23/12/2025

Do electric and hybrid vehicles really cut Australia’s transport emissions? - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Australia’s transport sector is one of the country’s fastest growing sources of greenhouse gas emissions.

Electric and hybrid vehicles are often presented as an obvious solution, yet their real climate value depends on electricity generation, manufacturing emissions, and how quickly the national fleet actually changes.

Australia’s car fleet is large, old and geographically dispersed, raising questions about whether electrification can deliver meaningful emissions cuts this decade.

New vehicle sales are changing quickly, but the vehicles already on the road turn over slowly.

At the same time, Australia’s electricity grid is decarbonising, but fossil fuels still supply a substantial share of power.

These factors complicate claims that electric vehicles automatically solve transport emissions.

This investigation examines whether electric and hybrid vehicles genuinely reduce climate change in the Australian context.

It analyses fleet data, lifecycle emissions, charging infrastructure, grid impacts and policy settings.

The evidence shows progress, limits, and risks that policymakers must confront now. (BITRE)

Australia’s vehicle fleet and why percentages matter

As at 31 January 2025, Australia had about 22.3 million registered motor vehicles, according to the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE)[2].

Passenger vehicles accounted for about 16.1 million of these, while light commercial vehicles such as utes and vans added another 4.2 million.

Together, these categories form a light vehicle fleet of about 20.3 million vehicles.

This is the most relevant base for assessing the climate impact of electric and hybrid vehicles.

Using this denominator avoids overstating progress by focusing only on new sales.

How many electric and hybrid vehicles are on Australian roads

BITRE data show around 259,700 battery electric vehicles registered nationally as at January 2025[2].

This represents about 1.28 percent of Australia’s light vehicle fleet.

Conventional hybrid electric vehicles numbered about 709,100, equivalent to roughly 3.5 percent of light vehicles.

Plug in hybrid vehicles are not separately enumerated in BITRE’s national registration tables.

This lack of disaggregated data limits precise assessment of their fleet share and emissions impact.

Even when battery electric and conventional hybrids are combined, fewer than 5 percent of light vehicles use electric drivetrains.

The overwhelming majority of vehicles on Australian roads still rely solely on petrol or diesel.

Sales momentum versus slow fleet turnover

New vehicle sales tell a very different story from fleet composition.

Battery electric vehicles accounted for about 13 percent of new passenger vehicle sales in 2024, according to the National Transport Commission[6].

Hybrid vehicles captured an even larger share of new sales, driven by fuel savings and lower upfront costs.

Despite this momentum, Australia’s average vehicle age exceeds 10 years.

Slow turnover means emissions reductions lag behind sales trends.

Policies that focus only on new vehicles risk overstating near term climate benefits.

Do electric vehicles reduce emissions on Australia’s grid

Lifecycle emissions include vehicle manufacturing, fuel or electricity use and end of life impacts.

Australian studies consistently find that battery electric vehicles produce lower lifecycle emissions than comparable petrol vehicles, even on the current grid[1].

The Electric Vehicle Council estimates that a medium electric car in Australia produces around 30 to 40 percent fewer emissions over its lifetime than a petrol equivalent.

As renewable energy expands, this advantage increases.

Manufacturing emissions for electric vehicles are higher, mainly due to batteries.

These emissions are typically offset after several years of driving.

Hybrids also reduce emissions compared with conventional vehicles, but by a smaller margin.

Electricity generation and future benefits

Australia’s electricity sector is undergoing rapid change.

Renewables now supply more than one third of national electricity generation, according to the Australian Energy Market Operator[7].

Coal still plays a major role, particularly in some states.

This means the emissions benefit of electric vehicles varies by location.

Drivers in states with higher renewable shares see greater emissions reductions.

Over time, grid decarbonisation is expected to amplify the climate benefit of electric transport.

Charging infrastructure and regional Australia

Public charging infrastructure has expanded rapidly in recent years.

Australia now has more than 1,270 public fast charging locations, according to industry tracking[3].

Most chargers are concentrated in major cities and along key highways.

Regional and remote areas still face coverage gaps.

These gaps affect confidence for long distance travel and regional adoption.

Home charging remains the primary method for most electric vehicle owners.

Renters and apartment residents face greater barriers.

Vehicle to grid and vehicle to home systems

Electric vehicles can do more than consume electricity.

Vehicle to grid and vehicle to home systems allow cars to export power back to homes or the grid.

ARENA supported trials in Australia show these systems can improve grid stability and reduce household energy costs[4].

Widespread adoption would require compatible vehicles, chargers and regulatory reform.

At present, only some models support these functions.

The long term potential is significant but uncertain.

Economic and equity challenges

Upfront cost remains a major barrier to electric vehicle adoption.

Although running costs are lower, purchase prices are higher than comparable petrol vehicles.

Government incentives vary by state and are subject to change.

Lower income households are less able to access new vehicles of any type.

Without targeted policy, electrification risks widening transport inequality.

