08/02/2019

When Extreme Weather Wipes Out Wildlife, The Fallout Can Last For Years

The Conversation | 

Dozens of brumbies were found dead near Santa Teresa in Australia’s remote interior. AAP Image
The recent heatwaves have proved deadly to many Australian animals, from feral horses to flying foxes.
And it’s not just heatwaves that can cause mass die-offs. Last year, flooding rain wiped out entire Antarctic penguin colonies, while drought has previously caused mass mangrove diebacks around the Gulf of Carpentaria.
These events generate headlines, but what about the aftermath? And are these catastrophic events part of a wider pattern?
Our research describes how species have responded to extreme weather events over the past 70 years. These responses can tell us a great deal about how species are likely to cope with change in the frequency and intensity of extreme events in coming years.
We reviewed 517 studies, dating back to 1941 and conducted throughout the world, that examined how birds, mammals, fish, amphibians, reptiles, invertebrates or plants have responded to droughts, cyclones, floods, heatwaves, and cold snaps.
We found more than 100 cases of dramatic population declines. In a quarter of these cases, population numbers showed no sign of recovery long after the event. And in most cases, extreme events reduced populations of common species that play an important role in maintaining ecosystem integrity.
For example, extreme drought in the 2000s drove massive population declines of invertebrate freshwater species across Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin, and populations of buffalo, waterbuck, and kudu along the Zambezi River in Zimbabwe suffered severe and persistent declines following droughts in the 1980s.
We also found 31 cases of populations completely disappearing after an extreme event. Large populations of lizards and spiders were eradicated after Hurricane Lilli struck the Bahamas in 1996, for example. These populations had begun to recover one year after Lilli, but in half of all the cases of local population extinction, the species was still absent years or decades after exposure to an extreme event.
Negative responses were the most commonly reported, and also included habitat loss, declines in species numbers, and declines in reproductive fitness after an extreme event. These impacts clearly pose a serious risk to the longevity of many species, and to threatened species in particular. Kosciuszko National Park, for example, is a stronghold for the endangered northern corroboree frog, but 42% of its breeding sites in the park were rendered unusable by severe drought conditions throughout the 2000s.

Is there an upside?
Alongside the many negative impacts, we also found a larger‐than‐expected number of positive or neutral responses to extreme events (21% of all responses). This is a reminder that natural disturbances from extreme events often play a crucial role in the natural dynamics of an ecosystem.
Unfortunately, however, in many cases it was invasive species that benefited from extreme events. Flooding in southern Minnesota in 2004, for example, led to the rapid incursion of invasive green sunfish into streams, and cyclones accelerated the invasion of sweet pittosporum in Jamaican rainforests in the 1990s.
Cases of extreme events benefiting threatened species were uncommon, but included rainforest frogs becoming less susceptible to a fungal pathogen, chytrid fungus, after cyclones reduced rainforest canopy cover.
We also identified a range of “ambiguous” responses, including changes in diet or foraging behaviour, and changes in the types of species inhabiting a study area. Changes in invertebrate communities were particularly prevalent (87 cases). In 18 of these cases, the changes were long-lasting. However, most of the studies we reviewed lasted less than one year, and did not monitor for long-term recovery following an extreme event. This limits our ability to assess the long-term implications of extreme events on the species composition of ecosystems.

Avoiding future impacts
The one failsafe option for helping species cope with extreme events is to retain intact habitats, as these are the places where species are most resilient to extreme events. Intact habitats are contiguous areas of water or native vegetation that often span various altitudes, temperatures and rainfall patterns. These places can also act as important refuges for species that rely on long breaks between extreme events to recover.
Where intact habitat protection is not possible, restoring land or seascapes can also help species to adapt to extreme events. For example, long-term restoration efforts (that is, those that will be effective for at least 15 years) in brackish marshes help plant and animal communities cope with drought events.
Ecological restoration that helps species to adapt to extreme events can also benefit humans too. For instance, coastal communities can use oyster reefs or seagrass beds to guard against flooding.
Climate change has already increased the intensity and frequency of extreme events across the world, and the trend is expected to accelerate in the future. Recognising the importance of planning for extreme events is essential for helping species cope with climate change. Building resilience to extreme events may also provide an opportunity to reduce the vulnerability of humans too.
Governments, local councils, and local communities are under increasing pressure to plan for extreme climate events. We now need similar recognition of the importance of extreme events in threatened species planning efforts. Right now, this planning is virtually non-existent, and that needs to change.

