21/06/2019

Analysis: Why Children Must Emit Eight Times Less CO2 Than Their Grandparents

Carbon BriefZeke Hausfather

Credit: Julie Johnson via Unsplash.
Global emissions of CO2 need to decline precipitously over the next few decades, if the world is to meet the Paris Agreement goals of limiting global warming to “well below 2C” and, ideally, below 1.5C.
If these goals are to be met, young people would have to live the greater part of their lives without contributing significantly to global emissions. Essentially, they would have fewer “allowable” CO2 emissions during their lifetime, compared with older generations.
To determine just how much smaller their personal CO2 limits would be, Carbon Brief has combined historical data on emissions and population with projections for the future. In a world where warming is limited to 1.5C, the average person born today can emit only an eighth of the lifetime emissions of someone born in 1950.
The interactive tool, below, shows the size of each person’s “carbon budget” during their  lifetime – based on when and where they were born.
It looks at two different scenarios: one where the world limits warming to well below 2C above pre-industrial levels by 2100; and one were warming is limited to 1.5C.
It also considers two different ways of sharing future allowable emissions: one where each country tracks “optimal” pathways taken from models; and another, focused on equality, where each person can use the same portion of future emissions, no matter where they live.
In all cases, younger generations will have to make do with substantially smaller lifetime carbon budgets than older generations, if the Paris limits are to be respected. This is because most of the allowable emissions have already been used up, meaning young people will not have the luxury of unmitigated emissions enjoyed by older generations.
The idea for this analysis was first proposed to Carbon Brief by Dr Ben Caldecott at the University of Oxford. The methodology used – and its limitations – are explained in detail at the end of this article. Carbon Brief is now working to further develop the analysis with Dr Caldecott and his colleagues.
The global picture
Global emissions must peak in the next decade and quickly decline for the world to stay below its Paris Agreement limits, according to the UN. In the scenarios examined in this article (see methodology at the end for details), global emissions peak around 2020, decline around 50% by 2045 and then fall below zero around 2075 in order to hold global warming to below 2C.
Emissions have to fall even faster for warming to be kept below 1.5C – falling around 50% by 2030 and to below zero by 2055. In the 1.5C scenarios examined here, large amounts of negative emissions are deployed by the end of the century, removing carbon from the atmosphere equivalent to roughly a third of today’s emissions.
These emissions pathways can be divided up into average “lifetime carbon budgets” that depend on an individual’s year of birth. This allocation is based on the changing global population and emissions during each individual’s lifetime.
The figure below shows the global average lifetime carbon budget for people born in each year between 1900 and 2017, in scenarios where warming is kept below 1.5C (dark blue) or 2C (light blue).

Global average lifetime carbon budgets per-capita by birth year for 1.5C and 2C scenarios, assuming a lifespan of 85 years. Based on historical emissions data from the Global Carbon Project, historical and future projected population from the United Nations and global emission projections from MESSAGE-GLOBIOM. Generation birth years shown at the bottom from the Pew Research Center. See the methodology section for details. Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
As the chart above shows, if warming is limited to well below 2C the global average lifetime carbon budget for someone born in 2017 is 122 tonnes of CO2, only about a third as large as the budget for someone born in 1950. If warming is to be limited to 1.5C, the remaining budget is only 43 tonnes of CO2 and the difference is eight times as large.
Current per-capita global emissions are around 4.9 tonnes per person per year. This means that the lifetime carbon budget of someone born today is equal to 25 years of current emissions if warming is limited to well below 2C – and only nine years of current emissions if warming is limited to 1.5C.

Divvying up emissions
The analysis above uses a global average carbon budget. However, in reality, there is no such thing as a “global average” person and each country’s emissions will follow a slightly different trajectory in “well below” 2C and 1.5C worlds.
In general, emission reductions will need to be proportionally larger in developed, wealthier countries, such as the US, where per-capita emissions are very high. Developing nations, such as India, already have much lower per-capita emissions.
To put the difference into perspective, the average Indian had emissions of 1.9 tonnes of CO2 in 2017, whereas the figure in the US was 16.9 tonnes of CO2.
Moreover, historical emissions vary greatly between countries, with the likes of the US and UK responsible for a far larger share of cumulative emissions since the industrial revolution. This poses an open question as to how the fixed global carbon budgets set by the Paris Agreement should be divided between different countries.
IAMs are computer models that analyse a broad range of data – e.g. physical, economic and social – to produce information that can be used to help decision-making. For climate research, specifically,… Read More
There are lots of different ways to allocating future emissions between countries. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) – energy system models that examine what mix of different technologies and choices are needed to meet climate targets – provide one set of budget allocations, reporting future emissions for each region of the world.
The figure below is based on the allocations in 1.5C scenarios from IAMs. It shows how lifetime carbon budgets vary based on birth year, for four major countries and regions that are responsible for the bulk of global CO2 emissions. These are the US (light blue line), Europe (dark blue), China (red), and India (yellow).