Hybrids currently offer a more accessible emissions reduction pathway for many buyers.

Minerals, recycling and supply chains

Electric vehicle batteries rely on minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt.

Australia is a major lithium producer, linking transport electrification to domestic resource policy[5].

Battery recycling systems are still emerging.

Clear national frameworks are needed to manage waste and recover materials.

Supply chain transparency will influence public acceptance.

What policymakers and planners must do next

The evidence shows electric and hybrid vehicles can meaningfully reduce emissions in Australia.

However, benefits depend on grid decarbonisation, infrastructure rollout and equitable access.

In the next five years, governments must accelerate renewable energy, expand regional charging and improve data transparency.

Standards for vehicle emissions, apartment charging and battery recycling will shape outcomes.

Without coordinated policy, fleet electrification will be slower and less effective.

References

  1. Electric Vehicle Council, Lifecycle emissions of electric vehicles in Australia
  2. Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics, Road Vehicles Australia January 2025
  3. Australian EV Infrastructure data summary
  4. Australian Renewable Energy Agency, Vehicle to grid trials
  5. Australian Government, Critical Minerals Strategy
  6. National Transport Commission, New vehicle sales trends
  7. Australian Energy Market Operator, Integrated System Plan

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22/12/2025

Two Years to 1.7°C: the “Prediction Game” We Can’t Afford to Lose - Gregory Andrews


Author

Gregory Andrews is:

Australia’s sweltering through another early-summer heatwave, and I’m trying to decide whether to write about the weather outside my window - or the bigger climate system we’re reengineering on this planet.

I’ve chosen the bigger one.

This week, Professor James Hansen and colleagues published projections that the global temperature record could reach +1.7°C by 2027. That’s not a throwaway line from a pundit. It is a blunt forecast from one of the world’s most influential climate scientists - the former Director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

And if that number lands in your gut the way it landed in mine, good. It should.

Hansen expects the 12-month running average global temperature to dip for a few months - down toward about +1.4°C - before rising again as El Niño kicks back in during 2026. This will set up a potential new record in 2027.

So what’s the “so what”?

The “so what” is that our climate system is now at the edge of thresholds we once talked about as “mid-century” problems. And the warming is accelerating - not merely continuing.

Even if you treat the +1.7°C as a forecast with uncertainty (as all forecasts are), it’s the direction and the time horizon that matter. Two years is nothing in climate time. It’s less than a federal election cycle. It’s the span between Year 10 and Year 12 for a student who will live through what we’re locking in now.

A crucial note about baselines (because people will weaponise confusion)

Hansen’s figures are expressed relative to 1880–1920. The Paris and IPCC framing of 1.5°C and 2°C warming is typically relative to 1850–1900.  Those aren’t identical baselines, and the difference isn’t just academic - people will use it to dismiss, downplay, or “gotcha” this whole warning.

The honest way to say it is: Hansen’s +1.7°C isn’t automatically the same as “Paris +1.7°C.” But it’s still a massive flashing red light, because it describes a near-term world with global temperatures pressing into territory where impacts escalate sharply.

Why I’m taking this seriously

Hansen isn’t playing a parlour game. He explicitly says he’s playing a “prediction” game to test understanding and accelerate scientific progress. That matters, because the default mode of public climate discussion is still: understate, hedge, soften, reassure, defer.

But in the real world - outside seminar and Ministerial meeting rooms - every fraction of a degree is lived experience: 

  • heat that drags on the body, 
  • fire weather that sharpens, 
  • floods that arrive with less warning and more violence, 
  • reefs that bleach again before recovering from the last bleaching, and 
  • ecosystems and species that run out of “adaptive capacity” long before the modelling graphs look scary enough.
If we are flirting with +1.7°C in the next two years, it means the “window” we keep talking about is not a metaphorical one. It is an actual closing aperture, with real consequences.

The political temptation: shrug and move on

Here’s what worries me more than the number itself: the way the world is learning to ignore or absorb these numbers without action.

We’ve become skilled at living with cognitive dissonance:

  • That “record year” is becoming an annual headline.
  • That “unprecedented” is now a familiar adjective.
  • That “once-in-a-century” events are being rebranded as the new normal.

The human mind adapts to almost anything. That is a gift but also a curse. The climate system doesn’t negotiate with our coping mechanisms.

So we need to treat the next two years as a mobilisation window, not a period to wait for better news. Whether we hit +1.7°C on one dataset or another is less important than whether we keep adding to what’s driving the trend.

It’s time to hold our leaders to the speed of physics. If the climate can shift meaningfully in two years, then “net zero by 2050” without strong near-term cuts isn’t a plan - it’s just a slogan. And slogans don’t cool the planet!

I don’t know whether we will see +1.7°C in 2027 exactly as Hansen projects. But I do know what it means that such a projection is plausible enough to publish, sign, and stand behind.

In a sane political culture, this would be treated like an emergency briefing. 

