Australia's Greenhouse Emissions Rise 5pc In Two Years

AFR - Ben Potter

Australia's greenhouse gas emissions have increased 5 per cent in the past two years, leaving a huge task for the proposed National Energy Guarantee. Paul Rovere PTR

Australia's greenhouse gas emissions have increased 5 per cent in the past two years, leaving a huge task for the proposed National Energy Guarantee to meet Paris climate commitments.
National greenhouse emissions were 554 million tonnes of carbon dioxide this year, up from 527 million tonnes in 2015, the last year for which the government reported.
The latest projections show emissions steady at 551 million tonnes in 2020, and rising 3.5 per cent over the following decade to 570 million tonnes in 2030, if new policies such as the National Energy Guarantee and tough vehicle emissions standards are not vigorously implemented.
The worst offenders are the farming sector, where emissions are projected to jump 14 per cent to 82 million tonnes between now and 2030 thanks to rising stock numbers, and transport, projected to be up 11 per cent to 112 million tonnes as the population and economy grow.

National greenhouse gas emissions will continue to rise without new policies such as the national Energy Guarantee. Australia's emissions projections 2017

The cumulative emissions reduction task for the decade to 2030 has been reduced by about 120 million tonnes but still weighs in at a challenging 866 million tonnes to 934 million tonnes to meet the 26-28 per cent reduction on 2005 levels that the Turnbull government agreed at Paris.

Right trend
Despite the mixed progress to date, environment and energy minister Josh Frydenberg said the trend was in the right direction, with Australia on track to over achieve its 2020 emissions target of a 5 per cent reduction from 2000 levels by 294 million tonnes.
Mr Frydenberg said Australia continues to close the gap on the 2030 target, and a long-awaited Review of Climate Change Policies, also released on Tuesday, found that Australia had comprehensive policies for each significant sector of the economy.
He highlighted the Emissions Reduction Fund which has secured more than 191 million tonnes of abatement mostly in agriculture and land use, continuing work at the Ministerial Forum on Vehicle Emissions and the National Energy Productivity Plan which aims to boost energy efficiency by 40 per cent.

Huge task for the NEG: ESB chair Kerrie Schott, environment and energy minister Josh Frydenberg and Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull at the release of the government's new energy policy. AAP

In the electricity sector, where emissions have edged up to 190 million tonnes in the two years since the Abbott government repealed Labor's carbon tax, the government is counting on the National Energy Guarantee, which is still being designed and is yet to win the approval of several states who must agree before it can be implemented.

Electricity emissions flatline
Underlining the scale of the challenge in electricity, the sector's emissions are only projected to fall slightly, to 175 million tonnes in 2020 and 173 million tonnes in 2030, without new policies such as the energy guarantee and further progress in reducing Australia's energy use per capita and unit of GDP.
Electricity demand has been weak thanks to the closure of some large manufacturing and heavy industry, such as car assembly and aluminium smelters.

Agriculture and transport are the worst offenders, thanks to growing herd numbers and population and economic growth. Australia's emissions projections 2017

Emissions are also been held in check by the growth of wind and solar energy, the cost of which is falling faster than forecasters can track, at the expense of coal power; the closure of the heavily polluting Hazelwood brown coal plant in Victoria at the end of March saw electricity sector emissions fall 1.6 per cent in the June quarter.
But the policy responsible for a lot of the growth in wind and solar energy - the Renewable Energy Target - peaks in 2020 meaning there will be less incentive for new wind and solar projects beyond 2020.
Emissions from direct combustion by industry are also projected to increase slightly, from 97 million tonnes to 105 million tonnes in 2020 and 103 million tonnes in 2030, while emissions from industrial processes are projected to fall 6 per cent to 32 million tonnes from 2020 to 2030.
The review confirms that the government has decided "in principle" to allow polluting companies to buy foreign carbon credits after 2020 to manage their liabilities under a proposed emissions guarantee.