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David Wallace-Wells - ‘The Devastation Of Human Life Is In View’: What A Burning World Tells Us About Climate Change

The GuardianDavid Wallace-Wells

I was wilfully deluded until I began covering global warming, says David Wallace-Wells. But extreme heat could transform the planet by 2100
A forest fire burns on a hill in Monchique, Portugal, August 2018. Photograph: Filipe Farinha/EPA
I have never been an environmentalist. I don’t even think of myself as a nature person. I’ve lived my whole life in cities, enjoying gadgets built by industrial supply chains I hardly think twice about. I’ve never gone camping, not willingly anyway, and while I always thought it was basically a good idea to keep streams clean and air clear, I also accepted the proposition that there was a trade-off between economic growth and cost to nature – and figured, well, in most cases I’d go for growth. I’m not about to personally slaughter a cow to eat a hamburger, but I’m also not about to go vegan. In these ways – many of them, at least – I am like every other American who has spent their life fatally complacent, and wilfully deluded, about climate change, which is not just the biggest threat human life on the planet has ever faced, but a threat of an entirely different category and scale. That is, the scale of human life itself.
A few years ago, I began collecting stories of climate change, many of them terrifying, gripping, uncanny narratives, with even the most small-scale sagas playing like fables: a group of Arctic scientists trapped when melting ice isolated their research centre on an island also populated by a group of polar bears; a Russian boy killed by anthrax released from a thawing reindeer carcass that had been trapped in permafrost for many decades. At first, it seemed the news was inventing a new genre of allegory. But of course climate change is not an allegory. Beginning in 2011, about a million Syrian refugees were unleashed on Europe by a civil war inflamed by climate change and drought; in a very real sense, much of the “populist moment” the west is passing through now is the result of panic produced by the shock of those migrants. The likely flooding of Bangladesh threatens to create 10 times as many, or more, received by a world that will be even further destabilised by climate chaos – and, one suspects, less receptive the browner those in need. And then there will be the refugees from sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the rest of south Asia – 140 million by 2050, the World Bank estimates, more than 10 times the Syrian crisis.
My file of stories grew daily, but very few of the clips, even those drawn from new research published in the most pedigreed scientific journals, seemed to appear in the coverage about climate change we watched on television and read in newspapers. Climate change was reported, of course, and even with some tinge of alarm. But the discussion of possible effects was misleadingly narrow, limited almost invariably to the matter of sea level rise. Just as worrisome, the coverage was sanguine, all things considered.
One California fire burned so quickly, evacuees sprinting past exploding cars found their sneakers melting to the asphalt
As recently as the 1997 signing of the landmark Kyoto Protocol, 2C of global warming was considered the threshold of catastrophe: flooded cities, crippling droughts and heatwaves, a planet battered daily by hurricanes and monsoons we used to call “natural disasters” but will soon normalise as simply “bad weather”. More recently, the foreign minister of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific offered another name for that level of warming: “genocide”.
There is almost no chance we will avoid that scenario. The Kyoto Protocol achieved, practically, nothing; in the 20 years since, despite all our climate advocacy and legislation and progress on green energy, we have produced more emissions than in the 20 years before.
In reading about warming, you will often come across analogies from the planetary record: the last time the planet was this much warmer, the logic runs, sea levels were here. These conditions are not coincidences. The geologic record is the best model we have for understanding the very complicated climate system, and gauging just how much damage will come from turning up the temperature. Which is why it is especially concerning that recent research into the deep history of the planet suggests that our current climate models may be underestimating the amount of warming we are due for in 2100 by as much as half. The authors of one recent paper suggested that slashing our emissions could still bring us to 4 or 5C, a scenario, they said, would pose severe risks to the habitability of the entire planet. “Hothouse Earth, they called it.
Because these numbers are so small, we tend to trivialise the differences between them – one, two, four, five. But, as with world wars or recurrences of cancer, you don’t want to see even one. At 2C, the ice sheets will begin their collapse, bringing, over centuries, 50 metres of sea-level rise. An additional 400 million people will suffer from water scarcity, major cities in the equatorial band of the planet will become unlivable, and even in the northern latitudes heatwaves will kill thousands each summer. There would be 32 times as many extreme heatwaves in India, and each would last five times as long, exposing 93 times more people. This is our best-case scenario. At 3C, southern Europe would be in permanent drought, and the average drought in Central America would last 19 months longer. In northern Africa, the figure is 60 months longer: five years. At 4C, there would be 8m more cases of dengue fever each year in Latin America alone and close to annual global food crises. Damages from river flooding would grow thirtyfold in Bangladesh, twentyfold in India, and as much as sixtyfold in the UK. Globally, damages from climate-driven natural disasters could pass $600tn – more than twice the wealth that exists in the world today. Conflict and warfare could double.
Global warming may seem like a distended morality tale playing out over several centuries and inflicting a kind of Old Testament retribution on the great-great-grandchildren of those responsible, since it was carbon burning in 18th-century England that lit the fuse of everything that has followed. But that is a fable about historical villainy that acquits those of us alive today – and unfairly. The majority of the burning has come in the last 25 years – since the premiere of Seinfeld. Since the end of the second world war, the figure is about 85%. The story of the industrial world’s kamikaze mission is the story of a single lifetime – the planet brought from seeming stability to the brink of catastrophe in the years between a baptism or barmitzvah and a funeral.
Between that scenario and the world we live in now lies only the question of human response. Some amount of further warming is already baked in, thanks to the protracted processes by which the planet adapts to greenhouse gas. But all of the paths projected from the present will be defined by what we choose to do now. If we do nothing about carbon emissions, if the next 30 years of industrial activity trace the same arc upward as the last 30 years, whole regions will become unlivable as soon as the end of this century. Of course, the assaults of climate change do not end at 2100 just because most modelling, by convention, sunsets at that point. In fact, they could accelerate, not just because there’d be more carbon in the atmosphere then, but because increased temperatures could trigger feedback loops that might send the climate system spiralling out of control. This is why some studying global warming call the hundred years to follow the “century of hell”.
It would take a spectacular coincidence of bad choices and bad luck to make a completely uninhabitable Earth possible within our lifetime. But the fact that we have brought that eventuality into play at all is perhaps the overwhelming cultural and historical fact of the modern era. Whatever we do to stop warming, and however aggressively we act to protect ourselves from its ravages, we will have pulled the devastation of human life on Earth into view – close enough that we can see clearly what it would look like, and know, with some degree of precision, how it will punish our children and grandchildren. Close enough, in fact, that we are already beginning to feel its effects ourselves, when we do not turn away.