Instead, it will compete with culture wars, cricket scores and Christmas shopping. That’s the real scandal.

Links


21/12/2025

Unlike politicians, thermometers do not lie - Julian Cribb

Surviving the 21st Century - Julian Cribb 


AUTHOR
Julian Cribb AM is an Australian science writer and author of seven books on the human existential emergency. His latest book is How to Fix a Broken Planet (Cambridge University Press, 2023)

If you thought 2025 was hot, wait till you hit 2027. With a resurgent El Nino, global temperature is predicted to reach +1.7 degrees Celsius above the 1880-1920 average.

That’s according to US climatologist Jim Hansen, the man who put global heating on the world map (back in the 1980s) and who has since been uncannily accurate in predicting what lies ahead.

Hansen says that 2025 will go out as the second hottest year on record, as El Nino slides into its La Nina phase. The three-year average, 2023-25, already smashed the Paris Accord target of +1.5 degrees. Peak heat coincides with peak El Nino. A small dip coinciding with the La Nina phase in early 2026 is likely to be succeeded by a new heat high in 2027 as El Nino resumes, he projects.

Meanwhile back in the USA, home of the rich and easily-fooled, Donald Trump has sought to drive yet another dagger into the heart of climate science by moving to close down the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Colorado, one of America’s leading climate research agencies, adding another 750 scientists to the country’s swelling unemployed.

Figure 1. Global surface temperature. Source: Hansen J et al, Dec 2025


“The Trump regime wants to dismantle a world leading climate research center. Why? Because the US has become a petrostate where the government has been captured by fossil fuel interests. They’re calling climate science “green new scam research”, in full-on denial of reality.” fumes Professor Stephan Rahmstorf, Head of Earth System Analysis at the Potsdam Institute.

Since his rambling tirade to the United Nations General Assembly back in September 2025, where he branded climate science a “con job” and “a hoax made up by people with evil intentions”, green energy “a scam” promoted by environmentalists who “want to kill all the cows”, Trump has doubled down on wild assertions about what is really happening with climate.

Unfortunately for Trump – and fortunately for the rest of humanity – thermometers do not lie. They show his blatherings on climate to be without factual basis. Around the planet, average temperatures have risen steadily for a century – and Hansen’s projections now show they are accelerating.

Figure 2. Accelerated global warming: Source Hansen J et al. 2025.

According to these latest forecasts, global heating will be in the range of +2-2.5 degrees by mid Century - up to half a degree hotter than previously predicted. They show unmistakably that the climate is getting out of hand – and well beyond the point where humans have much ability to influence the trend, as the Earth itself starts to vent more carbon as it heats.

Two degrees plus begin to push various regions beyond the tolerance levels for human life, especially those closer to the Equator. And they also begin to push world agriculture and the food system it supplies closer to collapse. Such temperatures were not expected to occur until late in the century. Now, it seems, they are on our immediate horizon.

They are also pushing Donald Trump into pole position as Big Oil’s champion liar and spreader of doubt and disinformation. Having already taken over and disabled the UN climate conference (COP) the fossil sector is seeking fresh advocates to cement its plans to destroy human civilisation for money – and in the US President has found its perfect ‘useful fool’.

To quote UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, “This toxic cover-up could push our world over the climate cliff. The sham must end. ”

Meanwhile the heat continues to rise, for everyone.

Julian Cribb Articles

20/12/2025

Climate Change Threatens Australia's Crop Heartland - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points


Australia's wheat belt is bracing for profound shifts as climate change accelerates.

North-West Victoria emerges as ground zero, with models forecasting up to 27 per cent yield losses under hotter, drier conditions likely by mid-century.1

State-wide, wheat production could drop 14 per cent, driven by rising temperatures and falling rainfall during critical growth phases.1

Southern cropping zones suffer most from prolonged droughts and heatwaves, while northern areas grapple with erratic rains.

Advanced simulations using APSIM and IPCC scenarios reveal stark declines across grains like barley and canola too.

Extreme heat days scorch crops, pests invade new territories, and seasonal windows narrow, squeezing farmers' margins.

ABARES reports highlight recent volatility, with 2025-26 forecasts hinging on elusive spring rains.6

Yet adaptation offers hope: drought-tolerant varieties and precise sowing could blunt the edge.

Policymakers face urgent calls to bolster regional resilience amid high-emissions pathways.

This investigation draws on peer-reviewed models and government data to map the risks ahead.

Regions at Risk

North-West Victoria stands out as the epicentre of projected crop declines.

Models predict 27 per cent wheat yield losses here under the IPCC's hotter-and-drier scenario by 2036-2065.1

Lower baseline rainfall exacerbates vulnerabilities during reproductive and grain-filling stages.

