These voices are the loudest in Australia’s ‘climate wars’ - Christian Downie

The Conversation - Christian Downie

Author Christian Downie Christian Downie is Professor of Political Science, School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University.

There’s a reason political commentators refer to Australia’s “climate wars”. Every time a climate policy is put on the table, supporters and opponents come out in force and duke it out.

Last year, debates over Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions target led to a heated contest between various groups such as the Climate Council — arguing for strong action — and others such as the Business Council of Australia, which commissioned modelling to highlight the economic costs of a strong target.

This was not a one-off. Since at least the 1990s, emissions-intensive industries such as coal and gas and their lobby groups have had an outsized influence on climate policy. This includes groups such as the Minerals Council of Australia, which represents BHP, Rio Tinto and Whitehaven Coal, and Australian Energy Producers, which lobbies on behalf of BP, Shell and Woodside, among others.

Until now, we did not have a good understanding of who mobilises on climate policy in Australia, what side of the issue they fall on, and in which arenas they mobilise. In our new research, we found a core set of only 20 groups dominating climate policy debate in Australia, including gas corporations, industry lobby groups, environmental NGOs, and think tanks.

Who are these groups?

To find out which groups are most influential, we collected data on all organisations active on climate policy in Australia between 2017 and 2022. This included examining the number of groups as well as their volume of activity in the executive branch of government (responsible for implementing and enforcing laws, managing day-to-day administration and setting policy), the parliament and the media. 

The top 20 groups dominating climate policy
Based on volume of activity across all arenas (2017-2022)

Industry labels are inferred from broad service categories and do not appear in the original data.

Table: The Conversation Source: Mapping organised interests across arenas in Australian climate policy, Christian Downie & Darren Halpin Created with Datawrapper

For example, we identified 700,000 mentions of groups in articles about climate change from 13 media outlets, including The Australian and the Sydney Morning Herald.

As well as media records, we also built a database of organisations who actively consulted with government departments and provided evidence to parliamentary inquiries.

We found 20 groups accounted for more than half (52%) of all activity.

They included a mix of mining and energy firms, such as AGL, BHP and Rio Tinto and their lobby groups, such as the Minerals Council of Australia. It also included high-profile NGOs, such as the Climate Council, and think tanks active on climate policy, including the Australia Institute and the Grattan Institute.

It’s important to note we didn’t look at the content of the messages in the media, the parliament or in departmental consultations, just the number of organisations and the frequency of their activity.

Where do these groups stand on climate action?

Among the 20 groups, some are strong supporters of climate action, such as the Climate Council. By contrast, the Minerals Council of Australia has a long history of opposing climate policies dating back to the Kyoto Protocol in the 2000s and the short-lived carbon price in the 2010s.

Interestingly, there are more pro-climate groups than anti-climate groups. Most NGOs in our study tended to support action on climate change, including the Australian Conservation Foundation, Greenpeace and WWF.

Many of the business groups do not. But it’s not as black and white as this might suggest. Firms and business advocacy groups are not unified. A growing number of renewable energy companies now mobilise in support of climate policy, often through advocacy groups such as the Smart Energy Council.

Interestingly, many industries active on climate policy don’t have a hardwired position. Rather, they sometimes support and sometimes oppose climate policy. This is often because their commercial interests are only indirectly impacted by climate policies, such as firms in the technology or finance industries.

These somewhat “neutral” groups actually account for the majority of groups active on climate policy in Australia.

Does this vary by arena?

We also explored whether some groups dominate the media more than the parliament, or the parliament more than the executive. For example, are environmental NGOs more active in the media than in Senate hearings? Are business groups more active in consultations with the government departments that make up the executive branch of government?

Interestingly, we found the media is the only arena where fossil fuel interests dominate. For example, groups typically opposed to climate action represent 43% of all media mentions, compared to 20% in support and 36% neutral.

Engagement in climate change policy in media
Number of engagements by type of organisation and stance of the organisation.

News Media data are mentions in Australian news media on articles on climate change; Social media are mentions in tweets of seed accounts of climate policy active entities in tweets mentioning climate change.

Chart: The Conversation Source: Mapping organised interests across arenas in Australian climate policy, Christian Downie & Darren Halpin Created with Datawrapper

Engagement in climate change policy in legislature
Number of engagements by type of organisation and stance of the organisation.

Legislature data sourced from appearances/evidence to committee inquiries on climate change Chart: The Conversation Source: Mapping organised interests across arenas in Australian climate policy, Christian Downie & Darren Halpin Created with Datawrapper

Engagement in climate change policy in the executive government
Number of engagements by type of organisation and stance of the organisation.

