05/09/2020

Portuguese Children Sue 33 Countries Over Climate Change At European Court

The Guardian

Ground-breaking crowdfunded case demands that states make more ambitious emissions cuts

A wildfire in Monchique in Portugal in 2018. The case was initiated in 2017 after devastating forest fires in Portugal killed over 120 people. Photograph: Filipe Farinha/EPA

Young activists from Portugal have filed the first climate change case at the European court of human rights in Strasbourg, demanding 33 countries make more ambitious emissions cuts to safeguard their future physical and mental wellbeing.

The crowdfunded legal action breaks new ground by suing multiple states both for the emissions within their borders and also for the climate impact that their consumers and companies have elsewhere in the world through trade, fossil-fuel extraction and outsourcing.

The plaintiffs – four children and two young adults – want the standard-setting court to issue binding orders on the 33 states, which include the EU as well as the UK, Norway, Russia, Turkey, Switzerland and Ukraine, to prevent discrimination against the young and protect their rights to exercise outdoors and live without anxiety.

The case is being filed after Portugal recorded its hottest July in 90 years. It was initiated three years ago following devastating forest fires in Portugal that killed over 120 people in 2017. Four of the plaintiffs are from Leiria, one of the worst-hit areas. The two other applicants live in Lisbon, which sweltered through record-breaking 44C heat in 2018.

Expert testimony will warn that these trends will worsen in the future. On the current path of about 3C of warming above pre-industrial levels, scientists have predicted a thirty-fold increase in deaths from heatwaves in western Europe by the period 2071-2100. At 4C, which is also possible, they say heatwaves above 40C would endure for more than 30 days a year, quadrupling the risk of forest fires.

Catarina Mota, 20, said governments must act on scientific warnings because the climate crisis was already affecting young people psychologically and physically.

“I am afraid for the future,” she said. “Lately, it is already impossible to exercise outdoors. If that was only for a few days it would be fine but the heatwaves are extreme and recurring. I live with the feeling my home is becoming more hostile each year. It scares me a lot.”

Sofia Oliveira, aged 15, said her generation was acutely conscious of the dangers that lie ahead: “We have seen unbearable heatwaves that cause water shortages and damage food production, and violent wildfires that give us anxiety and make us afraid to travel through our country’s forests … If we already see these extremes in 2020 what will the future be like?”

She said the EU must commit to a minimum 65% emissions reduction target by 2030 and ensure a green recovery from the Covid crisis by investing in renewables and clean technology rather than fossil fuels.

The young applicants are being represented by British barristers, including Marc Willers QC, who are experts in environmental and climate change law, and supported by the London- and Dublin-based NGO Global Legal Action Network (Glan), which raised £27,000 through crowdfunding.

More than 1,300 climate-related lawsuits have been filed worldwide since 1990. The most successful so far was in the Netherlands, where the Urgenda Foundation forced the government into scaling back coal-fired power plants and taking other compliance measures worth about €3bn (£2.7bn).

Gerry Liston, legal officer with Glan, said the latest case could go further because Strasbourg sets standards that other courts follow. “This case is unique in scale. This is the most countries ever taken to a regional court in a climate change case. If we win, it will have a very significant effect throughout Europe.”

He noted that this was the first time the court had dealt with an issue that threatens the very system of rules it was established to uphold, citing a warning last year by the UN special rapporteur Philip Alston that human rights may not survive the upheaval caused by climate change.

The NGO behind the case says the legal campaign aims to amplify the pressure applied by school climate strikers.

“This is a culmination of all the campaigning that the youth movement are engaged in. Now they are asking the courts to step up. This is a last-ditch effort to put the ship back on a course that doesn’t involve catastrophic climate change,” said Gearóid Ó Cuinn, the director of Glan. “It is the youth who stand to be discriminated against. They bear the burden in terms of risk.”

The court will have to consider whether the case is admissible and then, if so, rule on the merits of the case. This could take months or years. A new phase of crowdfunding has been launched. Ó Cuinn said there was no time to wait: “The situation is dire. The climate threat dwarfs Covid. Given the urgency of dealing with emissions, we think our case should be a priority.”

Links

(AU) The Mystery Of The Murray-Darling’s Vanishing Flows

ABC NewsMichael Slezak | Mark Doman | Katia Shatoba | Penny Timms | Alex Palmer

It might be the biggest whodunnit — or what-dunnit — in Australia.

More than 2 trillion litres of water — enough to fill Sydney Harbour four and a half times — has gone missing from our largest and most precious river system — the Murray-Darling Basin.

And it’s happened in what was already one of the driest periods the basin has seen.

According to an investigation by some of Australia’s top water scientists, shared exclusively with the ABC, 20 per cent of the water expected to flow down the rivers from 2012-2019 was simply not there. That’s despite almost $7 billion being spent to protect the health of the system’s rivers and ecosystems that rely on them.

Was it stolen? Was it lost? Has climate change made it go up in steam? Or was it simply never there in the first place?