The broader Victorian wheat belt could see 14 per cent drops, as high temperatures overwhelm rain-fed systems.1

Southern Australia, including parts of New South Wales and South Australia, faces intensified droughts and aridity.11

IPCC projections confirm south-west rainfall very likely to decrease under all scenarios.11

Northern regions like Queensland encounter heavier floods but risk heat stress on sorghum and cotton.4

Yield Projections by Crop

Wheat yields in Victoria plummet most severely, with medium-term losses tied to emissions pathways.

Under RCP8.5 hotter-drier conditions, North-West Victoria wheat falls 27 per cent by 2036-2065; state-wide 14 per cent.1

Short-term (2016-2045) declines hover lower at around 10-15 per cent across scenarios, per APSIM simulations.2

Barley and canola, simulated via APSIM across 3000-plus stations, face similar rainfall-driven drops in southern belts.2

Sorghum in Queensland's Darling Downs holds steadier short-term but risks 20 per cent medium-term under high heat.6

Corn and cotton endure pest surges and moisture deficits, with vegetables wilting under heatwaves.4

ABARES notes 2025-26 wheat at 30.6 million tonnes nationally, but warns of spring frost and drought risks.11

Key Climate Drivers

Temperatures climb 1.4 degrees Celsius across Australian land since 1910, intensifying heat extremes.11

High degree-days above 29 degrees Celsius slash yields during grain filling, partially offset by rain.1

Rainfall variability worsens: south-west cools-season cuts heighten soil moisture deficits.11

Extreme heat days proliferate, wilting crops like tomatoes and berries.4

Pest pressures mount as fall armyworm spreads southwards with warming.14

Diseases thrive in humid extremes, while frost lingers as a reproductive-phase threat.1

Shifts in Seasons

Cropping windows compress as sowing rains arrive later amid autumn dryness.11

Short-term: delayed wheat sowing north of Dubbo to July if rains fail.2

Medium-term: heat hastens maturation, risking terminal drought.1

Long-term under SSP5-8.5: fire weather extends, squeezing harvest slots.11

Vegetative phases shorten, curbing biomass buildup.

Data Sources and Models

APSIM drives simulations for wheat, barley, canola, sorghum across thousands of stations.2

CMIP6 under SSP2-4.5 (medium) and SSP5-8.5 (high) informs IPCC regional factsheets.11

Bureau of Meteorology supplies daily grids for temperature, rainfall exposures.1

ABARES crop reports track real-time yields, like 2025-26 forecasts.6

DSSAT offers comparative validation, though APSIM excels in arid simulations.3

Uncertainties and Gaps

Model ensembles yield wide yield ranges, especially above two degrees warming.7

Temperature responses vary across 29 wheat models, inflating projections.7

Adaptation unaccounted: tech lifts productivity 68 per cent since 1989 despite climate.12

Pest expansions poorly quantified beyond armyworm cases.

Long-term gaps persist in vegetable, cotton under high-emissions.

Adaptation Strategies

North-West Victoria farmers should prioritise heat-tolerant wheat varieties.

Shift sowing to capture residual moisture, per APSIM rules.2

Southern zones invest in soil management to retain fallow rains.

Government fund insurance against volatility, per ABARES insights.12

National R&D targets pest monitoring, resilient canola for NSW-SA.

Integrated planning blends mitigation with extension services for real-time forecasts.

References

  1. Impact of climate change on agriculture in Australia: an interactive fixed effects model approach
  2. Methodology – Yield Gap Australia
  3. APSIM and DSSAT models as decision support tools
  4. Agricultural Impacts: How Climate Change is Altering the Australian Food Landscape
  5. Australian Crop Report September 2025
  6. The uncertainty of crop yield projections is reduced by...
  7. Regional fact sheet - Australasia
  8. ABARES says changing climate is costing every farm
  9. Climate change's effects on farming and agriculture

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19/12/2025

Hotter, drier, riskier: where climate change hits Australian farming hardest by 2050 - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points
  • Climate change has already cut average Australian broadacre farm profits by around 23 per cent since 2001, hitting south west and south east regions hardest.1
  • By 2050, hotter conditions and less cool season rain are expected to increase drought risk across the Wheatbelt and Murray–Darling Basin, especially under high emissions scenarios.2
  • ABARES modelling suggests farm profits could fall by up to about 50 per cent nationally by 2050 in severe climate scenarios without further adaptation.3
  • Wheat, barley and canola face higher heat and drought stress in low rainfall zones, with production likely to keep shifting toward higher rainfall fringes and some southern regions.4
  • Irrigated cotton and key horticulture industries are highly exposed to tighter water allocations and more variable inflows in the Murray–Darling Basin.5
  • Governments have statements and strategies, yet gaps remain in land use planning, water governance, rural infrastructure and transition support for affected communities.6

Across Australia’s vast farm belt, the climate story that once sounded like a distant warning is now running through balance sheets, crop maps and town main streets.