Chart: The Conversation Source: Mapping organised interests across arenas in Australian climate policy, Christian Downie & Darren Halpin image Created with Datawrapper

This begs the question – why does the media appear to have a strong bias for reporting pro-fossil fuel messages?

One explanation consistent with overseas studies is simply that messages from business coalitions and very large businesses are more likely to receive media coverage than other types of organisations, such as environmental NGOs.

These organisations are likely to have high standing in the media because they are viewed as key players in policy debates with inside knowledge. Certainly in Australia, the largest firms and lobby groups mobilised on climate change are tied to? fossil fuel industries.

Do these groups matter?

As we sweat through another of the hottest summers on record, the federal government will rightly remain under pressure to put in place further policies to cut carbon pollution. In fact, recent polling shows one in two Australians want action on climate change “even if this involves significant costs”.

Who mobilises to support or oppose climate policies will likely have a big influence on policy outcomes such as increasing renewable electricity in the grid, phasing out petrol and diesel vehicles or stopping new coal and gas projects

Our research shows a core set of groups, including firms in the coal and gas industries, that are likely to have an outsized voice in such policy debates.

While this does not always equate to influence, it is an important precondition. In the media in particular, it appears fossil fuel interests have the loudest voice.

Links

Climate wars, carbon taxes and toppled leaders: the 30-year history of Australia’s climate response in brief​

With 2035 emissions targets set, what Australia does next will help shape global efforts to keep 1.5°C alive​

Membership and benefits: our members – Minerals Council of Australia​

Members – Australian Energy Producers​

Investigating networks of corporate influence on government decision-making: the case of Australia’s climate change and energy policies​

These voices are the loudest in Australia’s ‘climate wars’​

Australia’s 2035 climate target is coming. Here’s how we’ll know if it’s good enough​

What is a climate target, and how does Australia’s new one for 2035 stack up against other countries?​

Australian government lobbied to protect fossil fuel industry from IPCC criticism​

These voices are the loudest in Australia’s ‘climate wars’ (news feature)

Making polluters pay could fix Australia’s climate problem – and its budget: Michael Keating

 Pearls and Irritations - Michael Keating

A new report shows how making polluters pay will not only diminish the threat from climate change, but it can also help restore the budget and the economy.

Author Michael Keating Michael Keating is a former Secretary of the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Finance and Employment, and Industrial Relations.  He is presently a visiting fellow at the Australian National University.

The key domestic policy challenges facing Australia’s national government right now are climate change, restoring Australia’s fiscal capacity, and lifting Australia’s stagnant economic growth rate.

The best way forward in responding to these challenges are the tax changes proposed by the Superpower Institute in a very important report released on 29 January. 

Unfortunately, this report has been received very little attention by the mainstream media, and hence this summary that follows.

Climate change

As the Superpower Report demonstrates we are not on track to meet our climate targets.

“Sectors representing nearly 40 per cent of Australia’s emissions in 2005 have not begun to reduce. Transport emissions have risen by more than 20 per cent, industry by about seven per cent and stationary energy by more than 20 per cent. Almost all progress has come from land-use change”.

As the report says, “Australia’s current emissions-reduction policies are inefficient because they are narrow and fragmented, with large gaps in coverage… The current policy mix is also expensive to the Budget”, and none of the present policies raise the revenue required to support households and businesses in making the transition to net zero.

More than 50 years ago, the member countries of the OECD, including Australia, agreed that the polluter must pay.

Allowing free pollution is of course economically inefficient, as economic efficiency depends upon the people who destroy productive capacity and well-being being responsible for paying the costs of remediation. Otherwise, they have no incentive to stop polluting.

But making the polluter pay is not what we are presently doing in Australia, and most polluters incur no cost. The present Safeguard Mechanism is capturing only 30 per cent of Australia’s emissions. While the other main instrument for reducing carbon emissions – the Capacity Investment Scheme – has only commenced construction or commissioned less than 3GW of capacity compared to a target of 40GW of new renewable energy capacity and storage.

In addition, gas companies in Australia do not pay an adequate return for being allowed to extract the gas resources that really belong to all Australians. As the report finds, “Currently Australian state and federal governments take approximately 30 per cent of fossil fuel companies’ profits, through a combination of the corporate tax, royalties, and the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax”. This compares with the between 75 and 90 per cent that other major fossil fuel exporting countries typically take, without damage to their trade.

In particular, when fossil fuel prices rise to generate super profits, unlike in other countries, these additional profits in Australia do not translate into additional government revenue.