There are clues scattered up and down the rivers but one simple message is clear in the scientists’ findings. For the first time, they provide evidence that the Murray-Darling Basin Plan — the most expensive environmental program in Australia’s history — is delivering much less water than was expected.

And the implications could be huge.

The Murray-Darling Basin covers a seventh of the continent, is home to nearly 10 per cent of Australia's people, and produces a third of our food.

The Murray-Darling Basin is enormous network of rivers, creeks, wetlands and valleys.

“It’s a huge discrepancy to be missing a fifth of the water that’s meant to be in the rivers,” said Jamie Pittock from the ANU. He’s an expert in water management and a co-author of the Wentworth Group’s report.

“It means that there are all sorts of things that Australians value that won’t be sustained … like more water for towns … the floodplains, growing grass for sheep and cattle, in terms of biodiversity being conserved, waterbirds, red gum forests and conserving our fish.”

Rob Vertessy is a hydrologist and chair of the Murray-Darling Basin Authority’s (MDBA) Advisory Committee on Social Economic and Environmental Sciences.

He said the report was an important contribution to the body of scientific knowledge on the system.

“It is pointing to a problem, which I guess people have had a sense of, but which hasn’t been properly dimensioned until now,” Professor Vertessy said.

“The levels of flow in the river are lower than everyone would have hoped.”

The MDBA itself worked with the Wentworth Group to help with the analysis over the past several months, and is completing its own similar analysis set to be released later this year.

The MDBA’s head of basin strategy, Vicki Woodburn, said the shortfall was not a failure of the basin plan itself, since it was still being implemented.

The missing water is a mystery — nobody knows exactly why it’s not being seen in the rivers.

But here’s the thing: there are clues. Lots of them. We’ve seen water go missing up and down the river with clear explanations before. And looking closely at the new report, many of those explanations are consistent with the new data.

Clue one: tampered meters and criminal prosecutions


One possible explanation for the shortfall is that some of the missing water has been stolen.

An investigation by Four Corners in 2017 put water theft in the spotlight — much of it around the Barwon-Darling catchment in the Northern Basin.

Irrigation pumps in the Barwon River near Brewarrina in New South Wales. AAP: Dean Lewins

Irrigators there, according to official figures, use 3 per cent of all the water taken from the entire Murray-Darling Basin.

But on top of those official figures, there has been significantly more water taken in that area. The Murray-Darling Basin Authority itself estimated that in the Northern Basin, as little as 25 per cent of surface water take has been metered.

Some of the water that went unmetered was stolen.

Peter Harris, who was named in the 2017 Four Corners, was this year found guilty of water theft just upstream from those gauges at Brewarrina.

Anthony Barlow, another person named in the program, was found guilty and fined $190,000, for water theft just upstream again.

Since the Natural Resources Access Regulator (NRAR) was formed in NSW in 2018, 15 additional charges have been laid in these locations across the state for water theft and related actions, according to an NRAR spokeswoman.


Emma Carmody, a lawyer at the Environmental Defenders’ Office, said the criminal prosecutions do not represent how widespread water theft has been.

“I’d actually go so far as to say that this situation pre-2018 was catastrophically bad in those northern catchments in relation to compliance and enforcement,” Dr Carmody said.

Irrigators deny water theft is a significant issue in the missing water mystery.

“I think if people are saying, ‘oh, well, this is about water theft’, then what they’re doing is really just trying to find someone to blame rather than trying to find solutions,” said Steve Whan, the CEO of the National Irrigators’ Council.

It’s probably impossible now to calculate the true scale of water theft over the seven years analysed by the Wentworth Group, but it’s unlikely to explain much of the shortfall. And whatever role it played, there are other key suspects in the case of the missing water.

Clue two: shadow take


Travel further upstream along the Macquarie River towards Dubbo, and you land in the internationally protected wetlands of the Macquarie Marshes.


It’s one of the largest remaining inland, semi-permanent wetlands in the Murray-Darling Basin and supports more than half a million birds in a large flood.

In the vast flat landscape, decent rains cause water to spill over the banks of the Macquarie and its tributaries and spread as far as the eye can see.

The Macquarie Marshes are listed as a wetland of international importance. ABC News: Matthew Abbott

In a landscape so flat, structures like roads, engineered channels and small levee banks can divert staggering volumes of floodwater — potentially shepherding it across a farmer’s fields where it is left to soak into the ground, or even pumped into dams.

This water taken by irrigators and graziers from the floodplains — rather than from the rivers — has hardly ever been measured.

Using satellite imagery, flood paths appear guided by seemingly innocuous structures, or completely cut off by others.



Richard Kingsford is a river ecologist at the University of New South Wales who has studied the Macquarie Marshes and the impacts of floodplain harvesting.

He says water that spills over floodplains often drains back into rivers, and interrupting its flow can have big impacts, including contributing to the missing flows.

“There are very few places where we have an accurate estimate of how much water is being taken from the floodplain. And to me, this has been a yawning gap in the policy,” he said.

This floodplain harvesting was not always illegal — so long as the earthworks were approved and the total amounts taken were within certain limits. But without proper measurement, nobody can be sure, and the volumes taken were unknown.