In southern California, December is meant to bring the start of rainy season. Not in 2017. The Thomas fire, the worst of those that roiled the region that year, grew 50,000 acres in one day, eventually burning 440 sq miles and forcing the evacuations of more than 100,000 Californians. A week after it was sparked, it remained, in the ominous semi-clinical language of wildfires, merely “15% contained”. For a poetic approximation, it was not a bad estimate of how much of a handle we have on the forces of climate change. That is to say, hardly any.
Five of the 20 worst fires in California history hit the state in the autumn of 2017, a year in which more than 9,000 separate ones broke out, burning through almost 1.25m acres – nearly 2,000 sq miles made soot. That October, in northern California, 172 fires broke out in just two days – devastation so cruel and sweeping that two different accounts were published in two different local newspapers of two different ageing couples taking desperate cover in pools as the fires swallowed their homes. One couple survived, emerging after six excruciating hours to find their house transformed into an ash monument; in the other account, it was only the husband who emerged, his wife of 55 years having died in his arms.
Smoke rises behind a destroyed apartment complex after the Thomas fire ripped through Ventura, California. It was the worst fire in the state in 2017, burning 440 sq miles. Photograph: Noah Berger/AP
In the summer of 2018, the fires were fewer in number, totalling only 6,000. But just one, made up of a whole network of fires, together called the Mendocino Complex, burned almost half a million acres alone. In total, nearly 3,000 sq miles in the state turned to flame, and smoke blanketed almost half the country. Things were worse to the north, in British Columbia, where more than 3m acres burned, producing smoke that would travel across the Atlantic to Europe. Then, in November, came the Woolsey Fire, which forced the evacuation of 170,000, and the Camp Fire, which was somehow worse, burning through more than 200 square miles and incinerating an entire town so quickly that the evacuees, 50,000 of them, found themselves sprinting past exploding cars, their sneakers melting to the asphalt as they ran. It was the deadliest fire in Californian history.
Two big forces conspire to prevent us from normalising fires like these, though neither is exactly a cause for celebration. The first is that extreme weather won’t let us, since it won’t stabilise; even within a decade, it’s a fair bet that these fires, which now occupy the nightmares of every Californian, will be thought of as the “old normal”. The good old days.
The second force is also contained in the story of the wildfires: the way that climate change is finally striking close to home. Some quite special homes. The California fires of 2017 burned the state’s wine crop, blowtorched million-dollar vacation properties, and threatened both the Getty Museum and Rupert Murdoch’s Bel-Air estate. There may not be two better symbols of the imperiousness of American money than those two structures. Nearby Disneyland was quickly canopied by an eerily apocalyptic orange sky. On local golf courses, the west coast’s wealthy swung their clubs just yards from blazing fires in photographs that could not have been more perfectly staged to skewer the country’s indifferent plutocracy. Last year, Americans watched the Kardashians evacuate via Instagram stories, then read about the private firefighting forces they employed, the rest of the state reliant on a public force full of conscripted convicts earning as little as a dollar a day.
In Sweden, forests in the Arctic Circle went up in flames. Fires that far north are increasing more rapidly than in lower altitudes
By accidents of geography and by the force of its wealth, the US has, to this point, been mostly protected from the devastation climate change has already visited on parts of the less developed world. The fact that warming is now hitting its wealthiest citizens is not just an opportunity for ugly bursts of liberal schadenfreude; it is also a sign of just how hard, and how indiscriminately, it is hitting. All of a sudden, it’s getting a lot harder to protect against what’s coming.
What is coming? Much more fire, much more often, burning much more land. American wildfires now burn twice as much land as they did as recently as 1970. By 2050, destruction from wildfires is expected to double again. For every additional degree of global warming, it could quadruple. At three degrees of warming, our likely benchmark for the end of the century, the US might be dealing with 16 times as much devastation from fire as we are today, when in a single year 10m acres were burned. The California fire captain believes the term is already outdated: “We don’t even call it fire season any more,” he said in 2017. “Take the ‘season’ out – it’s year-round.”But wildfires are not an American affliction; they are a global pandemic. Each year, between 260,000 and 600,000 people