Trend is right: Minister for Environment and Energy Josh Frydenberg at Parliament House in Canberra on Friday 8 December 2017. fedpol Photo: Alex Ellinghausen

The national has made some progress but has a long way to go to meet its 2030 Paris climate commitments Australia's emissions projections 2017

Links

• Australia's greenhouse gas emissions increase for third consecutive year
• No policy change needed: climate review
• 2017 Review of Climate Change Policies (pdf)
• Australia’s emissions projections 2017 (pdf)
• Australia’s emissions projections 2016 (pdf)

Trump Officially Removes Climate Change From List Of Global Threats

The Independent - Alexandra Wilts

'America is in the game, and America is going to win'

President Donald Trump speaks on national security, Monday, Dec. 18, 2017, in Washington AP

In another departure from his predecessor Barack Obama, President Donald Trump has removed climate change as a global threat in his new national security strategy – a plan that prioritises economic and military might and paints China and Russia as competitors that want to shape global events to match their interests.
Echoing his 2016 presidential campaign message, the President declared in a speech introducing his strategy: “America is in the game, and America is going to win.”
The remarks at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington were largely another reiteration of his “America First” doctrine, which emphasises national sovereignty and the economic implications of global participation. Officials have said the core principles of the strategy have already been put into practice.

While discussing his strategy, Mr Trump seemed to envision nations in constant competition and brushed aside Obama-era warnings on climate change. The President also stressed that the US would defend its sovereignty at all costs, even if that meant ripping up existing agreements. 

The strategy focuses on four main themes: protecting the homeland, promoting American prosperity, demonstrating peace through strength and advancing American influence in an ever-competitive world. 

Along with listing off the threat of rogue regimes like North Korea, Mr Trump said, “We also face rival powers, Russia and China, that seek to challenge American influence, values, and wealth.” 

“We will attempt to build a great partnership with those and other countries, but in a manner that always protects our national interest,” he added. 

He then noted how Russian President Vladimir Putin had called him the previous day to thank America for intelligence the CIA had provided regarding a planned terror attack in St Petersburg. 

“Many people, perhaps in the thousands, could have been killed,” Mr Trump said. “They were able to apprehend these terrorists before the event, with no loss of life. And that’s a great thing, and the way it’s supposed to work. That is the way it’s supposed to work.”

He continued: “But while we seek such opportunities of cooperation, we will stand up for ourselves, and we will stand up for our country like we have never stood up before.” 

Both China and Russia have sought to “change the status quo”, according to Trump administration officials, in a manner the US opposes and could challenge American interests. As examples, an official cited Chinese military expansion and island-building in the South China Sea and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.

Mr Trump also made the decision to exclude climate change from a list of global threats in his strategy. The Obama administration had first included the phenomenon, said to be a major cause of the recent massive wildfires in California, in its own national strategy in 2015. 

The strategy sets a goal of being an “energy-dominant nation” but does say the US “recognises the importance of environmental stewardship”. 

In his speech, the closest Mr Trump came to mentioning the topic of climate change was in his reference to his decision to pull out of the landmark Paris climate accord, which was aimed at fighting global warming. 

The move was criticised by world leaders, but the US President maintains that the agreement is “very expensive and unfair” for the US. Opponents of Mr Trump’s decision have said the President is forsaking America’s role as a global leader by withdrawing from the deal. 

But Mr Trump on Monday faulted previous US leaders for failing to look out for the nation’s citizens.

Mr Trump stressed his “serious plan to defend our homeland”, again calling for the construction of a border wall with Mexico and pledging to end “chain migration” of immigrants’ relatives and to close “loopholes that undermine enforcement” of immigration restrictions. 

He also said that for the first time, American strategy recognises that economic security is national security. This calls for cutting taxes and rolling back unnecessary regulations, he said.

Links

• Trump’s decision to ignore climate change’s threat endangers everyone
• Trump drops climate change from national security strategy
• Under Trump, climate change not a national security threat
• Ignoring Public Opinion and Pentagon, Trump Denies Climate Change Is Threat to National Security
• Trump's national security plan scraps climate change, confirms US will defend sovereignty at all costs

Climate Scientists And Policymakers Need To Trust Each Other (But Not Too Much)

The Conversation - Rebecca Colvin | Christopher Cvitanovic | Justine Lacey | Mark Howden

Trust is everything. oneinchpunch/Shutterstock.com

At a time when the effects of climate change are accelerating and published science overwhelmingly supports the view that humans are responsible for the rate of change, powerful groups remain in denial across politics, the media, and industry.
Now more than ever, we need scientists and policymakers to work together to create and implement effective policy which is informed by the most recent and reliable evidence.
We know that trust between scientists and policymakers is important in developing policy that is informed by scientific evidence. But how do you build this trust, and how do you make sure that it genuinely leads to positive outcomes for society?
In response to these questions, our recent Perspective in Nature Climate Change explores the dynamics of trust at the interface of climate science and policy.
We suggest that while trust is an important component of the science-policy dynamic, there can be such a thing as “too much” trust between scientists and policymakers.
Understanding this dynamic is crucial if we are to deliver positive outcomes for science, policy, and the society that depends on their cooperation.