The idea that floodplain harvesting could explain some of the missing water fits with the data in the Wentworth Group’s report. In late 2016, there was a flood in some parts of the basin and despite there being much more water in that period, the shortfall remained high.

Infographic: Even in high-flow years, there were still discrepancies between the expected and observed flows at Marebone Break. (Source: Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists)

“During the wet sequences, which haven’t been frequent … I think it’s a matter of legitimate disquiet that many have about the failure to really bring those floodplain harvesting schemes into the calculations,” says Professor Vertessy.

“It’s well past the time that we should have a full fix on that,” he said.

In NSW, where the potential for floodplain harvesting is the biggest, rules are now being implemented to measure it.

Steve Whan from the National Irrigators’ Council said the new rules would help reduce shortfalls in future analyses.

“We’re seeing extensive work done to improve measurement, including bringing floodplain harvesting into a volumetric system … And all those things are really important steps. Many of them are still only partway through,” Mr Whan said.

Clue Three: The cash splash


If we head all the way to southern NSW, we see a completely different clue.

Billions have been spent subsidising “efficiency measures” to help farmers save water there.

That can be done by upgrading old irrigation systems to deliver water directly to roots, or lining water channels, for example. Then about half of the water saved by the farmers gets handed to the government for the environment.

But according to some experts, the “inefficiencies” prior to the upgrades just meant some of the water used by irrigators flowed back into the rivers. The upgrades mean that “return flow” stops happening.

“So when you say ‘I’ve saved all this water’, the question is what was it doing before it was saved?” said John Williams, another co-author of the Wentworth Group report and former head of the CSIRO’s Division of Land and Water.

In a report published in 2019, Professor Williams estimated that at least 280 billion litres of water per year might have been lost from the rivers — and are unaccounted for — due to this problem.

“That must be a major reason that we’re not getting the flow regimes that we need,” Professor Williams said.

The MDBA commissioned its own analysis of the issue and concluded the loss of return flows was reducing water in the rivers by 121 billion litres a year.

They say that review shows the reduction in return flows is not a significant factor and does not impact the outcomes of the basin plan.

“The most comprehensive analysis suggests it is an issue, but not a huge one,” said Professor Vertessy.

Clue Four: Climate change


There is one issue, however, that most experts do agree is a major reason for the missing water in the basin.

“The MDBA considers a changing climate to be the primary contributory factor,” said the MDBA’s Vicki Woodburn.

Since the basin plan was introduced, heat records across the area have been broken in four of the eight years. The last three years have been the hottest ever recorded in the basin.

Infographic: 2019 was the hottest year on record in the Murray-Darling Basin. (Source: Bureau of Meteorology)

According to the South Australian royal commission into the Murray-Darling basin plan, the MDBA “completely ignored climate change” when determining how much water needed to be saved.

If true, that means the overall target may have been set too low — that more water needs to be recovered from irrigation to save the river system.

But the same models used to set those targets have also been used to manage the rivers, and now to calculate how much water should be in the rivers. And by inadequately accounting for climate change, those models are likely over-predicting how much water is being recovered.

Climate change means more water is likely being lost between gauges, as it flows along — lost into the dry river beds and the hot air.

“The river models that project where the water will be in the rivers haven’t accounted for things like greater evaporation of water,” said Professor Pittock.

Professor Vertessy said most people were surprised by the magnitude and speed of the changes seen across the basin.

“I think a very important thing to appreciate is that we’re in a very different hydro-climatic sequence than we ever would have envisaged at the time of the architecting of the basin plan,” he said.

Clue five: The water was never there


In a twist worthy of any whodunnit, could it be that some of the missing water was simply never there in the first place?

According to the Wentworth Group, the government modelling used to predict how much water we should see in the river has some fundamental flaws which likely exaggerate the volumes.

For example, in 2018, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority found its modelling “has trouble predicting low flows”.

That meant that when water stopped flowing in the river, the model would still show water flowing — something that could have been particularly problematic over the past seven years when low flows were very common.

If true, it likely means much more water needs to be recovered to save the system to get the same outcomes.

The Wentworth Group scientists say they are confident they applied the modelling as best as was possible, and Rob Vertessy, who advises the MDBA on science, agrees.

“Given their intent, which is to make a comparison of expected flows and those which were realised, then, yes, I think it’s as solid as any approach you could adopt,” he said.

But the MDBA has some reservations. “While the Wentworth Group has partially accounted for the climate and as-yet-unfinished basin plan implementation, both effects are still present in the analysis and inflate the outcome,” said Vicki Woodburn.

Everyone seems to be on the same page about how much better the modelling needs to be.

“The MDBA is working to achieve this improved modelling, however it requires further investment and would be done in collaboration with all basin governments,” said Ms Woodburn.

“This type of analysis should be a fairly routine thing, but in effect, it’s a significant research project,” said Professor Vertessy.

But Wentworth Group scientists are scathing of the lack of adequate modelling and monitoring of flows.

“You can’t manage properly what you’re not measuring. And it’s concerning that the governments haven’t been measuring the … real water in the rivers against their flow targets,” said Professor Pittock.