worldwide die from the smoke they produce. In icy Greenland, fires in 2017 appeared to burn 10 times more area than in 2014; and in Sweden, in 2018, forests in the Arctic Circle went up in flames. Fires that far north may seem innocuous, relatively speaking, since there are not so many people there. But they are increasing more rapidly than fires in lower latitudes, and they concern climate scientists greatly: the soot and ash they give off can blacken ice sheets, which then absorb more of the sun’s rays and melt more quickly. Another Arctic fire broke out on the Russia-Finland border in 2018, and smoke from Siberian fires that summer reached all the way to the mainland US. That same month, the 21st century’s second-deadliest wildfire swept through the Greek seaside, killing 100. At one resort, dozens of guests tried to escape the flames by descending a narrow stone staircase into the Aegean, only to be engulfed along the way, dying literally in each other’s arms. There were record-breaking fires in the UK, as well, including one on Saddleworth Moor that was thought to be defeated – until it emerged again from the forest’s peat floor, to become the largest British wildfire in living memory.
A firefighting helicopter tackles a blaze in a suburb of Athens last year. Photograph: Alexandros Vlachos/EPA 
The effects of these fires are not linear or neatly additive. It might be more accurate to say that they initiate a new set of biological cycles. Scientists warn that the probability of unprecedented rainfalls will grow, too – as much as a threefold increase of events like that which produced the state’s Great Flood of 1862. Mudslides are among the clearest illustrations of what new horrors that heralds; in January 2018, Santa Barbara’s low-lying homes were pounded by the mountains’ detritus cascading down the hillside toward the ocean in an endless brown river. One father, in a panic, put his young children up on his kitchen’s marble countertop, thinking it the strongest feature of the house, then watched as a rolling boulder smashed through the bedroom where the children had been just moments before. One child who didn’t make it was found close to two miles from his home, in a gulley traced by train tracks close to the waterfront, having been carried there, presumably, on a continuous wave of mud. Two miles.
It gets worse. When trees die – by natural processes, by fire, at the hands of humans – they release into the atmosphere the carbon stored within them, sometimes for as long as centuries. In this way, they are like coal. This is why the effect of wildfires on emissions is among the most feared climate feedback loops – that the world’s forests, which have typically been carbon sinks, would become carbon sources, unleashing all that stored gas. The impact can be especially dramatic when the fires ravage forests arising out of peat. Peatland fires in Indonesia in 1997, for instance, released up to 2.6 gigatons (Gt) of carbon – 40% of the average annual global emissions level. And more burning only means more warming only means more burning. Wildfires make a mockery of the technocratic approach to emissions reduction.
In the Amazon, 100,000 fires were found to be burning in 2017. At present, its trees take in a quarter of all the carbon absorbed by the planet’s forests each year. But in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro was elected president of Brazil, promising to open the rainforest to development – which is to say, deforestation. How much damage can one person do to the planet? A group of Brazilian scientists has estimated that between 2021 and 2030, Bolsonaro’s deforestation would release the equivalent of 13.12 Gt of carbon. In 2017, the US, with all of its aeroplanes and automobiles and coal plants, emitted about 5 Gt.
This is not simply about wildfires; each climate threat promises to trigger similarly brutal cycles. The fires should be terrorising enough, but it is the cascading chaos that reveals the true cruelty of climate change – it can upend and turn violently against us everything we have ever thought to be stable. Homes become weapons, roads become death traps, air becomes poison. And the idyllic mountain vistas around which generations of entrepreneurs and speculators have assembled entire resort communities become, themselves, indiscriminate killers.
Trees in the Brazilian Amazon are felled, then burned. Scientists estimate that, by 2030, this could create three times the carbon emissions produced by the US in a year. Photograph: Avalon/UIG via Getty Images
And yet I am optimistic
Since I first began writing about warming, I’ve often been asked whether I see any reason for optimism. The thing is, I am optimistic.