Lifetime carbon budgets by birth year based on historical emissions and future IAM 1.5C scenarios, assuming a lifespan of 85 years. Based on historical emissions data from the Global Carbon Project, historical and future projected population from the United Nations and regional emission projections from MESSAGE-GLOBIOM. Generation birth years shown at the bottom from the Pew Research Center. See the methodology section for details. Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
If the remaining carbon budget is divided up in this way, based on IAM pathways, then national  allowable lifetime emissions are much more similar for someone born in 2017 than in 1950 – but there are still large differences between countries.
For example, someone born today in the US would still be allocated a lifetime carbon budget some 15 times larger than someone born in India. Their budget would be four times larger than someone born in China and around twice as large as in Europe.
The table below shows the lifetime carbon budget in a 1.5C world (2C world) both globally and by major country/region, broken down by generation:
Pre-Boomer
(pre-1946)
Boomers
(1946-1964)
Gen X
(1965-1980)
Millennials
(1981-1996)
Gen Z
(1997-2012)
Post-Gen Z
(post-2012)
Global275325 (348)276 (322)202 (264)118 (191)56 (134)
US14941464 (1530)1191 (1342)846 (1052)472 (709)238 (489)
Europe686698 (733)582 (668)398 (521)218 (363)105 (259)
China119255 (291)256 (334)220 (326) 151 (279)71 (213
India3864 (71)61 (74)52 (69)23 (54)18 (39)

Lifetime carbon budgets in tonnes of CO2 by birth year based on historical emissions and future IAM 1.5C (and 2C) scenarios. Pre-Boomer generations have identical 1.5C and 2C carbon budgets. Using generation periods from the Pew Research Center and averaging the lifetime budget of all the birth years of each generation.
This approach raises obvious questions about equity, as it implies that countries with high historical emissions will also receive a larger share of the proverbial pie in the future. There are lots of different ways to define equity – and little agreement – regarding which approaches would be both possible and “fair” for allocating future emissions.
One alternative would be to allocate the remaining budget equally between all people, wherever they live. This might be hard to achieve in practice as, say, per-capita US emissions would need to fall rapidly towards the global average while those in India would immediately rise.
But it provides a useful thought experiment that can be contrasted to the lifetime carbon budget allocation set out above. Even this might not be truly equal, is it neglects responsibility for historical emissions.
The figure below shows the effect of this allocation on lifetime carbon budgets by birth year for the same four major countries and regions. It is based on historical per-capita emissions and equal per-capita shares of the remaining carbon budget from 2018 onwards, in a scenario where warming is limited to 1.5C.

Same as the prior figure, but using global emission projections from MESSAGE-GLOBIOM to calculate future global per person emissions. See the methodology section for details. Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
The chart above shows that lifetime carbon budgets converge much more quickly when future emissions are divided equally, even though historical differences between countries remain. As a result, someone born in 2017 would have a similar lifetime carbon budget no matter where they are born.

Some limitations
Calculating lifetime carbon budgets is necessarily imperfect and relies on a series of unrealistic assumptions. Every person is different and, in practice, individual emissions will be strongly affected by income, behaviour and other factors.
While the average 1.5C lifetime carbon budget of someone, say, born in the US around 1995 might be 696 tonnes of CO2, people in that generation will, in practice, have widely varying individual emissions.
The approach taken here – dividing national emissions by population – also glosses over the fact that a sizable portion of emissions for some countries are the result of industrial and commercial activity producing goods for trade that are not consumed at home. These “consumption footprints” can differ significantly from national emission estimates, as Carbon Brief has previously examined.
For simplicity, a constant lifespan of 85 years is assumed when calculating lifetime carbon footprints. This is higher than the current average lifespan in most countries, but may be more realistic for younger generations today given expected advances in medical science and access to healthcare. However, in practice, lifespan differences between countries will likely persist into the future and could impact these calculations.
Finally, this approach assumes that emissions in a given year can be assigned equally across the population regardless of age. In reality, people are probably responsible for considerably lower emissions when they are children than adults, as they are not, say, driving cars and are often consuming less.
That said, this analysis provides a first look at how lifetime carbon budgets vary by age. It suggests that the allowable lifetime emissions for young people today is a fraction of that of previous generations, as the global budget for avoiding warming of 1.5C or 2C has already been mostly used up.