What happens when there is ‘too much’ trust?
Trust between climate scientists (researchers in a range of disciplines, institutions, and organisational settings) and policymakers (civil servants in government departments or agencies who shape climate policy) is useful because it enhances the flow of information between them. In a trusting relationship, we can expect to see a scientist explaining a new finding directly to a policymaker, or a policymaker describing future information needs to a scientist.
Together, this arrangement ideally gives us science-led policy, and policy-relevant science.
But as scholars of trust have warned, there is a point beyond which these positive benefits of trust can turn sour.
Think about a hypothetical situation in which a scientist and policy-maker come to trust each other deeply. What happens if one of them starts to become loose with the facts, or fails to adhere to professional standards? Is their trusting counterpart more, or less, likely to identify the poor behaviour and respond appropriately?
Over time, a trusting relationship may evolve into a self-perpetuating belief of trustworthiness based on the history of the relationship. This is where scientists and policymakers may find themselves in a situation of “too much” trust.
We know that science advances by consensus, and that this consensus is shaped by rigorous research and review, and intense debate and scrutiny. But what if (as in the hypothetical example described above) a policy-maker’s trust in an individual scientist means they bypass the consensus and instead depend on that one scientist for new information? What happens if that scientist is – intentionally or unintentionally – wrong?

More trust is not always best. ‘Too much’ trust can cause perverse outcomes at the science-policy interface. Adapted from Stevens et al. (2015)

When you have “too much” trust, the benefits of trust can instead manifest as perverse outcomes, such as “blind faith” commitments between parties. In a situation like this, a policymaker may trust an individual scientist so much that they do not look for signs of misconduct, such as the misrepresentation of findings.
Favouritism and “capture” may mean that some policymakers provide information about future research support only to selected scientists, denying these opportunities to others. At the same time, scientists may promote only their own stream of research instead of outlining the range of perspectives in the field to the policymakers, narrowing the scope of what science enters the policy area.
“Cognitive lock-in” might result, where a policymaker sticks to a failing policy because they feel committed to the scientist who first recommended the course of action. For example, state-of-the-art climate forecasting tools are available in the Pacific but are reportedly underused. This is partly because the legacy of trusting relationships between scientists and policymakers in the region has led them to continue relying on less sophisticated tools.
“Too much” trust can also lead to overly burdensome obligations between scientists and policymakers. A scientist may come to hold unrealistically high expectations of the level of information a policymaker can share, or a policymaker may desire the production of research by an unfeasible deadline.

What’s the right way to trust?
With this awareness of the potentially negative outcomes of “too much” trust, should we abandon trust at the climate science-policy interface all together?
No. But we can – and should – develop, monitor, and manage trust with acknowledgement of how “too much” trust may lead to perverse outcomes for both scientists and policy-makers.
We should aim for a state of “optimal trust”, which enjoys the benefits of a trusting relationship while avoiding the pitfalls of taking too trusting an approach.
We propose five key strategies for managing trust at the climate science-policy interface.

• Be explicit about expectations for trust in a climate science-policy relationship. Climate scientists and policy-makers should clarify protocols and expectations about behaviour through open discussion as early as possible within the relationship.
• Transparency and accountability, especially when things go wrong, are critical to achieving and maintaining a state of optimal trust. When things do go wrong, trust repair can right the relationship.
• Implement systems for monitoring trust, such as discussion groups within scientific and policy organisations and processes of peer review. Such approaches can help to identify the effects of “too much” trust – such as capture, cognitive lock-in, or unrealistically high expectations.
• Manage staff churn in policy and scientific organisations. When scientists or policy-makers change role or institution, handing over the trusting relationships can help positive legacies and practices to carry on.
• Use intermediaries such as knowledge brokers to facilitate the flow of information between science and policy. Such specialists can promote fairness and honesty at the science-policy interface, increasing the probability of maintaining ‘optimal trust’.

Embracing strategies such as these would be a positive step toward managing trust between scientists and policymakers, both in climate policy and beyond.
In this time of contested science and highly politicised policy agendas, all of us in science and policy have a responsibility to ensure we act ethically and appropriately to achieve positive outcomes for society.

Links

• Nature v technology: climate ‘belief’ is politics, not science
• Is this the moment that climate politics and public opinion finally match up?
• After Bonn, 5 things to watch for in the coming year of global climate policy
• Why remote Antarctica is so important in a warming world
• Why meeting the Paris climate goals is an existential threat to fossil fuel industries
• How citizens are fighting climate change on the global stage