What it all means


If there’s less water in the rivers than we ever planned for, what’s to be done about it?

Irrigators say the response should not be to buy more water from farmers, as that would cost too many jobs.

“If we think about changes to [sustainable diversion limits], then we also have to then think about what impact it has on those things as well,” said Steve Whan from the National Irrigators’ Council.

Mr Whan wants environmental targets to focus more on “complementary measures” — measures of environmental health, rather than volumes of water.

The MDBA itself says we need to wait until more of the basin plan is enacted before we think about changing the recovery targets, or “sustainable diversion limits” (SDLs) — which are set for review in 2026.

“The basin plan is still not fully implemented so it is too early to suggest the SDLs need to change,” says Vicki Woodburn.

But Professor Vertessy, who advises the MDBA, thinks this sort of shortfall could contribute to a rethink of the long-term water recovery targets.

“We may have to — I think everyone would accept that these sustainable diversion limits aren’t quantities which you ossify for posterity,” he says.

“They’ve got to be adjusted to fit in with the new climate realities and the social preferences of the day.”

And the scientists say whatever the response to the findings, something has to give.

“The current basin plan tries to pretend that we can do everything with a smaller and smaller cake,” says Professor Pittock.

“What this really means is that society is going to have to make some hard choices. How much irrigated agriculture do we want as a society versus how much do we want to retain by way of wetlands and ecosystems [or] of sites of cultural value to Indigenous people?”

Links

(AU) El Nino Lulls Lead To Harsh Floods, Fires And Droughts: Study

Sydney Morning HeraldPeter Hannam

The world's biggest climate pattern, the swing between El Ninos and La Ninas in the Pacific, operates with a kind of memory - with periods of low activity followed by stints of extreme events.

A study, led by CSIRO scientist Wenju Cai, found the roughly 20-year relative lull in the so-called El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) from 1998 will be made up for in future decades by an increase of as much as a third in activity. For Australia, that could mean more extreme droughts, fire seasons and floods.

Two big El Ninos, forming in 1997 and 2015 in the Pacific. The climate patterns swing between periods of lower activity to more active ones, with global consequences. Credit: NASA

Rising greenhouse gases and the resulting global heating amplify this giant self-modulating system, exacerbating the extremes, the research published on Thursday in Nature found.

"If the greenhouse effect now on the El Nino [is to suppress it], in the future the response to that subsequent greenhouse warming will be much more dramatic," Dr Cai told the Herald and The Age. "The [1998-2018] hiatus will cause us more extremes in the future."

The researchers, including Agus Santoso from the University of NSW and Michael McPhaden from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, derived their findings by applying the so-called butterfly effect on computer models to see how tiny changes in initial conditions affect eventual El Nino activity.

Those tweaks involved altering temperatures by one hundred of a trillionth of a degree to mimic the effects akin to the metaphoric flapping of a butterfly's wings.

As the Nature paper noted, El Nino and La Nina years typically have major impacts on extreme weather, ecosystems and food production.

El Nino events are marked by rainfall patterns shifting eastwards away from Australia and south-east Asia, with western parts of South America often hit by flooding. La Nina years – including possibly this one by spring, according to Australia's Bureau of Meteorology – are the reverse, with Australia typically hit by more cyclones and heavy rain.

The self-organising system retains a "memory", Dr Cai said, with effects playing out over a century or more. "What happens now actually can affect the future. El Nino actually remembers its own past," Dr Cai said.

During El Nino years, surface winds take out more heat than usual from the tropical Pacific, lifting temperatures. Those events are often followed by a La Nina, as the system naturally reorganises itself.

The lull, playing out over most of the first two decades of the 21 century, amounted to a reduction of 13 per cent in ENSO activity, Dr Cai said. The modelling indicates that suppressed activity will be countered by a projected increase in ENSO variability by as much as 37 per cent from the 2000-19 level, the paper concludes.

While the system will eventually compensate for the suppressed activity with more intense events, "we don't know which decades" that payback will come, he said.

Dr Cai, who has published previous studies that found most extreme El Nino years will become stronger and more intense by the end of the 21st century with global heating, has also submitted a paper examining how the butterfly effect plays out in the Indian Ocean, another of Australia's main climate influences.

Links

The Catastrophic Science Behind The Stunning Photos Of The Arctic Crater

Inverse - Nina Pullano

Climate change is both a cause and effect of this massive hole.

As once-permanently frozen soil begins to melt, it throws off entire ecosystems. The planet is warming, and the Arctic is heating up especially quickly. There, the thawing permafrost is an increasingly alarming and hard-to-ignore phenomenon.

In 2020, melting permafrost has already caused a Russian oil tank to topple, and Arctic wildfires spotlight how climate change accelerates the meltdown.

Stunning new images show an extreme manifestation of what happens when the Arctic becomes unfrozen — in the form of a giant crater in the earth.

The 160-foot-deep crater opened up on northern Siberia's Yamal peninsula, The Siberian Times reports.