The Superpower Institute report has proposed two major new taxes to limit carbon emissions and secure a fairer return from our gas supplies: a Polluter Pays Levy (PPL), and a Fair Share Levy (FSL).

The PPL is a tax on the carbon embedded in fossil fuels extracted or imported for use in Australia. If applied to around 140 extraction sites operated by fewer than 60 companies, the Superpower Institute estimates that will cover more than 80 per cent of Australia’s emissions – well above the 30 per cent currently covered by the Safeguard Mechanism and the 34 per cent covered by policies for the electricity sector.

The PPL would begin in 2026 at $17 per tonne of CO2 equivalent and rise until it meets the EU carbon price in 2034, after which it would follow the EU price. In addition, the PPL should be accompanied by a European-style Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or CBAM, applied to energy-intensive imports so that domestic producers are not disadvantaged.

Modelling in the report shows that PPL would accelerate the reduction in emissions, delivering about 100 million tonnes of additional abatement after ten years, and more than double the total reductions expected under current policies.

The FSL is a tax on economic rents modelled on Norway’s Special Tax on Petroleum Income. Because rent taxes leave normal returns untouched, they do not affect future incentives to invest or trade, or Australia’s international competitiveness, and do not increase prices. In addition, because most of the profits from Australia’s oil and gas industry accrue to foreigners, a substantial share of this additional tax burden is borne offshore, while Australians are better off.

The proposed FSL of 40 per cent would lift Australia’s effective tax on fossil fuel profits to around 58 per cent, still at the lower end of global norms.

Restoring Australia’s fiscal capacity

The official forecasts show ongoing structural budget deficits forever of around two per cent of GDP. This represents a real danger to economic management, but it will not be fixed unless the government raises additional revenue or cuts government expenditures.

Of course, no-one wants to pay more tax, but the fact is that many government programs have been chronically under-funded for a decade or more. For example, the punitive university fee regime imposed by Morrison continues to distort tertiary education, equitable school funding under Gonski will not be fully realised until 2034, and public investment in universities, the CSIRO and R&D is lower in real terms than it was a decade ago. 

Hospital waiting lists remain too long, in part because aged care is still inadequate, with home care packages delayed for more than a year. Income support for unemployed people is widely regarded as insufficient, rent assistance remains too low, and public housing funding is well short of historic norms. In addition, it is generally agreed that we will need to spend a lot more on defence in future.

So clearly we need to raise more revenue, and the two taxes proposed in this report, represent by far the easiest way to make a substantial start.

It is estimated that together the two levies would raise on average $35.6 billion a year in additional revenue over the next 25 years.

However, the report recognises that many small businesses and households have limited opportunities to avoid the additional energy costs. The first call on this additional revenue must therefore be compensation payments to small businesses and households.

To insulate small businesses, the report proposes a Small Business Energy Compensation Payment of $325 per year, similar to the support provided by the former Energy Bill Relief Fund (EBRF) from 2023 to the end of 2025. It is estimated that this relief would require around $325 million per year of PPL revenue and would support around one million eligible small businesses.

The report proposes two payments to households to help insulate them from rising energy costs. However, as households electrify their homes these costs will fall.

First, a Household Compensation Payment will cover conservative estimates of the increases in energy bills before they are able to electrify their homes. The report estimates that this payment will cost an average of $4.1 billion each year, between 2026 and 2050, and it will be worth an average of $330 per household between 2026 and 2050, peaking at about $500 per household in 2033.

The second payment would be to those households, such as renters, those living in apartments and any others who face barriers to electrifying their homes. For the first decade of the PSL the report recommends committing $4 billion per year to supporting these people.

After these compensation payments are netted out, the report estimates that the PPL will deliver an average of $18.5 billion in net annual revenue through to 2050. In addition, it is estimated that the FSL will raise an average of around $13 billion a year.  So together these two taxes will make a very significant contribution to fixing our budget problems, as well as accelerating the desired reduction in carbon emissions.

Lifting Australia’s stagnant economic growth rate

Australia’s economic stagnation over the last 15 years or so largely reflects low investment as manufacturing investment has been wound back and we have switched to service industries. In addition, Treasury modelling released last September predicts that the annual value of fossil fuel exports will fall by more than $60 billion by 2030 as countries decarbonise their economies.

However, as the report says, Australia has a remarkable opportunity to accelerate its economic growth and maintain its exports in a decarbonising world. Australia’s renewable energy, mineral, and other natural resources give it a comparative advantage in producing and exporting zero-carbon, energy intensive goods such as green iron, aluminium, silicon, ammonia and fuels.