Warming of 3 or 3.5C is, I’d wager, the likeliest range this century, given conventional decarbonisation and the existing – dispiriting – pace of change. It would unleash suffering beyond anything that humans have ever experienced. But it is not a fatalistic scenario; in fact, it’s a whole lot better than where we are headed without action – north of 4C by 2100, and the perhaps six or even more degrees of warming in the centuries to come. We may conjure new soutions, in the form of carbon-capture technology, which would extract CO2 from the air, or geoengineering, which would cool the planet by suspending gas in the atmosphere, or other now-unfathomable innovations. These could bring the planet closer to a state we would today regard as merely grim, rather than apocalyptic.
I’ve often been asked whether it’s moral to reproduce in this climate, whether it is fair to the planet or, perhaps more importantly, to the children. As it happens, last year I had a child, Rocca. Part of that choice was delusion, that same wilful blindness: I know there are climate horrors to come, some of which will inevitably be visited on her. But those horrors are not yet scripted. The fight is, definitively, not yet lost – in fact, will never be lost, so long as we avoid extinction. And I have to admit, I am also excited, for everything that Rocca and her sisters and brothers will see, will witness, will do.
She will be entering old age at the close of the century, the endstage bookmark on all of our projections for warming. In between, she will watch the world doing battle with a genuinely existential threat, and the people of her generation making a future for themselves, and the generations they bring into being, on this planet. And she won’t just be watching it, she will be living it – quite literally the greatest story ever told. It may well bring a happy ending.
Western liberals contort their consumption into performances of moral or environmental purity – less beef, more Teslas, fewer flights
Climate change is not an ancient crime we are tasked with solving now; we are destroying our planet every day, often with one hand as we conspire to restore it with the other. Which means we can also stop destroying it, in the same style – collectively, haphazardly, in all the most quotidian ways, in addition to the spectacular-seeming ones. The project of unplugging the entire industrial world from fossil fuels is intimidating, and must be done in fairly short order – by 2040, many scientists say, with others guessing 2050. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says we’ll need to halve our carbon emissions by 2030 to avoid catastrophe. In the meantime, many avenues are open – wide open, if we are not too lazy and too blinkered and too selfish to embark upon them.
Perhaps as much as half of British emissions, one report recently calculated, come from inefficiencies in construction, discarded and unused food, electronics, and clothing; two-thirds of US energy is wasted; globally, according to one paper, we are subsidising the fossil fuel business to the tune of $5tn each year. None of that has to continue. Americans waste a quarter of their food, which means the carbon footprint of the average meal is a third larger than it has to be. That need not continue. Five years ago, hardly anyone outside the darkest corners of the internet had even heard of bitcoin; today, mining it consumes more electricity than is generated by all the world’s solar panels combined, which means that in just a few years we’ve assembled a programme to wipe out the gains of several long, hard generations of green energy innovation. It did not have to be that way. And a simple change to the algorithm could eliminate that bitcoin footprint entirely.
These are just a few of the reasons to believe that climate nihilism is, in fact, another of our delusions. What happens, from here, will be entirely our own doing. The planet’s future will be determined in large part by the arc of growth in the developing world – that’s where most of the people are, in China and India and, increasingly, sub-Saharan Africa. But this is no absolution for the west, which accounts for the lion’s share of historical emissions, and where the average citizen produces many times more than almost anyone in Asia, just out of habit. I toss out tons of wasted food and hardly ever recycle; I leave my air-conditioning on; I bought into bitcoin at the peak of the market. None of that is necessary, either.
But it also isn’t necessary for westerners to adopt the lifestyle of the global poor. It’s estimated that 70% of the energy produced by the planet is lost as waste heat. If the world’s richest 10% were limited to the average European footprint, global emissions would fall by a third. And why shouldn’t they be? Almost as a prophylactic against climate guilt, as the news from science has grown bleaker, western liberals have comforted themselves by contorting their own consumption patterns into performances of moral or environmental purity – less beef, more Teslas, fewer transatlantic flights. But the climate calculus is such that individual lifestyle choices do not add up to much, unless they are scaled by politics. That should not be impossible, once we understand the stakes.
Annihilation is only the very thin tail of warming’s very long bell curve, and there is nothing stopping us from steering clear of it.