Photos show the cylindrical hole in the ground, also called a funnel:
Funnels are the direct result of melting permafrost. As it thaws, methane gas accumulates beneath the surface of the land, and forms pockets underground. Those pockets can then erupt, launching methane into the atmosphere — along with ice and soil.

As it formed, bits of land were thrown hundreds of feet from the crater. But the most dangerous effect of the gas eruption is invisible: methane gas. Methane is a greenhouse gas 84 times more powerful than carbon dioxide. It dissipates more quickly in the atmosphere, but has devastating consequences for the environment.

Events like the Yamal funnel demonstrate how climate change often operates in a feedback loop. The same global warming that causes the methane to erupt is also fed by the eruption, as more planet-warming methane is released.

Scientists from NASA previously predicted that, within the next few decades, the greenhouse gases released by thawing permafrost will be significant. A 2018 study found that in the next 300 years, the carbon dioxide emitted by thawing land will be 10 times the amount humans emitted in a single year.

Crater findings

The crater in northern Siberia is a physical manifestation of climate change's dramatic effects. Perhaps it's not coincidental that it slightly resembles a portal to the underworld, or the devastating sinkhole from The Good Place.

This isn't the first time a funnel like this has opened up. A similar hole appeared in 2014 on the Yamal peninsula. Scientists said at the time that a warm 2012 summer played into the funnel's emergence.

The new funnel is believed to be the largest to suddenly appear in recent years. Researchers say it also holds scientific significance. But they won't yet announce what that is.

Vasily Bogoyavlensky, professor at the Russian Oil and Gas Research Institute, said the funnel "carries a lot of additional scientific information, which I am not yet ready to disclose."

Links

04/09/2020

Climate Change: A Threat to International Peace & Security?

OpinioJuris - Mark Nevitt

Author
Mark Nevitt is an Associate Professor at Syracuse University College of Law and affiliated faculty with Syracuse University’s Institute for Security Policy & Law and a former lawyer in the United States Navy.
Is the climate-security century upon us?  If so, what are the implications for international legal governance and institutions?

In his recent Opinio Juris essay, based on his provocative and meticulously researched article, Atmospheric Intervention, Professor Martin argues that the climate change crisis may well exert pressure for change on the governing jus ad bellum regime.

Climate Change: A Destabilizing Physical and Legal Force

I am persuaded by Prof. Martin’s argument that the climate change crisis is likely to impact the international collective security system.  While his focus was on the jus ad bellum regime, he briefly discusses the role of the UN Security Council and other institutional structures.   My own work has focused on how the crisis will implicate the international institutions and governance structures that oversee the entire collective security system, particularly the UN Security Council.

In a forthcoming law review article, I argue that climate change will force us to look at international institutions and governance structures with fresh eyes as we struggle to prevent climate-exacerbated conflict and save island nations from possible climate-driven extinction.  In turn, the UN Security Council can and should play a substantive role in addressing the multi-faceted challenges that we face in our “climate security century.” 

Climate change demands both innovative governance solutions and a legal entrepreneurship mindset—using existing tools in new ways.   After all, climate change is an aptly named “super-wicked” problem—no one technological innovation or legal agreement is likely to solve it by itself.  As climate change’s risks are felt—not to mention the risk of “green swan” climate events that transcend any one risk model—we must proactively expand the climate governance aperture.

Call it the “all hands-on deck” approach to international climate governance.  In what follows, I acknowledge both the challenges to UN Security Council action on climate, while arguing that the Council should take three concrete steps to meet the climate security challenges.

The Security Council and Climate Change:  Political and Legitimacy Challenges

Increased Council climate engagement faces significant political headwinds:  witness the Council’s failure last week to extend the 13-year-old embargo on arms trade with Iran, Council gridlock surrounding the Syrian crisis, and the Council’s slow response to the COVID-19 crisis.  And any Council climate action must overcome political calculations from each member of the Permanent Five (P5).   It may also face legitimacy challenges by some Members who argue that the Council is simply exceeding its understood mandate.

Skeptics will assert that climate change is not part of the Council’s agenda and should remain solely within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Economic and Social Council.  Further complicating matters, P5 Members are some of the world’s worst climate offenders.  China, for example, contributes more Greenhouse Gas emissions than any other nation on an annual basis, while the U.S. is the largest GHG emitter on a historical basis.  Why should we listen to them?

But Council climate inaction presents its own legitimacy and political costs.  After all, the UN Charter confers on the Council the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”  With this responsibility comes broad, delegated authorities.  The Council is afforded broad discretion in both investigating situations likely to endanger international peace and security (Chapter VI) and making a “threat to the peace” determination under Article 39 (Chapter VII) of the U.N. Charter.  What constitutes a “threat to the peace” is left to the Council’s discretion.

Increasingly, a diverse group of environmentalists, climate scientists, and national security professionals are sounding the alarm on climate change’s role in catalyzing conflicts, intensifying natural disasters, and threatening the territorial integrity and very sovereignty of several island nations.