By embracing taxes on carbon pollution Australia will create the necessary incentives to promote the development of these new green industries and lift overall economic prosperity.

This report has provided a pathway for the Albanese Government to provide the leadership we expect from government and make a real difference to both the environment and the economy. Action along these lines will not cost the government electorally and it could well help isolate the Opposition.

Michael Keating Recent Articles

• Making polluters pay could fix Australia’s climate problem – and its budget
• Mark Carney – Values: an economist's guide to everything that matters
• Australia’s economic growth forecasts look upbeat – but the foundations are shaky
• Best of 2025 - Why Labor can’t be bold without confronting tax reform
• Best of 2025 - Assessing the Liberal Party's policy-making capacity
• Best of 2025 - The debate about net zero ignores the evidence
• Trump is delusional about Venezuelan oil
• Best of 2025 - Trump’s risky American economy

Lethal Heat, Soft Targets: Is the ACT’s New Climate Framework Enough for a Burning Canberra? - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

New ACT climate paper shifts from fixed targets to a flexible framework backed by rolling action plans.1 Strategy groups act under eight themes, keeping a 2045 net zero goal but soft‑pedalling 2035 milestones.2 Government concedes it is unlikely to fully meet its 2025 emissions target, exposing a credibility gap.3 Community and environment groups have branded the discussion paper a vague “placeholder”.4 The ACT’s claim to climate leadership is under pressure amid weak national progress and ongoing fossil fuel approvals.5 Public consultation runs to 18 March 2026, framed by advocates as a last chance to demand a plan with teeth.6

On a not‑too‑distant summer afternoon in 2035, the bitumen in a quiet Gungahlin cul‑de‑sac is soft enough to take a footprint, the air still and 40‑plus degrees even after 6pm, and the only movement is the shimmer above the roofs of tightly packed townhouses.⁷

Inside, an evaporative cooler labours uselessly in air that is both scorching and dry, while a young family huddles in the only semi‑bearable room, scrolling their phones to find the nearest public “heat refuge” promised in the ACT’s new climate strategy.⁷

Outside, the patchy street trees offer almost no shade, and the concrete paths radiate stored heat accumulated over days of a heatwave that climate models say will become far more frequent in Canberra by mid‑century.⁷

Against this backdrop of lethal heating, the ACT Climate Change Strategy 2026–35 arrives wrapped in the cool language of “overarching frameworks”, “thematic pillars” and “sequenced action plans”.¹

It promises a fair and inclusive shift to a net‑zero, climate‑resilient city by 2045, but leaves key decisions about how steeply emissions must fall in the 2030s to future documents and future ministers.¹

Community groups and climate advocates say that gap between embodied heat in suburbs like Gungahlin and the paper’s abstract language could be measured in extra ambulance call‑outs, higher power bills, and lives lost in poorly insulated rentals.⁴

Now, with consultation open until 18 March 2026, Canberrans are being asked whether a framework without firm 2035 targets is enough as the climate crisis accelerates around them.⁶

The promise of a new framework

The ACT Climate Change Strategy 2026–35 is pitched as an evolution rather than a rewrite, shifting from a single, detailed plan to an overarching framework supported by a series of shorter‑term action plans that can be updated as technology, economics and federal policy change.¹

The government argues this model will allow it to respond more nimbly to new risks and opportunities, rather than locking in a fixed list of measures in 2026 that may be out of date by the early 2030s.¹

In practice, that means the strategy sets the direction and principles, while detailed commitments – from building standards to public transport timetables and retrofit programs – are pushed into rolling action plans with shorter time horizons.¹

Officials frame this as a way to avoid the “set and forget” problem that plagued some earlier climate documents, in which ambitious targets were not always matched by delivery mechanisms or regular public reporting.¹⁰

But critics warn that flexibility cuts both ways: a framework can be a vehicle for rapid escalation, or a convenient shell into which future governments pour watered‑down commitments if political winds change.⁴

Eight themes, one net‑zero horizon

The discussion paper organises the next decade of climate action into eight themes that run from energy and transport through to resilience, housing, nature and the economy, each intended to knit mitigation and adaptation together.¹

The themes include energy, transport, buildings and urban form, the natural environment, waste and the circular economy, industry and innovation, community resilience and wellbeing, and government leadership.¹

Across these pillars the strategy reaffirms the territory’s long‑standing goal of reaching net zero emissions by 2045, building on interim targets of a 50–60% cut by 2025, 65–75% by 2030 and 90–95% by 2040 against 1990 levels.⁸