Methodology
Lifetime carbon budgets were calculated by adding the historical and projected future per-capita emissions for each year that an individual is expected to live – assuming a constant lifespan of 85 years since a given birth year for simplicity. This is higher than the current global average lifespan (it is typical of Japan today), but may be more typical for the lifespan of younger people today given continuing medical advances.
For example, if someone were born in the year 2000 in India, their lifetime carbon footprint would be the sum of historical per-capita emissions in India from 2000 to 2017, plus forecast per-capita emissions in India between 2018 and 2085.
The end of 2017 serves as the demarcation between historical and future emissions because 2018 emission and population values are not yet available for all countries.
Carbon budgets were calculated for all possible birth years from 1900 to 2017 for major countries and each of the world regions where UN population projections were available: Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Oceania and Asia.
Historical CO2 emission estimates for each country from 1751-2017 were obtained from the Global Carbon Project. Historical population data from 1950-2017 and future population projections from 2018-2100 were obtained for each country from the UN World Population Prospects 2017. The “medium” scenario was chosen for future population projections, as it matches reasonably well with the population assumptions in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP2) world used for IAM emission scenarios.
Future emissions by country for both 1.5C and 2C targets were based on IAM runs from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) MESSAGE-GLOBIOM model using the SSP2 world. SSP2 is a world where current economic and population trends broadly continue and MESSAGE-GLOBIOM was the model chosen to represent SSP2. MESSAGE-GLOBIOM emissions by region – and globally – were taken from the IAMC 1.5C Scenario Explorer.
As IAM runs in recent years lack country-specific values, regional emission estimates were used to estimate country-specific trajectories by scaling current country emissions by the percent reduction in regional emissions from the IAM runs. For example, if the IAM runs showed OECD countries reducing emissions by 50% by 2040 in a 1.5C scenario, emissions in each OECD country were estimated to decrease by 50% by 2040.
Net future emissions were used for per-capita emission estimates. This means that in many countries future per-capita emissions go negative in the second half of the 21st century, particularly in 1.5C scenarios. The distribution of negative emissions in MESSAGE-GLOBIOM varies regionally, with a particularly high concentration of negative emissions in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Finally, as both emission and population projections are only available through to 2100, but people born after 2015 will still be alive post-2100, per-capita emissions are assumed to remain constant at 2100 values in subsequent years.
Two future emission allocation scenarios are provided: one based on the regional MESSAGE-GLOBIOM emission pathways and one where the global MESSAGE-GLOBIOM projected emissions are distributed evenly to every country on a per-capita basis after 2017. The latter shows how a more equitable distribution of remaining emissions would affect lifetime carbon budgets, compared to the allocation in IAMs.
The countries featured in the interactive tool are a subset of those with the largest populations. However, major regions are also included, so if there is a country not featured on the list its region should provide a reasonable estimate. The “North America” region is not shown as all member countries appear on the list.

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Australia’s Energy Exports Increase Global Greenhouse Emissions, Not Decrease Them