The country has already warmed by around 1.5 degrees since 1910, with more hot days and fewer cold nights, and the trend is projected to intensify by mid century.2

Cool season rainfall has fallen markedly across southern Australia, especially in the south west and parts of the south east, cutting inflows to dams and soil moisture that broadacre cropping relies on.2

ABARES estimates that changes in seasonal conditions since 2001 have already reduced average broadacre farm profits by about 23 per cent or $29,200 per farm each year, with the biggest hits in cropping regions of Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales.1

Looking ahead to 2050, national projections point to more intense heat extremes, longer periods in drought and further declines in winter and spring rainfall across much of the main grain and livestock zones.2

These shifts will not fall evenly, leaving some regions facing escalating production risk, others relatively buffered, and some seeing new crop opportunities as climate bands move.

Major crops such as wheat, barley, canola and cotton are expected to face higher heat and water stress in lower rainfall and northern fringes, while parts of southern and coastal regions may retain or even gain comparative advantage under some scenarios.4

At the same time, more variable inflows and hotter temperatures threaten the reliability of irrigation that underpins high value horticulture in regions such as the Murray–Darling Basin, Sunraysia and the Riverland.5

Yet while governments have begun to recognise these risks in national statements and adaptation plans, key gaps remain in how land use, water, infrastructure, insurance and community support are aligned with the climate that farmers are likely to face by mid century.6

For regional planners and policymakers, the next five years will be critical in deciding whether Australia’s farm regions arrive in 2050 as controlled landing zones or hard hit frontlines.

High risk regions by 2050

By the 2041–2060 period, climate models assessed by the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO indicate continued warming across all of Australia and further declines in cool season rainfall for large parts of the southern and eastern mainland, especially under higher emissions scenarios.2

These changes line up with ABARES modelling that shows the greatest climate related pressure on farm profitability in broadacre regions of south west Western Australia, the Murray–Darling Basin and other southern grain belts.1

South west Western Australia, including much of the WA Wheatbelt, has already seen around a 16 per cent drop in April to October rainfall since 1970, and projections point to further drying and more time spent in drought, putting rainfed wheat, barley and canola systems at high risk.2

In the Murray–Darling Basin, a combination of higher temperatures, lower average cool season rainfall and more intense droughts is expected to reduce surface water availability and increase competition between irrigation, towns and the environment, raising risks for irrigated cotton, rice, grapes and fruit production.2

ABARES projections suggest that under more severe future climate scenarios, without further adaptation, average farm profits could decline by up to around 50 per cent nationally by 2050, with the largest proportional falls in already marginal and drier regions on the northern and western edges of current cropping zones.3

For many towns in these belts, the combination of lower average yields, more frequent poor seasons and higher operating costs will test the viability of smaller farms and related local businesses.

Medium and lower risk regions

Not all agricultural regions face the same level of exposure, and projections suggest some coastal and higher rainfall zones may be relatively less affected in terms of water availability, at least under moderate emissions pathways.2

Parts of Tasmania and some higher rainfall fringes of south east South Australia and south west Victoria are projected to see smaller reductions or even slight increases in cool season rainfall in some seasons, leaving them better placed to support rainfed grains, pastures and horticulture as conditions deteriorate elsewhere.2

Northern Australia presents a more mixed picture, with evidence of increased rainfall and streamflow in some monsoonal regions since the 1970s and low confidence in the direction of future rainfall change, though higher temperatures and evaporative demand are likely to challenge extensive grazing systems and any future expansion of irrigated cropping.2

These medium and lower risk regions are not immune to heat extremes, fire weather and market shocks, yet they are comparatively better placed to host some of the crop and livestock production that may migrate away from the most drought exposed areas.2

Crop futures: wheat, barley, canola and cotton

Australian grains research points to a long term trend of wheat, barley and canola production shifting towards higher rainfall and more reliable parts of the Wheatbelt and away from drier margins, partly in response to climate pressures since the 1990s.4

Analyses cited by ABARES indicate that climate change has already reduced Australian wheat yields by in the order of a quarter since 1990 relative to a stationary climate, with notable impacts in drier south western and south eastern cropping regions, although improved management and technology have offset some of these losses.4

By mid century, higher average temperatures, more hot days during critical flowering and grain filling stages, and reduced cool season rainfall are expected to increase yield variability for dryland cereals and oilseeds in low rainfall zones such as the northern edge of WA’s cropping belt, parts of inland New South Wales and central Queensland.4

Conversely, some modelling suggests that under moderate warming, shorter season wheat and barley varieties combined with improved water use efficiency could maintain or modestly increase average yields in higher rainfall southern and coastal zones, although this depends on emission pathways and adaptation investment.4

For cotton, which is heavily concentrated in the Murray–Darling Basin and northern New South Wales and Queensland, the main climate risks are tighter, more volatile water allocations and extreme heat, which can damage bolls and shorten growing windows.5

Under scenarios where inflows into key Basin storages decline and competition for water intensifies, irrigated cotton production is likely to face more frequent cutbacks and pressure to shift toward more water efficient systems or alternative crops.5

