solutions.
As might be intuited, support for mitigation and for adaptation were positively correlated – people who supported one were more likely to support the other. However, while the two overlap, they do understand and perceive the two strategies to be different.

Gateway strategy?
We found additional important differences. Overall, mitigation solutions received more support than adaptation strategies. Mitigation was also more divisive, showing the widest divide between conservatives and liberals. Adaptation was less divisive; perhaps this bodes well for future climate-solution conversations and action.
However, a key caveat is crucial for thinking about how we go forward. While we did find less disagreement around adaptation, and some general support, many people probably have not yet been exposed to information or debates about adaptation, or given it much thought.
Perhaps this novelty represents a naive stage among citizens about any issue before it becomes politicized and polarizing. On the other hand, adaptation more than mitigation is agnostic about climate-change causes; whether climate change results from human causes or natural ones is irrelevant. This may be one reason we found more agreement around adaptation.
But what will happen when adaptation is as prominent on everyone’s radar as mitigation has been for years? Maybe it will become polarizing like mitigation, in which case we should have more of these conversations sooner rather than later.
Looking ahead, certain questions are crucial: As we engage in more adaptation efforts, what will we do with respect to mitigation? We cannot stop engaging in those vital activities to reduce greenhouse gases. On the other hand, the climate change train has left the station, so we have to adapt. But beware the false choice; we still have to slow the train down through more mitigation.
Theories offer competing predictions on whether engaging in adaptation will reduce our mitigation efforts. People may feel less urgency to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through mitigation if we interpret our adaptation as progress and preparedness, lessening our “felt need” to mitigate.
On the other hand, people may come to see both mitigation and adaptation as a commitment to doing all that is needed to cope with climate change, and view the two solution strategies as complementary rather than substitutes.
Ideally, adaptation is a gateway strategy for cooperation, a common ground for conversation and the beginnings of continued collaboration. Ideally, too, adaptation efforts will reveal more about the full costs of climate change. After all, action now and at the source (mitigation) is both cheaper and higher leverage than forever adapting into the future.
And now geoengineering – or deliberately altering the climate system, such as shielding the sun’s heat by injecting particles into the atmosphere – is looming as a possible third solution set. Crucially, geoengineering has a different risk matrix and unstudied implications, both scientific and psychological.
Only by understanding the psychology of climate change can we deploy optimal strategies and solution mixes that vary appropriately over time and across different geographies.

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