This is an edited extract from The Uninhabitable Earth: A Story Of The Future, by David Wallace-Wells

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David Wallace-Wells On Climate: ‘People Should Be Scared – I'm Scared’

The Guardian

The journalist and author has claimed climate change will soon render the world uninhabitable, leading his supporters to say he’s telling the terrifying truth and critics to brand him a reckless alarmist. Why is he so worried?
David Wallace-Wells: ‘I am motivated by fear.’ Photograph: Linda Nylind/The Guardian 
David Wallace-Wells’s apocalyptic depiction of a world made uninhabitable by climate chaos caused an outcry when it was published in New York magazine in 2017.
Based on the worst-case scenarios foreseen by science, his article portrayed a world of drought, plague and famine, in which acidified oceans drown coastal homelands, dormant diseases are released from ancient ice, conflicts surge, economies collapse, human cognitive abilities decline and heat stress becomes more intolerable in New York City than in present-day Bahrain.
Critics called this irresponsibly alarmist. Supporters said it was a long-overdue antidote to climate complacency. Whatever your view, it was among the best-read climate articles in US history.
Now he is back with a book-length follow-up.

Jonathan Watts: You have written a hell of a book. Your now-famous opening lines – “It’s worse, much worse, than you think” – are like a voice from a nightmare. Are you deliberately upsetting people about the climate?
David Wallace-Wells: That is one of the intentions. My hope is first of all to tell the story as I see it. That has a couple of components. One is to show the crisis is happening much faster and is more all-encompassing than people think. And then also to think how those dramatic changes are going to cascade through the lives we live, the way we relate to one another, our politics, our culture, our psychology, all that stuff. I would like people to be scared of what is possible because I’m scared. And because I am motivated by fear, I also hope they will be motivated.