Horticulture and water security

The horticulture sector, which includes fruit, vegetables, nuts and vines, is particularly sensitive to both short term climate variability and long term trends, given its reliance on secure irrigation and narrow temperature bands for quality and timing.7

Studies coordinated through the Climate Change Research Strategy for Primary Industries note that Australia’s increasingly variable climate and water constraints make horticulture inherently vulnerable, especially in irrigation dependent regions such as Sunraysia, the Murrumbidgee, the Goulburn Valley and parts of Queensland and Western Australia.7

Projected declines in cool season rainfall and streamflows across much of southern Australia are expected to increase competition for water between high value horticulture, other irrigated crops, town supply and environmental flows, raising the stakes for water sharing rules and infrastructure performance.2

In some coastal and Tasmanian regions where water availability may be less constrained and temperatures more moderate, there may be opportunities for expanded horticultural production, although this will require careful planning to avoid new environmental and biosecurity pressures.2

Uncertainty and climate scenarios

Climate projections for Australia to mid century are not a single forecast but a range of plausible futures that depend on global emissions pathways and how sensitive regional rainfall is to warming.2

There is high confidence that temperatures will continue to rise, bringing more heat extremes and higher evaporative demand, and that cool season rainfall will decline on average across much of southern Australia, although the exact size of the rainfall change varies between models.2

For northern Australia, there is low confidence in the direction of long term rainfall change by late century, meaning that mid century planning must accommodate both wetter and drier possibilities while recognising that hotter conditions will increase water stress in any case.2

ABARES emphasises that its estimates of potential profit declines by 2050 in severe scenarios do not factor in further adaptation, so realised outcomes will depend heavily on how rapidly farmers, industries and governments invest in new practices and risk management tools.3

Policy gaps: land, water, infrastructure and insurance

Despite clear evidence of emerging climate risks, Australian policy on climate change and agriculture remains a patchwork of federal, state and commodity based initiatives rather than a coherent national adaptation framework for farm regions.6

The Productivity Commission has previously identified regulatory and policy barriers to effective climate adaptation, including land use planning rules that do not adequately account for changing hazards, fragmented responsibilities and weak signals about who bears climate risks.8

In land use planning, zoning and development assessment often lag behind emerging climate risk maps, allowing new housing, intensive agriculture and infrastructure to be placed in areas likely to face more frequent drought, fire or flood stress over coming decades.8

Water governance in the Murray–Darling Basin and other systems has improved transparency, yet climate change is expected to reduce the reliability of historic allocation rules, and there is ongoing debate about how to share increased shortfalls between irrigation, towns and the environment.5

Rural infrastructure, from roads and bridges to digital networks and energy supply, is under pressure from more extreme weather, and current investment pipelines do not always prioritise projects that would enhance climate resilience in high risk farm regions.5

Insurance markets are also adjusting, with evidence that premiums for some climate exposed assets are rising or coverage is being restricted, which can leave smaller farm businesses and regional councils carrying more residual risk unless public risk sharing mechanisms are updated.5

Economic and social consequences for regions

Climate change is already affecting the economic performance of regional Australia, with estimates that changes in climate since 2000 have reduced average broadacre farm profits and contributed to slower agricultural productivity growth.1

Research on past droughts suggests that prolonged dry periods can cut agricultural income significantly and reduce employment in affected regions by thousands of jobs, with flow on impacts to local services, population and social cohesion.9

As climate pressures intensify, there is a risk that some already vulnerable communities in the most exposed belts will experience a slow erosion of farm numbers, youth out migration and a shrinking rates base, complicating councils’ ability to maintain infrastructure and services.

At the same time, regions that can combine relatively favourable climate exposure with new investment in renewable energy, value added agriculture and climate resilient infrastructure may be better placed to attract people and capital, widening disparities between districts.2

What governments can do now

Experts across ABARES, the Productivity Commission and state adaptation programs point to practical measures that can be taken in the 2020s to reduce long term agricultural risk rather than waiting for impacts to fully unfold.1

First, governments can embed latest climate projections into statutory regional plans and zoning schemes, steering new intensive agriculture, housing and critical assets away from areas projected to face the most severe declines in water availability and the highest hazard exposure.8

Second, water reform can be updated to test allocation frameworks against mid century dry scenarios, invest in modernising irrigation infrastructure where it delivers clear efficiency and environmental gains, and strengthen mechanisms for trading and sharing risk within and between valleys.5

Third, targeted extension and whole farm planning support can help producers adopt climate smart practices and technologies, with studies showing that integrated planning can raise profits even under more variable and warming conditions when combined with suitable crop choices and risk management tools.10

Fourth, rural infrastructure programs can be refocused to prioritise projects that enhance climate resilience, such as all weather freight routes, resilient power systems, communications and community facilities in high risk regions identified by climate and economic analysis.5