Having already shifted its electricity supply to 100% renewable contracts, the ACT locates the bulk of remaining emissions cuts in phasing out fossil gas, electrifying transport, improving building performance and reshaping urban development to reduce car dependence.¹⁰

Electrification is the dominant through‑line: the paper foreshadows a gas‑free future for new suburbs, continued expansion of zero‑emissions public transport, and support for households to replace gas appliances and petrol cars with electric alternatives powered by renewables.¹⁰

On the adaptation side, the themes bundle commitments around resilient infrastructure, urban cooling, emergency management and nature‑based solutions such as urban forests and restored waterways that can blunt the worst impacts of extreme heat and storms.¹

Electrification and resilient infrastructure

The strategy doubles down on the ACT’s reputation as an early mover on electrification, with a clear signal that gas has no long‑term future in the territory’s homes, businesses or public assets.¹⁰

Earlier commitments – including phasing out gas by 2045, delivering all new government buildings and public schools as all‑electric, and transitioning the government’s passenger fleet and bus network to zero emissions – are presented as foundations for the next phase rather than completed work.¹⁰

Electrification is framed not just as a climate measure but as a cost‑of‑living and health intervention, with more efficient homes, cleaner air and reduced exposure to volatile fossil fuel prices cited as co‑benefits.¹

Resilient infrastructure emerges as the other major pillar, with the paper canvassing upgrades to energy and transport networks, drainage systems and public assets so they can withstand longer heatwaves, more intense storms and increased bushfire risk.¹

This includes proposals for more shaded streets, climate‑ready schools and community facilities that can double as refuges during extreme heat and smoke events, acknowledging that even rapid emissions cuts will not prevent dangerous warming already locked in by past pollution.⁹

The target the ACT is likely to miss

Beneath the aspirational language, the paper contains a blunt admission: the ACT is unlikely to fully achieve its 2025 emissions reduction target of 50–60% below 1990 levels, despite its vaunted status as “the nation’s climate action capital”.⁸

The government points to population growth, slower‑than‑expected shifts in transport and building emissions, and national policy constraints as reasons the territory is struggling to bend the curve fast enough in the early 2020s.¹

That frankness is unusual in Australian climate politics, where missed milestones are more often buried than acknowledged, but it also raises uncomfortable questions about whether the ACT can credibly promise steeper cuts again in the 2030s.¹¹

Under the existing trajectory, the ACT must not only regain lost ground from the 2025 shortfall but accelerate towards its 2030 and 2040 goals, cutting deeply into transport and building emissions that tend to be slow and capital‑intensive to shift.⁸

Critics say this is precisely why the new strategy should contain binding, sector‑specific targets for 2035 and beyond, rather than leaving the steepness of the emissions descent curve to future action plans and future parliaments.⁴

Frameworks, hard numbers and the 2035 gap

The timing of the ACT strategy coincides with the federal government adopting a national 2035 target of cutting emissions 62–70% below 2005 levels, a benchmark that highlights how much of Australia’s decarbonisation effort is now expected in the decade after 2030.¹²

National projections released late last year suggested Australia was on track for only about a 48% cut by 2035 on current settings, well short of that goal, underscoring how quickly policies will need to tighten if the country is to stay inside a 1.5C‑consistent carbon budget.¹²

Against that backdrop, the ACT’s decision to stop short of spelling out explicit 2035 targets in its core strategy looks to some like a retreat from the transparent, time‑bound goals that once set the territory apart from larger jurisdictions.⁸

Climate advocates argue that a framework without clear waypoints risks allowing incrementalism to creep back in, especially as the “easy wins” of renewable electricity have already been banked and the remaining cuts require reshaping transport, housing and land‑use patterns.¹¹

Others, including some policy experts, say a framework could still drive deep cuts if it is paired with legally binding carbon budgets, transparent sectoral plans and independent monitoring that forces future governments to explain any backsliding in public.¹⁰

For now, the draft paper leans more on the language of “pathways” and “options” than on the hard numbers and enforcement mechanisms that would give those pathways real teeth.¹

Voices from the ground

Outside the bureaucracy, patience is wearing thin among parts of Canberra’s climate movement, which has long celebrated the ACT’s leadership but now fears the territory is coasting on past achievements just as the crisis intensifies.⁴

The Conservation Council ACT Region has described the 2026–35 discussion paper as a “vague”, “hastily put‑together placeholder” that sketches broad principles but ducks crucial decisions about timelines and accountability for cutting emissions this decade and next.⁴

Housing advocates, renters’ groups and health organisations are also pressing for much stronger commitments on minimum energy performance standards, mandatory upgrades for the worst‑performing rentals and more ambitious urban greening to cut lethal heat in low‑income suburbs.⁹