Several studies suggest that the climate crisis will  increase the future risk of violent armed conflict within countries.  The consequences of climate change also strikes at the heart of the sovereignty-based UN Charter system:   Scientists predict that four island nations—Kiribati, Maldives, Republic of Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu—may well be uninhabitable by mid-century.

Can the Council afford to stand by while climate change leads to drought and food insecurity, a rise in violent conflicts, mass migration, and possible nation extinction? 

Of course, Council policy—and the votes of the P5—are beholden to politics.  And U.S.-China relations may well be at a nadir, thus thwarting Council action today.  I recognize the current political and legitimacy headwinds that any Council climate action faces.  But I also acknowledge that political calculations can change quickly—witness proactive Council action on terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11.

In addition, the United States is less than 75 days from a historic election. A new Biden Administration would immediately rejoin the Paris Agreement and may well seek to jumpstart the China-U.S. bilateral climate agreement signed in the run-up to the 2015 Paris Climate Accord.

Indeed, in his Democratic acceptance speech last night, Biden explicitly called climate change an existential threat and one of the four historic crisis facing the nation.  So what should the Council do to address the climate crisis that may be within the realm of political possibility in the short or medium term?

Formalize & Synchronize Council Debates & Discussions on Climate Change

First, the Council should lean into its role as a powerful, agenda-setting international institution by continuing to host high-level open debates and climate security discussions with U.N. Member Nations, NGOs, and IGOs.

Doing so taps into Security Council expertise, provides a ready-made forum to engage with the leading climate scientists, and allows space to formulate legal and policy solutions to address the most pressing climate-security threats.  Since 2007, the Council has sponsored four Climate Security open forums and several more informal “Arria-formula” climate meetings.

Yet these Council climate debates and meetings occur in an ad hoc manner.  Whether they occur rests entirely on the whims and priorities of the rotating Security Council Presidency.  Why not synchronize and formalize future Security Council climate debates in a systematic way? 

Such meetings could take place in the immediate aftermath of the Framework Convention’s annual Climate Change’s Conference of the Parties (COPs)? These “Security COPs” would work in governance harmony with ongoing climate efforts, establish a more formal linkage to the Framework Convention.

It would also centralize the Framework Convention’s role in climate mitigation matters while tapping into specialized Council expertise on discrete security matters. This establishes a two-way dialogue between the Council and other climate efforts. Too often, international institutions fail to break free from their governance silos despite the clear need to collaborate across institutions and expertise.

Develop Forward-Looking Climate-Security Risk Assessment Tools

Second, the Council should build upon its earlier efforts to address climate change’s adverse effects via Security Council Resolutions.  But the Council should take a more proactive risk-based approach to climate.  In 2017, the Council took the historic step of specifically recognizing climate change’s destabilizing effects on the ongoing conflict in the Lake Chad Basin.

It followed up with similar pronouncements in Mali, Somalia, and Darfur.  In doing so, the Council emphasized the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies to address future conflict areas.  While the Council acknowledged the relationship between climate change and conflict in these resolutions, they were fundamentally reactive in nature.

We know that climate change serves as both a catalyst for conflict and threat multiplier and threat accelerant.  Why not take the lead in developing these risk management strategies before climate disaster strikes? Clearly, climate change will have a massively destabilizing impact in the African Sahel and numerous developing nations in other regions.  Where are the other climate-security hotspots and how can we begin to plan for them today?

Developing forward-looking risk assessment measures could take many forms.  The Council could coordinate specific climate-security matters across interested U.N. organs.  This could potentially include the development of an early climate warning system.  Better yet, the Council could establish an early warning information-sharing “clearinghouse” system across U.N. organs or establish a more formal institutional home to assist the U.N. in responding to future climate crisis. 

Either way, the Council—which has historically been criticized as a reactive institution—must think proactively on where future climate disruption and conflict is likely to take place.  Best to adopt a proactive, risk-based approach to climate today, rather than waiting for climate disruption to inevitably strike.

Debate Whether Climate Change Is a Threat to International Peace and Security

Third, the Council should debate whether the consequences or causes of climate change constitute a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter.  Doing so elevates climate change and its security impacts on the international stage and serves as a  potential key that unlocks the door to a menu of powerful and legally binding Council follow-on actions.

Article 41 economic measures—or the mere threat of its invocation—could serve as a powerful tool to address climate change through the use of targeted sanctions to punish particularly destructive climate actions by the “climate rogue states” discussed in Prof. Martin’s article. 

Declaring a non-military or non-traditional security threat such as the consequences or causes of climate change to be a threat to international peace and security is not entirely without precedent.   The Council made such a determination during the Ebola crisis in 2014, a public health crisis with similar collective action characteristics. This facilitated the flow of logistics and humanitarian assistance to countries ravaged by Ebola.

Doing so reflects a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of what can threaten national security—a point made by Prof. Oona Hathaway and others. The COVID-19 crisis showcases that non-traditional security threats can have a devastating effect on human security—projected coronavirus deaths in the U.S. could surpass American lives lost in World War II.  