Finally, governments can work with industry and communities to design transition support for places likely to see structural adjustment, including retraining, regional diversification strategies and mechanisms to manage the social impacts of farm consolidation and changing water use.6

The next five years

Over the next five years, regional planners and policymakers need to lock in climate informed land use plans, stress test water and infrastructure systems against mid century scenarios, and scale up on farm adaptation support in the most exposed regions so that by 2050 Australian agriculture is operating within, rather than being overwhelmed by, the realities of a hotter, drier and more variable climate.1

References

  1. ABARES – Climate change impacts and adaptation on Australian farms
  2. CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology – State of the Climate 2024
  3. ABARES – Climate change research and future farm profitability scenarios
  4. ABARES – Simulating the effects of climate change on the profitability of Australian farms
  5. Climate Council – How climate change is damaging Australia’s economy
  6. Australian Government – National Statement on Climate Change and Agriculture
  7. CCRSPI – Climate change and the Australian horticulture industry
  8. Productivity Commission – Barriers to Effective Climate Change Adaptation
  9. Climate Council – Economic impacts of droughts and extreme weather on regional Australia
  10. Scientific Reports – Whole farm planning raises profit despite burgeoning climate risk

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18/12/2025

Climate change is remaking what Australia eats - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Within a generation, the climate will change what Australians grow, how much it costs and who can afford to eat well.5

Short term shifts to 2030 are already visible on farms in heat‑stressed livestock, more volatile harvests and higher food prices after floods and droughts.7

By mid‑century, without strong global emissions cuts and rapid adaptation, staple crops such as wheat and barley are projected to suffer falling yields in many grain regions, while horticulture and irrigated agriculture face tightening water constraints.4

By 2100, higher warming scenarios point to deep risks for national food production, labour capacity and supply chains, with flow‑on effects for prices and diet quality.5

These impacts will not be felt evenly, with northern Australia, inland drylands, river‑dependent irrigation districts and coastal fisheries among the most exposed systems.2

Remote, Indigenous and low‑income communities, already facing higher rates of food insecurity, are expected to be hit hardest by climate‑driven shocks to availability, access and food quality.5

Australia’s first National Climate Risk Assessment has now placed primary industries and food among the nation’s priority climate risk systems, highlighting escalating threats from heat, drought, bushfires, storms and floods to 2100.6

Agricultural groups warn that without accelerated adaptation, climate change will drive higher on‑farm costs, more frequent supply disruptions and long‑term pressure on supermarket shelves and household budgets.7

Experts argue that the response must reach far beyond the farm gate, combining policy reform, new technologies, land‑use change and a rapid build‑out of urban and peri‑urban food systems to keep Australia fed in a harsher climate.1

Short, medium and long‑term pressures

In the near term to 2030, Australian farms are already experiencing more frequent heatwaves, changed rainfall patterns and a higher risk of concurrent droughts and floods, which drive production losses and price spikes after extreme events.2

Analyses of the food supply chain suggest that climate‑related disasters will make temporary shortages and disrupted supermarket deliveries more common, even when national production is sufficient overall.8

By around 2050, climate projections for temperate Australia point to continued warming, less cool‑season rainfall and more intense droughts, with modelling for parts of the wheat–sheep belt indicating declines in wheat yields of up to several tens of per cent by 2080 without adaptation measures.4

Higher temperatures and changing water availability are expected to erode productivity in many irrigated and rain‑fed systems, unless farmers can shift planting dates, varieties, irrigation efficiency and farm layouts at scale.1

Looking to 2100, global assessments warn that under high‑emissions scenarios, climate change could significantly reduce agricultural and fisheries productivity in countries that are home to the bulk of the world’s population, including Australia, with impacts on food supply, prices and nutrition.5

Heat stress on outdoor work is also projected to cut labour capacity in hot regions, which can increase production costs and crop prices, adding another channel through which climate change affects what consumers pay for food.5

Which foods and regions are most at risk

The national climate risk assessment and sector reports highlight livestock, horticulture, broadacre cropping and irrigated agriculture as among the most exposed parts of Australia’s food system.3

Livestock are vulnerable to extreme heat that harms animal welfare and reduces productivity, while pasture growth and feed quality are affected by hotter, drier conditions and more frequent droughts.3

Horticultural industries, including fruit and nuts, face rising risks of sunburn damage during heatwaves, alongside reduced winter chilling in temperate regions and altered flowering and yields in both temperate and tropical crops as cool‑season temperatures increase.3

Studies of Australian mixed crop–livestock systems show that warming of around half to more than one and a half degrees by 2030 can shift the optimal balance between cropping and grazing, encouraging more land to be allocated to pasture in drier regions as an adaptation strategy.1

South‑eastern grain belts including parts of South Australia have been identified as facing potential wheat yield declines without adaptation by late century, although elevated carbon dioxide can partially offset some losses in some conditions.4