They argue that without concrete timelines and funding for measures like deep retrofits, street trees and accessible cooling refuges, the burden of rising temperatures will continue to fall hardest on people in older homes, social housing and outer‑suburban estates with little shade.⁹

For these groups, the debate is less about the elegance of the framework and more about whether their members will be safer, healthier and less exposed by the time the next mega‑heatwave or smoke‑choked summer rolls through the capital.⁷

The government’s collective action case

The ACT government, for its part, insists the strategy is grounded in collective action and wellbeing, highlighting co‑benefits such as lower bills, cleaner air, active transport, improved biodiversity and more liveable neighbourhoods as central to the plan.¹

Ministers argue that framing climate policy through health, equity and quality of life – rather than only tonnes of carbon – will make it easier to build durable public support for the disruptive changes required in housing, transport and energy systems.¹

The paper talks about partnering with communities, businesses and First Nations organisations to co‑design local solutions, from neighbourhood‑scale energy projects to nature‑based adaptation and culturally appropriate emergency responses.¹

Yet in the absence of binding interim targets or guaranteed minimum investment levels, those aspirations risk reading as hopeful rather than assured, leaving community groups to fight the same battles budget by budget and project by project.⁴

The tension between the government’s emphasis on shared wellbeing and advocates’ demand for harder edges – targets, timelines, enforcement and funding – runs through almost every section of the draft strategy.⁴

Climate leadership at a crossroads

For more than a decade, the ACT has revelled in its image as Australia’s climate pioneer, from legislating ambitious targets to contracting 100% renewable electricity and pledging to phase out gas without buying offsets to meet its goals.¹⁰

That leadership has often stood in stark contrast to national policy, where the Safeguard Mechanism, heavy reliance on offsets and a slow‑moving coal and gas sector have left Australia off‑track for both its 2030 and 2035 targets.¹²

At the same time, the federal government has promoted “Nature Positive” laws and global biodiversity summits while continuing to approve new fossil fuel projects and maintain a pipeline of coal and gas developments that independent analysts say would blow the global 1.5C budget.¹³

Reports released in the wake of recent disasters such as Cyclone Alfred have described Australia as a “fossil fuel behemoth”, noting that its coal, oil and gas exports are on track to cause several times more climate damage than its domestic emissions.¹³

In that context, the ACT’s new strategy will be read not just as a local policy document but as a test of whether a self‑declared climate leader can maintain its edge with frameworks and principles rather than firm timelines and enforceable carbon budgets.⁸

If the territory loosens its grip on clear targets while the rest of the country continues to expand fossil fuel production under a Nature Positive banner, the gap between climate rhetoric and lived reality in suburbs like Gungahlin will only widen.¹²

Adaptation, accountability and a deadline

Beyond emissions accounting, the 2026–35 strategy will shape how Canberra adapts to a climate already changing faster than many models anticipated, with hotter summers, shifting rainfall and compounding risks from fire, heat and smoke.⁹

That makes decisions about building standards, rental protections, insurance, planning codes, urban forests and public infrastructure as consequential for residents’ day‑to‑day safety as decisions about the territory’s next megawatt of renewable generation.⁹

Advocates warn that if the strategy does not lock in stronger adaptation measures by the mid‑2030s – from mandatory cool roofs and higher energy performance to expanded green space in heat‑vulnerable suburbs – the costs will show up in health statistics, lost productivity and widening inequality.⁹

They argue that a credible plan for the next decade must combine clear emissions trajectories with legally backed adaptation benchmarks, transparent reporting and independent oversight, so that no government can quietly let the framework drift while temperatures climb.¹¹

For now, though, the most tangible line in the sand is not a 2035 carbon budget but a consultation deadline: public submissions on the ACT Climate Change Strategy 2026–35 close on 18 March 2026, a date community groups describe as a final chance for Canberrans to demand a plan with teeth before the shape of the next climate decade is effectively locked in.⁶