Alternatively, the Council could issue a broad climate-security resolution that falls short of a formal Article 39 determination.  This is similar to the Council’s earlier efforts on HIV/AIDS that date back to 2000.  While the Council has been relatively slow (and heavily criticized) in its COVID-19 response, it did manage to address the COVID-19 crisis last month through the passage of Resolution 2532.

This Resolution called for a global 90-day ceasefire and requested that the Secretary General provide updates to the Council “on the U.N. efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic in countries in situations of armed conflict or affected by humanitarian crisis.”  An analogous climate-security resolution could adopt a similar approach, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities in climate hotpots and establishing a more formal dialogue between the Secretary-General and the Council.

Either way, there is space and precedent for Council action to address non-traditional security threats.  And climate change’s continual physical toll—130 degrees in Death Valley last week and ongoing California wildfires—will stress the need for any meaningful climate action.

Climate Change Transcends Borders and Governance Frameworks

Regardless of whether the Council can overcome its current political paralysis, this much is clear:  climate change is indifferent to both political borders and political calculations. Just as climate change massively destabilizes the physical environment, it will destabilize existing legal frameworks and institutions.

Climate-drive disruption will continue to occur, irrespective of international governance efforts. Greta Thunberg and other climate change activists have even brought their advocacy for massive climate action to the Council:  they recently critiqued the climate policies of two prospective non-permanent Security Council members (Canada and Norway) in this year’s election for a non-permanent seat on the Council.

The Council can and should proactively play a role in shaping governance solutions as we come to terms with an “all hands-on deck” approach to international climate governance.  These three concrete steps are a good place to start.

Links

(AU) Australia’s Big Polluters Required To Offset Just 1.2% Of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

The GuardianMurray Griffin of Footprint News

Analysis shows state and federal governments not exercising their powers to require companies to increase offsets

Australia’s top 65 greenhouse gas-emitting companies were responsible for about two-thirds of the country’s greenhouse output, a new analysis shows. Photograph: Bloomberg via Getty Images

Only 1.2% of the greenhouse gas emissions released by Australia’s top 65 emitting companies had to be offset under federal and state laws last financial year, an analysis has found.

The analysis by Footprint, a sustainability news site, examined both regulatory constraints imposed on businesses with emissions greater than 1m tonnes and any voluntary offsetting commitments they made.

Combined, the 65 businesses emitted 352.7m tonnes – about two-thirds of Australia’s total greenhouse output. The analysis examined operational emissions only, and did not consider “scope 3” emissions that result from the products the businesses sell.

Energy giant AGL was the biggest emitter, releasing more than 40m tonnes. The smallest on the list was the corporate group that owns rail freight business Pacific National, which emitted slightly more than 1m tonnes.

The federal government’s safeguard mechanism policy was promised to limit emissions from major industrial facilities, in part by requiring them to offset carbon dioxide above a baseline. States and territories can also require companies to offset emissions through environmental approvals and licences.

However, the analysis shows that both levels of governments have opted not to exercise these legislative powers. No state or territory government has imposed a carbon offset condition for more than a decade and there are only two state-imposed legacy offset conditions in place.

Both were enforced by the Western Australian government – one on Chevron’s Gorgon liquefied natural gas project, the other on Woodside’s Pluto LNG development. Between them they require less than 4.5m tonnes of greenhouse gas to be offset.

That equates to about 1.2% of total emissions from the 65 businesses that had to be offset.

At the federal level, the safeguard mechanism is explicitly designed to constrain only “rogue emitters”, so the 65 do not have to offset in the overwhelming majority of cases.

Five businesses had to surrender a total of 27,357 carbon credits last financial year to stay below their emissions limit, or baseline. It covered less than .0008% of the emissions released by the 65 entities.

Nearly a third of the companies examined – 22 – had set voluntary targets that they would reduce their emissions in line with the headline temperature goals of the Paris agreement or expressed some kind of aspiration to reach net-zero emission.

This group included several large corporate players: AGL, Origin Energy, Anglo American, BHP, Qantas, Fortescue and Telstra.

Another 17 were found to have voluntary targets that were outdated, not based on what climate scientists say is necessary, including a net-zero aspiration.

These included EnergyAustralia, Chevron, Alcoa, Santos, ConocoPhillips, Exxon, South32, Adelaide Brighton, Orica, Incitec Pivot, Boral and Newcrest. Two of these, Energy Australia and South32, say they intend to set goals that align with the Paris agreement.

The remaining 25 had no emissions reduction target. They include Delta Electricity, LNG company Inpex, Peabody, Whitehaven, APA Group, Viva Energy, Coles Group and the owner of the Loy Yang B coal-fired power station. Coles says it plans to change this and set a target.

The analysis also found that 25 of the businesses had not committed to adopting the globally recognised recommendations on climate-related financial disclosure, which set out what businesses should reveal to investors and shareholders about their exposure to climate risk.

Those who had not committed to the disclosure standards include Alcoa, Delta, Peabody, Yancoal, Virgin Australia, Pratt Holdings, CITIC Pacific and several government-owned energy businesses, including Queensland’s Stanwell and CS Energy.