The sense of speed comes across very strongly. It is as if people have got used to seeing the climate crisis as an old horror film with slow-lurching zombies but, in your version, the zombies are the much faster, scarier ones you see in modern horror films. You address the risks of heat death, hunger, drowning, wildfire, dying oceans, economic collapse and conflict, and suggest the climate problem driving them has super-accelerated beyond what many people think.
That is the thing that first opened my eyes to the change. When I learned the astonishing fact that more than half of the carbon we have emitted into the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels was emitted in the past 25 years, that really shocked me. This means we have burned more fossil fuels since the UN established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) than in all of the centuries before – so we have done more damage knowingly than we ever managed in ignorance. That is a horrifying fact. It also means we are engineering our own devastation practically in real time. How much will depend on how we act, how we behave, how we respond.
A lignite-fired power station in Poland. Photograph: Florian Gaertner/Photothek via Getty Images 
The book is based on the piece you wrote for New York magazine last year that focused on worst-case climate scenarios. Were you prepared for the storm that caused?
It had about 6m page views. Within a couple of days, it was the most-read article we had ever published. It was a true phenomenon. That was thrilling in a way because the conventional wisdom about climate writing – at least in American journalism – was that it was traffic Kryptonite, that nobody would read these stories. I felt that was in part because we had left a lot of storytelling tools on the table and weren’t embracing a certain kind of writing that might reach people dramatically. I felt the article was a proof of concept for that.

In the book, you focus more on warming of around 2-4C, which is more likely than the worst-case scenarios, though still bad enough. Was this different approach an attempt to tighten up because there was quite a lot of scientific pushback on some of the claims you made in the original article?
I had anticipated a pushback. I wrote in the original article about scientific reticence and the way many researchers were reluctant to talk about their own scary findings in public in the terms they might have included in their papers. But I do not feel the science of my story was irresponsible. We ended up publishing four corrections to the piece. What it motivated me to do – and not just me, but my fact checker and the editor – was to publish this fully annotated version of the piece within a couple of days, in which we footnoted every fact with a paper. I do believe that basically answered that first reflexive criticism of the piece as being scientifically irresponsible.

There were also questions about rhetoric. Scientists said your article was “hyperbolic” and “exaggerated”, and your alarmism was as irresponsible as climate denial. In the book, you are unapologetic. You write: “The facts are hysterical” and the only way to address them is with the language of theology and mythology. Is this Armaggeddonising a way to reach new audiences and break down barriers?
Yes, and to activate people who are only casually engaged. To me, that is the most important messaging mission. It is important to mobilise people who at the moment are concerned, but basically complacent, and turn them into people who are much more activated and essentially voting about climate as a first-order political priority rather than a third- or fourth-order priority – judging politicians on the basis of their climate policy.

Disruption is important. But to what extent? You talk of last year’s UN IPCC 1.5C report. It is a science paper and it is sober. It spells out the huge – and horrifying – differences between 1.5C and 2C of warming, and the actions we need to take right now if we are to avoid the extra half a degree, which will require a 45% reduction in emissions by 2030. You say the message of the report is: “It’s OK now to freak out.” But I guess most scientists would say: “Don’t freak out! Act! Focus! Do not succumb to paralysing fear.” Is “freak out” what you really mean?
The short answer is yes. We should not sit back and feel complacent that the world beyond us will figure this out without political pressure. We cannot continue on the path we are on and believe our future will be secure and stable. We need to dramatically change our climate policy globally. That was the very clear message of the UN report. You are right that, in a certain way, it was written soberly, but it is also the case that it was saying we need mobilisation on the scale that we saw in the second world war in Europe and the US – and that is not a keep-calm message. It is saying we have to light the fuse and get going.
On the question of what kind of motivation is most effective, I don’t believe fear and alarm are the only options; there is a place for hope and optimism. There are many shades in between. But fear is what animated me. We do not tell people only about the positive benefits of quitting smoking. We tell them about what will happen to them if they smoke. And to go back to the second world war analogy, we did not mobilise in that way because we were optimistic about the future. We mobilised in that way out of fear, because we thought nazism was an existential threat. And climate change is obviously an existential threat and it is naive to imagine we could respond to it without some people being scared. I think it is silly to throw that rhetorical tool away. My basic perspective is that any story that sticks is a good one. If you can get people engaged, it is good, however you do it.
But I also come to this subject not as an advocate, not as an environmentalist. I have been drawn into that role to some extent as a result of this work. I come into it as a journalist and as a storyteller and, at some level, the imperative for me is to tell the story true, to tell it as I see it. As you say, and as I wrote in the book, it is simply the case that the facts are hysterical. To shy away from that, I think, is irresponsible – in part because it would encourage complacency but also from the basic truth-telling level. We know these things are true to the extent that scientists can know them. I don’t think the public should be shielded from them.
David Wallace-Wells: ‘Air travel is the one thing that I really do feel guilty about.’ Photograph: Daniel Leal-Olivas/AFP/Getty Images 
What struck me in the book was that you shake the reader up and say, “Look, wake up, get going!”, and yet there isn’t much there in terms of where to go next. You delved into solutions, but you didn’t give them much chance of achieving anything. Do you believe there isn’t much out there that could help us?
I think the book does a fair amount of hope-giving. The most important thing anybody can do is vote. If people are mobilised, we can relatively quickly usher in – perhaps not globally, but in many of the more important nations – a much stronger commitment to a more aggressive climate policy.
My hope is that the US and China, with support from some other countries, start making dramatic investments in [negative-emissions] climate technology in the near future. I’m sceptical of conventional decarbonisation. We will need these additional technologies. We need to invest in them quickly.