The Conversation | 

Australia’s LNG exports aren’t as good for the planet as the government seems to think. AAP Image/Origin Energy
When unveiling government data revealing Australia’s rising greenhouse emissions, federal energy minister Angus Taylor sought to temper the news by pointing out that much of the increase is due to liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, and claiming that these exports help cut emissions elsewhere.
LNG exports, Taylor argued, help to reduce global emissions by replacing the burning of coal overseas, which has a higher emissions factor than gas. In reality, Australian gas displaces a mix of energy sources, including gas from other exporters. Whether and to what extent Australian gas exports reduce emissions therefore remains unclear. Meanwhile, Australia’s coal exports clearly do increase global emissions.
The way Australia can help clean up world energy systems in the future is through large-scale production and export of renewable energy.
In a statement accompanying the latest quarterly emissions figures, the Department of Environment and Energy stated:
Australia’s total LNG exports are estimated to have the potential to lower emissions in importing countries by around 148Mt CO₂-e [million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent] in 2018, if they displace coal consumption in those countries.
In truth, the assumption that every unit of Australia’s exported gas displaces coal is silly. The claim of a 148Mt saving is wrong and unfounded. The real number would be much smaller, and there could even be an increase in emissions as a result of LNG exports.
For the most part, exported gas probably displaces natural gas that would otherwise be produced elsewhere, leaving overall emissions roughly the same. Some smaller share may displace coal. But it could just as easily displace renewable or nuclear energy, in which case Australian gas exports would increase global emissions, not reduce them.

How much might gas exports really cut emissions?
Serious analysis would be needed to establish the true amount of emissions displaced by Australian gas. It depends on the specific requirements that importers have, their alternatives for domestic energy production and other imports, changes in relative prices, resulting changes in energy balances in third-country markets, trajectories for investments in energy demand and supply infrastructure, and so forth. No such analysis seems available.
But for illustration, let’s make an optimistic assumption that gas displaces twice as much coal as it does renewable or nuclear energy. Specifically, let’s assume - purely for illustration - that each energy unit of Australian exported LNG replaces 0.7 units of gas from elsewhere, 0.2 units of coal, and 0.1 units of renewables or nuclear.
Australia exported 70 million tonnes of LNG in 2018. A Department of Environment and Energy source told Guardian Australia that this amount of gas would emit 197 million tonnes of CO₂ when burned. We calculate a similar number, on the basis of official emissions factors and export statistics.
Under the optimistic and illustrative set of assumptions outlined above, we calculate that Australia’s LNG exports would have reduced emissions in importing countries by about 10 million tonnes of CO₂ per year. (See the end of the article for a summary of our calculations.)
They might equally have reduced emissions by less, or they might in fact have increased these countries’ emissions, if more renewables or nuclear was displaced than coal. But whatever the the actual number, it’s certainly a long way short of the 148 million tonnes of emissions reduction claimed by the government.
We also should consider the emissions within Australia of producing LNG. The national emissions accounting shows that the increase in national emissions of 3.5 million tonnes of CO₂-e compared with the year before is mostly because of a 22% increase in LNG exports. This means that LNG production in Australia overall may be responsible for 16 million tonnes of CO₂ emissions per year.
A full analysis of global effects would also need to factor in the emissions that would be incurred from the production of alternative energy sources displaced by Australia’s LNG.

Coal exports unambiguously raise emissions
The picture is more clear-cut for coal. If there was no Australian thermal coal (the type used in power stations) in world markets, much of this would be replaced by more coal mined elsewhere. The remainder would be replaced by gas, renewables or nuclear. As for the case of gas, the precise substitution effects are a matter of complex interactions.
The crucial point is that all alternative fuels are less emissions-intensive than coal. In the substitution of Australian-mined coal for coal from other sources, there could be some substitution towards coal with higher emissions factors, but this is highly unlikely to outweigh the emissions savings from the substitution to nuclear, renewables and gas.
So, removing Australian coal from the world market would reduce global emissions. Conversely, adding Australian coal to the world market would increase global emissions.
Australia exported 208 million tonnes of thermal coal in 2018, which according to the official emissions factors would release 506 million tonnes of CO₂ when burned. On top of this, Australia also exported 178 million tonnes of coking coal for steel production.
If a similar “replacement mix” assumed above for gas is also applied to coal – that is, every unit of coal is replaced by 0.7 units of coal from elsewhere, 0.2 units of gas, and 0.1 units of renewables or nuclear – then adding that thermal coal to the international market would increase emissions by about 19% of the embodied emissions in that coal. As in the case of LNG, this is purely an illustrative assumption.
So, in this illustrative case, Australia’s thermal coal exports would increase net greenhouse emissions in importing countries by about 96 million tonnes per year.
This figure does not consider the coking coal exports, nor the emissions from mining the coal in Australia and transporting it.