Links

IPCC: The Dirty Tricks Climate Scientists Faced In Three Decades Since First Report

The Conversation

EPA-EFE/FELIPE TRUEBA 

Author
Marc Hudson is Research Associate in Social Movements, Keele University.
Thirty years ago, in a small Swedish city called Sundsvall, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its first major report.

Even then, the major dilemmas facing those who sought rapid action were clear.

An account by Jeremy Leggett, who had thrown in a well-paid job as a geologist for Shell to become Greenpeace’s climate campaigner, reported the events of that first summit, including an encounter with coal industry lobbyist Don Pearlman.
They had their heads down, copies of the draft negotiating text for the IPCC final report open in front of them. Pearlman was pointing at the text, and talking in a forceful growl… As I walked past, I saw him pointing to a particular paragraph and I heard him say, quite distinctly, ‘if we can cut a deal here…’
Although it seems so naïve now, I was shocked.
Days later, a delegate from the Pacific island of Kiribati pleaded with the conference for a breakthrough in the negotiations.
Concerted international action is needed to drastically decrease our consumption of fossil fuels. The time to start is now. In the low-lying nations, the threat… of global warming and sea level rise is frightening.“
He paused before concluding.
I hope this meeting will not fail us. Thank you.
Shortly afterwards the US delegation "tabled a catalogue of attempted emasculations” of the text. Along with the Saudi and Soviet delegations, representatives of the richest and most powerful country in the world “chipped away at the draft, watering down the sense of alarm in the wording, beefing up the aura of uncertainty”.

It would be a painful three decades for people anxious to see action on climate change. For the scientists investigating the problem, it would often be a personal battle against powerful interests.

Kiribati is an island nation that is at risk of disappearing due to sea level rise. Nava Fedaeff/Shutterstock















The path to the summit

The accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, caused primarily by the burning of fossil fuels, had been worrying scientists since the 1970s. The discovery of the “ozone hole” above Antarctica had given atmospheric scientists enormous credibility and clout among the public, and an international treaty banning chlorofluorocarbons, the chemicals causing the problem, was swiftly signed.

The Reagan White House worried that a treaty on CO₂ might happen as quickly, and set about ensuring the official scientific advice guiding leaders at the negotiations was under at least partial control. So emerged the intergovernmental – rather than international – panel on climate change, in 1988.

Already before Sundsvall, in 1989, figures in the automotive and fossil fuel industries of the US had set up the Global Climate Coalition to argue against rapid action and to cast doubt on the evidence. Alongside thinktanks, such as the George Marshall Institute, and trade bodies, such as the Western Fuels Association, it kept up a steady stream of publishing in the media – including a movie – to discredit the science.

But their efforts to discourage political commitment were only partially successful. The scientists held firm, and a climate treaty was agreed in 1992. And so attention turned to the scientists themselves.

The Serengeti strategy

In 1996, there were sustained attacks on climate scientist Ben Santer, who had been responsible for synthesising text in the IPCC’s second assessment report. He was accused of having “tampered with” wording and somehow “twisting” the intent of IPCC authors by Fred Seitz of the Global Climate Coalition.

In the late 1990s, Michael Mann, whose famous “hockey stick” diagram of global temperatures was a key part of the third assessment report, came under fire from right-wing thinktanks and even the Attorney General of Virginia. Mann called this attempt to pick on scientists perceived to be vulnerable to pressure “the Serengeti strategy”.

As Mann himself wrote
By singling out a sole scientist, it is possible for the forces of “anti-science” to bring many more resources to bear on one individual, exerting enormous pressure from multiple directions at once, making defence difficult. It is similar to what happens when a group of lions on the Serengeti seek out a vulnerable individual zebra at the edge of a herd.

Michael Mann - The Serengeti Strategy

As the evidence became ever more compelling, the attacks on scientists escalated.

In late 2009, just before the Copenhagen climate summit, emails among climate scientists were hacked and released. They were carefully selected to make it seem as if scientists were guilty of scaremongering.

The so-called “climategate” scandal was not to blame for Copenhagen’s failure, but it kept climate deniers energised and helped muddy the waters enough to make it seem as if legitimate doubt persisted over the scientific consensus.

What next?

Thanks to COVID-19, the next IPCC assessment report probably won’t be delivered before the delayed conference in Glasgow at the end of 2021. There probably won’t be anything in it that tells us more than what we already know – CO₂ levels are rising, the consequences are piling up, and campaigns for delaying meaningful action have been spectacularly successful for the last 30 years.

Some scientists, including Columbia University professor James Hansen, argue that the agonising efforts of scientists to avoid provoking accusations of alarmism have led to an innate optimism bias. The official science reported by the IPCC may in some cases be a cautious underestimate. It’s likely worse – much worse – than we think.

If the last three decades have taught the international community anything, it’s that “the science” is not a single, settled entity which, presented properly, will spur everyone to action. There are no shortcuts to the technological, economic, political and cultural changes needed to tackle climate change.

That was true 30 years ago in Sundsvall. The only thing that has changed is the time in which we have left to do anything.

Links

Lethal Heating is a citizens' initiative