Putting hope in technology is the excuse George HW Bush gave for not doing anything decisive in the late 1980s when he was president and it is the message of the Trump administration. You don’t sound as if you are aligned with them. What about a carbon tax?
We have to do everything we can. I would absolutely support a carbon tax and what we are talking about now in the US: a green new deal of massive investment in renewable energy. But when you look around the world, small taxes on carbon haven’t had a meaningful impact. I think we have to learn from that and realise we need much more aggressive taxes or other solutions.

In the past year, we have seen more radical action such as student strikers led by Greta Thunberg and protests by Extinction Rebellion. Do you think groups like this are useful?
Absolutely. I’m an enormous admirer of Thunberg and I am in awe of how much energy and attention Extinction Rebellion has generated in such a short time. I think their imperative to tell the truth is very important and powerful.

Would you join?
They are organising another major event soon in New York that I will be going to. Temperamentally, and by background, I am not an activist and I still think of myself primarily as a journalist and storyteller. But no matter how disinclined you are, how temperamentally reluctant you are to be a joiner, it is hard to think about the state of the climate and not be called to action.

What about individual choices? Early in the book, you state very clearly you are not environmentalist, you eat meat, and you think it is better to have economic growth than protect nature. But then you write: “Like many Americans, I am fatally complacent and wilfully deluded.” That was your starting point. How has writing this book changed you?
Everybody should live according to their values. There are people who want to radically change their lives to reduce their carbon footprint, and there are people who want to make symbolic gestures. Air travel is the one thing that I really do feel guilty about. I make choices about travel with that in mind in a way that I didn’t even a year ago.

Wallace-Wells: ‘If I go from eating three hamburgers a year to zero, the impact on my carbon footprint is really quite trivial.’ Photograph: Soubrette/Getty Images 
And meat?
Personally, I don’t feel that it is my thing. I admire people who give up meat for this reason. I think globally we need to be eating less meat, especially those of us in the wealthy parts of world who eat too much of it; for health reasons, too. But if I go from eating three hamburgers a year to zero, the impact on my carbon footprint is quite trivial. I have to say right now it feels so overwhelmingly the case that political action is the most important thing anyone could do, including me, that it overwhelms any of the other things.

In the book, you ask whether it is moral to have children in this climate. In the past year, you have done just that. What hope do have that your child won’t live in the uninhabitable world of your title?
I come at the question of hope from the perspective that truly total devastation is possible and something close to that is where we are heading now. So every degree cooler, every tick of temperature that we prevent, is an improvement and therefore a reason for hope. So, if we stabilise the planet at 3C that is better than 3.5C, 2.5C is better than 3C, and so on.
For reasons independent of climate, I wanted to have children. Most people do. I don’t think this is an impulse we need to disavow before we have finished the final act of this story. I think it is a reason to fight now so that we can continue to have those children and continue to live in the ways we want to live. It is possible regardless of how bad the news from science is.

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