The real opportunity is in export of renewable energy
Thankfully, there actually is a way for Australia to help the world cut emissions, and in a big way. That is by producing large amounts of renewable energy for export, in the form of hydrogen, ammonia, and other fuels produced using wind and solar power and shipped to other countries that are less blessed with abundant renewable energy resources.
Even emissions-free production of energy-intensive goods like aluminium and steel could become cost-competitive in Australia, given the ever-falling costs of renewable energy and the almost unlimited potential to produce renewable energy in the outback. Australia really could be a renewable energy superpower.
Such exports will then unambiguously reduce global emissions, because they will in part displace the use of coal, gas and oil.
Once we have a large-scale renewable energy industry in operation, the relevant minister in office then will be right to point out Australia’s contribution to solving the global challenge through our energy exports. In the meantime, our energy exports are clearly a net addition to global emissions.

Summary of data and calculations

LNG emissions and displacement - illustrative scenario
Emissions inherent in Australia’s LNG exports of 69.5 million tonnes (in calendar year 2018) are 197 million tonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide, based on emissions factors published by the Australian government.
If the same amount of energy was served using coal, emissions would be:
197Mt CO₂ + 148Mt CO₂
= 345Mt CO₂
Emissions under the mix assumed for illustration here would be:
0.7 x 197 (LNG) + 0.2 x 345 (coal) + 0.1 x 0 (renewables/nuclear)
= 207Mt CO₂
That is 10Mt higher than without Australian LNG.

Coal emissions and displacement - illustrative scenario
Australia’s thermal coal exports were 208Mt in calendar year 2018. Emissions when burning this coal were 506Mt CO₂, based on government emissions factors.
Assuming typical emissions factors for fuel use in electricity generation of 0.9 tonnes of CO₂ per megawatt-hour (MWh) from black coal and 0.5 tonnes of CO₂ per MWh from gas, the emissions intensity of electricity generation under the mix assumed for illustration here would be:
0.7 x 0.9 (coal) + 0.2 x 0.5 (gas) + 0.1 x 0 (renewables/nuclear)
= 0.73 tonnes CO₂ per MWh
This is 19% lower than the emissions intensity of purely coal-fired electricity, of 0.9 tonnes CO₂ per MWh.
19% of 506Mt CO₂ is 96Mt CO₂.
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Obligations To The World’s Children In The Climate Emergency