References

1. ACT Government – Developing the next ACT Climate Change Strategy 2026–35 discussion paper
2. ACT Climate Change Strategy targets and net zero by 2045 commitment
3. ACT Climate Change Strategy 2019–25 – 2025 emissions reduction target (50–60% below 1990)
4. Conservation Council ACT Region – commentary on 2026–35 climate strategy as “vague placeholder”⁴
5. Fossil Fuel Non‑Proliferation Treaty Initiative – Exporting Harm: Australia’s fossil fuel expansion and climate hypocrisy
6. ACT Government – Climate Change Strategy consultation dates (29 January–18 March 2026)
7. AdaptNSW – Projected climate change impacts and heatwaves in the ACT region
8. ASBEC – Overview of ACT Climate Change Strategy 2019–2025 and interim targets
9. AdaptNSW – Climate risks, health and adaptation needs in the ACT
10. ACT Greens – Commitments on electrification, gas phase‑out and zero‑emissions fleets
11. Climate Action Tracker – Australia’s policies, offsets reliance and decarbonisation pathways
12. ABC News – Australia projected to badly miss 2035 climate target of 62–70% cuts
13. The Australia Institute – Nature Positive rhetoric and fossil fuel approvals critique

Back to top

Australia’s Climate Blind Spot: Why Schools Still Fail to Teach the Defining Crisis of This Century - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Climate change appears in the Australian Curriculum but is unevenly taught across year levels. [1] Primary school students are not guaranteed structured climate change education. [1] Secondary climate education is stronger but varies by subject and teacher confidence. [2] Climate literacy is increasingly recognised as essential for economic, civic and social resilience. [3] A coherent national approach could better prepare students for a climate-shaped future. [4]

Australia’s education system is quietly failing to equip young people with the climate knowledge they will need to survive and govern a warming world.

Whether climate change is taught in Australia’s primary and secondary schools is no longer academic. 

Climate change is already reshaping Australia’s economy, ecosystems, infrastructure and public health. 

The children currently sitting in classrooms will spend their adult lives navigating escalating heat, extreme weather, ecological disruption and energy transition. 

Whether they understand these forces will influence how well Australia copes.

Climate change does appear in the Australian Curriculum. But its treatment is fragmented, uneven and often delayed until late secondary school. As a result, many students complete their schooling with only a partial understanding of climate science, risks, and responses.

How climate change appears in the Australian Curriculum

Australia’s national curriculum is set by the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), with implementation overseen by States and Territories. In the most recent Version 9.0 update, ACARA significantly increased explicit references to climate change across learning areas.

ACARA documents identify more than thirty explicit mentions of climate change across science, geography, humanities, civics and cross-curriculum priorities. This represents a substantial increase compared with earlier versions, where climate change was frequently implicit or peripheral. ^[1]

In secondary school, climate change is most clearly addressed in Science and Geography, particularly in Years 9 and 10. Students are expected to learn about greenhouse gases, energy balance, observed warming, impacts and mitigation strategies. Civics and citizenship subjects may also touch on international climate agreements and governance.

However, the curriculum does not mandate a comprehensive climate learning sequence across all years. Much depends on subject selection, teacher confidence and school priorities.

Primary school climate education: largely optional

In primary school, climate change is rarely taught explicitly. While related concepts appear, such as weather, natural hazards, ecosystems and sustainability, there is no requirement that students understand climate change as a scientific and societal phenomenon.

Analyses of curriculum changes show that earlier geography content dealing with climate systems was reduced in favour of broader environmental themes. This has limited opportunities to introduce climate concepts early in an age-appropriate way. ^[5]

As a result, primary climate education often depends on individual teachers or schools choosing to go beyond minimum requirements. Some schools engage external programs or use state-based resources, but coverage remains inconsistent across jurisdictions.

This gap matters. Research shows that early climate education supports scientific literacy, critical thinking and emotional resilience. Delaying structured climate learning until adolescence risks leaving students unprepared to understand climate impacts they are already experiencing.

Secondary school climate education: uneven depth

Secondary schools provide more formal exposure to climate change, particularly in science. Students typically learn about the enhanced greenhouse effect, evidence of warming and human drivers. Geography classes may examine climate impacts, adaptation, and mitigation.

Yet even at this level, coverage is uneven. Climate change may be treated as one unit among many, sometimes rushed or disconnected from real-world decision making. Teachers report uncertainty about how deeply to engage with policy, economics, or social justice dimensions.

Studies and departmental reviews indicate that some educators avoid climate change due to perceived controversy, lack of training or concern about community backlash. ^[2]

The result is fragmented climate literacy. Students may learn isolated facts without understanding how climate change shapes energy systems, food security, employment, health, or governance.

Barriers teachers face

Teachers operate within crowded curricula and tight time constraints. Literacy and numeracy targets dominate early schooling, leaving little room for emerging cross-cutting issues unless they are clearly prioritised.

Many teachers report limited access to professional development focused on climate pedagogy. While scientific consensus is clear, translating climate knowledge into age-appropriate, solution-focused learning requires support.