Coastal and river‑dependent regions are exposed to compounding pressures from sea‑level rise, ocean warming and changes in runoff, which can affect fisheries, aquaculture and irrigated crops that depend on reliable water flows.2

Who will feel the pain first

Climate change does not affect all households equally, and food security research shows that vulnerable groups typically include small‑scale producers, Indigenous communities and low‑income urban residents.5

In Australia, remote and regional communities already face higher food prices and fewer options, so climate‑driven disruptions to roads, freight and local production can quickly translate into shortages and sharp price rises in local shops.7

National climate risk assessments identify Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, communities and primary industries as systems that are particularly exposed to worsening climate hazards, including temperature extremes, drought, bushfires and floods.6

When extreme events hit multiple regions or happen alongside other shocks, such as pandemics, even robust supply chains can struggle, increasing the risk that remote communities see empty shelves while food remains available elsewhere in the country.8

Low‑income households, which already spend a higher share of their budgets on food, are particularly exposed when climate‑related events push up prices for fresh produce, meat and basic staples for months at a time.7

Heat, drought, floods, pests and broken links

Australia’s first National Climate Risk Assessment lists rising temperatures, drought, bushfires, storms, flooding and ocean warming among the priority hazards that will intensify under all plausible climate futures, with direct implications for food and agriculture.6

More frequent and severe heat extremes can damage crops, reduce livestock productivity, increase irrigation demand and raise the risk of heat stress for workers across the food system.2

Prolonged droughts reduce soil moisture and streamflows, cut yields and lead to higher input costs, especially for irrigation water, while intense rainfall and floods can cause severe soil erosion, nutrient loss and direct losses of crops and livestock.10

Climate change is also expected to increase some biosecurity risks, as changing rainfall and temperature patterns alter the survival, reproduction and spread of pests and diseases that affect crops, livestock and fisheries.3

Beyond the farm gate, climate‑driven disruptions to critical infrastructure and supply chains, such as road and rail closures during floods or fires, have already caused local food shortages and are projected to become more frequent as hazards worsen.8

Policy, technology and land management

Experts emphasise that limiting global warming through deep emissions cuts is essential to reduce long‑term risks to food systems, but that substantial adaptation is still required to manage the changes already locked in.5

International assessments of food, fibre and ecosystem products describe a suite of adaptation options for agriculture, including crop diversification, improved water management, climate‑resilient varieties, agroforestry and more flexible land‑use planning to strengthen resilience.5

Australian studies of mixed crop–livestock systems suggest that reallocating land towards livestock and pasture can improve farm profitability in some drier regions under moderate climate change, although this will not be feasible or desirable everywhere.1

Horticulture reports highlight the need for better soil and water conservation, protection from extreme heat, and infrastructure and management practices that can cope with more intense rainfall and flooding, alongside investments in forecasting and decision tools for farmers.10

The National Adaptation Plan framework signals that governments are beginning to integrate climate risk into planning for primary industries and food, including actions on water security, infrastructure protection, trade, finance and community resilience.6

Urban and peri‑urban food lifelines

While most food is still produced in rural Australia, urban and peri‑urban agriculture is emerging as an important part of climate resilience strategies in cities worldwide, helping diversify supply, shorten supply chains and provide fresh food during disruptions.5

Climate risk assessments of food systems underline how concentrated many supply chains have become, with limited storage and few alternative routes, which makes local and regional production hubs more valuable when disasters cut off major transport corridors.8

Urban farming technologies such as rooftop gardens, protected cropping, vertical farms and community market gardens can help produce vegetables, herbs and some fruits closer to consumers, reducing transport exposure and, in some cases, providing more controlled growing environments under heat and rainfall extremes.5

Peri‑urban food bowls on the fringes of cities, if protected from urban sprawl and supported with water‑efficient infrastructure, can play a key role in buffering metropolitan areas against short‑term shocks and supporting local food hubs and markets.8

Building climate‑resilient food systems will also require stronger governance for land use around cities, support for community‑run food projects and better integration of urban and regional planning with national adaptation policies for agriculture and food security.6

References

  1. Ghahramani A. et al. (2020), Land use change in Australian mixed crop–livestock systems under climate change
  2. IPCC AR6 WGII, Chapter 11: Australasia (final draft chapter)
  3. Farmers for Climate Action (2025), Time for Action: Climate Risk Assessment Report released
  4. Meat & Livestock Australia, Wheat and sheep production in a changing climate
  5. IPCC AR6 WGII, Chapter 5: Food, Fibre and Other Ecosystem Products
  6. Australian Government, Dashboard – Climate risks to primary industries and food (National Climate Risk Assessment)
  7. Farmers for Climate Action (2022), Impacts of climate change on our food supply
  8. Climate Council, Feeding a Hungry Nation: Climate change, food and farming in Australia
  9. Clayton Utz (2025), Australia’s first National Climate Risk Assessment report and National Adaptation Plan
  10. Hort Innovation, Australian horticulture’s response to climate change and variability

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