Independent AustraliaDavid Shearman

This government is not fit to govern on the climate change emergency because of its incapacity to grasp the imminent danger to Australia, our neighbours and indeed the world.
Image courtesy Imogen Bunting
David Shearman
Dr David Shearman AM FRACP is Emeritus Professor of Medicine at Adelaide University and the author or co-author of many articles and several books on reforming several aspects of democracy, including 'The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy’.
FOR 30 or more years’ science has modelled the consequences of steadily rising greenhouse emissions and their expected trajectories of warming have been correct — as a result, current predictions have a high degree of confidence.
The latest review of these predictions from David Spratt and Ian Dunlop summarises the latest 4°C statements from esteemed scientific institutions, commencing with the Royal Society in 2011 and followed in 2013 by a comprehensive report from the Potsdam Institute and World Bank predicting 4ΒΊC before the end of this century.
This was confirmed by a study from Chinese scientists in the Journal Advances in Atmospheric Sciences,  which estimated there is a 74 per cent chance of exceeding a rise of 4°C by the turn of the century.
Admiral Chris Barrie, in his foreword to the Spratt and Dunlop review, states:
'My colleague Professor Will Steffen has said of the climate challenge: “It’s not a technological or a scientific problem, it’s a question of humanities’ socio-political values...we need a social tipping point that flips our thinking before we reach a tipping point in the climate system” The question is “what thinking needs flipping”.'
The determination and statements of the thousands of young people marching for action on climate change have given us an answer, for in their early teens they are not yet fully inculcated in today’s mindset. Their understanding comes from two gifts: firstly, the different mind processes of their leader Greta Thunberg, which render her far less susceptible to current ideology.
Greta says:
"I see the world a bit different, from another perspective ... I have a special interest. It’s very common that people on the autism spectrum have a special interest."
Secondly, most young minds have not yet completed their absorption into this creed of neo-liberalism, which, as sociologist LΓΆic Wacquant puts it, is an 'articulation of state, market and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third.'
As an aside, it is relevant that those ministers pontificating most against the children’s marches and time off school were those in the “Right” captured most by the market imperative — a childhood has to be moulded in their image.
This branding by neoliberal thought begins in early childhood education, when the seeds of competition and self importance subsume those of collectivism. This is followed by educational subjects that ready them to join the striving economic world of commerce and industry, which has captured much of university endeavour — to say you are studying the liberal arts or philosophy is met with a questioning look of “drop-out”.
The marching children are likely to understand more than we credit.
As a child of five or six, I recall my fascination with two middle aged men marching the streets of our town carrying placards which proclaimed 'The End is Nigh'. "Mum, what are they doing?”, I asked. Mother, who had religious inclinations replied “Never mind, dear, they are doing their best”. To a child suffering the privations, bombs and poverty of war, I had followed the daily BBC bulletins; the placard said to me: Hitler was nigh!  When at age seven, I heard the BBC bulletin of the landing in France, but continued to see the men with placards, further searching questions had to be answered in detail.
The writings of political philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy are relevant to this discussion. His search for a new political and moral vision for our times is described in his 2009 book, Left in Dark Times: A Stand Against the New Barbarism. He describes a relationship between the fragmentation of international collectivism and cooperation, leading to the loss of a sense of purpose and time — a time that previously offered a sense of future that may be better, however bad the present. Since the beginning of history, there was always a time when no one could suspect that time could end except in metaphysical terms. Not any more, it is impending.
Children are capable of understanding the end game can be in their lifetime. It can certainly be recognised by those who understand the 4°C rise scenario, such as scientists and intelligentsia who are reluctant to have children and in community movements such as BirthStrike. There is also a sense of desperation in renewed discussion over the risks of geo-engineering.
The endgame of neoliberal minds is the catastrophe of financial collapse.
It is imbued by Margaret’s Thatcher’s statement:
Economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul.”
This all-consuming ideology has enabled a brain to compartmentalise many other more important issues in an exceedingly complex world.
The brain denies them when they clash with the primacy of neo-liberalism, for they are, Joel Millward-Hopkins says:
'... devoid of notions such as duty, compassion and solidarity with an artificial sense of separation from other people and from the ecology that supports all life, to seek fulfilment in increased wealth and consumption.'
If you were the leader of a country receiving a pay rise of 2 per cent when you earned over $500,000 per annum, could you accept it when seeing homeless on the streets? The psychological studies of Lasana Harris have illustrated this compartmentalisation or shutting off of empathy to homeless people.
Nor is there empathy for the soon to be homeless Pacific Islanders 
Current management of the world economy sees greenhouse emissions increase with economic activity and decrease in recessions. Despite government claims of good economic management, they are not decoupling our economy. Continuing economic growth is impossible in a finite world. These are inconvenient truths in their mantra of jobs and growth, and they are suppressed and denied by the neoliberal brain.
The children of today have grown up in a world of fragmentation of politics and failure of international cooperation. Levy relates the nihilism demonstrated by the Yellow Vests and the destructive Right movements in many countries to loss of hope for a meaningful future; children sense this insecurity without understanding its full implications.
Many in the legal and medical professions have moved to emphasise intergenerational justice. There are legal cases against inactive governments with children as plaintiffs and in the No Time for Games campaign Doctors for the Environment Australia works to provide a safe and healthy planet for children. Instead of a ministerial statement advising striking children to learn to drill for oil and gas, the Government should establish a national dialogue with children age 13 and over and enhance their knowledge of climate change issues and send a signal to the community that they wish to move forward.
In the words of Andrew Glickson:
“Only the children seem to know.”
Conclusions
Michael Bloomberg wrote:
'I believe that we are living in a similar moment (the moon landing). But this time, our most important and pressing mission is not to explore deep space. It’s to save our planet, the one we’re living on, from climate change. And unlike 1962, the primary challenge is not scientific or technological. It’s political.'
In Australia, we cannot wait another three years to fulfill a grossly inadequate target in a dubious "canter" if we are to meet our obligations as a rich, secure country able to do much more for itself and world humanity.
Churchill may have been wrong when he said:
“Democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms.”
Some practical democratic reforms for the next three years will be described in future articles, which could be driven by the concerned united voices of business, scientific and technological expertise and the professions.

Greta Thunberg full speech at UN Climate Change COP24 Conference

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