There is also concern about student anxiety. Without guidance on constructive framing, some teachers avoid climate discussions rather than risk distress. This avoidance can inadvertently increase anxiety by leaving students without tools to understand or contextualise what they see in the world around them.

Why climate literacy matters

Climate change is no longer a niche scientific topic. It influences infrastructure design, public health planning, agriculture, insurance, defence, energy markets and labour demand. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) has repeatedly warned that climate impacts will intensify across Australia this century. ^[6]

Students leaving school today will enter a workforce shaped by decarbonisation, climate adaptation and disaster response. Climate literacy supports employability, civic participation and democratic decision making.

Young Australians themselves consistently express strong interest in learning about climate change and contributing to solutions. Education systems that ignore this reality risk disengagement and mistrust.

Should climate change be taught more comprehensively?

The evidence strongly suggests yes. A coherent national approach would ensure all students develop climate literacy regardless of school, postcode, or teacher background.

This would involve explicit learning outcomes at each stage of schooling, beginning with foundational concepts in primary years and progressing toward systems thinking, solutions and civic engagement in secondary school.

Climate change should be integrated across disciplines. Mathematics can explore data trends. Civics can examine governance. Arts can explore cultural responses. Science can provide the physical foundation.

Teacher support is essential. Commonwealth and state governments could expand professional development, resource hubs and curriculum guidance aligned with best practice and scientific consensus.

Preparing students for a climate-shaped future

Education alone cannot solve climate change. But without climate-literate citizens, Australia’s capacity to respond is weakened.

Schools shape how young people understand risk, responsibility, and possibility. Teaching climate change clearly, early and constructively is not political advocacy. It is preparation for reality.

The world Australian students will inherit is already warmer than the one their parents knew. Education systems that fail to acknowledge this are not neutral. They are unprepared.

References

1. ACARA: Australian Curriculum Version 9.0 and climate change
2. Australian Government Department of Education: Climate change education
3. IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report
4. Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO: State of the Climate
5. The Conversation: Climate change in the Australian Curriculum
6. CSIRO: Climate change science and impacts

Back to top

Burning issue: how the world’s biggest fossil fuel users are driving and reshaping the climate crisis - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Ten countries burning most fossil fuels drive the bulk of global CO₂ emissions and will decide whether the world stays within safe climate limits 1. Emissions from coal, oil and gas hit record highs in 2023 even as clean energy investment accelerates 2. Policy responses among major emitters range from aggressive coal phase‑outs to renewed fossil fuel expansion and subsidy regimes 3. By 2030, fossil fuel demand is projected to peak globally but remain stubbornly high in several producer economies 4. Communities in the top‑emitting countries already face escalating social, economic and ecological damage from a warming climate 5. Planners and policymakers must deliberately wind down fossil fuel production while scaling renewables, efficiency and just transition measures 6.

Heating the planet, one barrel and tonne at a time

Burning coal, oil and gas is still pushing global greenhouse gas emissions to record highs, even as the science makes clear that most fossil fuels must stay in the ground to avoid catastrophic climate change.²

Fossil fuels account for nearly 90% of carbon dioxide released by human activity, driving an “enhanced greenhouse effect” where extra heat is trapped in the atmosphere and oceans.¹

That additional heat is already supercharging deadly heatwaves, extreme rainfall, coral bleaching and bushfires, with impacts felt from Chinese manufacturing hubs to Indian farms and American suburbs.⁵

Responsibility for these emissions is highly concentrated, with ten economies led by China, the United States, India, the European Union and Russia producing the majority of global fossil‑fuel CO₂ each year.¹

These same countries are also central to solutions, because their policies on coal power, oil demand, gas infrastructure and industry will set the pace of the global energy transition this decade.⁴

Recent data suggests global demand for fossil fuels could peak before 2030 under current policies, but not fall fast enough to align with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C temperature goal.⁴

The choices these major emitters make now – whether to double down on fossil fuels or accelerate clean alternatives – will shape social stability, economic resilience and ecological survival far beyond their borders.⁵

The big ten: who burns the most

Recent emissions inventories show that China, the United States, India, the EU‑27, Russia, Japan, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and South Korea are the world’s largest national greenhouse gas emitters, dominated by fossil fuel combustion.¹

Together, these ten economies account for well over half of global fossil fuel consumption and nearly two‑thirds of greenhouse gas emissions, despite representing a smaller share of the world’s population.¹

China alone is responsible for more annual CO₂ from fossil fuels than any other country, driven by coal‑fired power, heavy industry and rising oil use for transport.⁹

The United States follows as the largest historical emitter, with high per‑capita oil and gas consumption, particularly in transport, buildings and electricity generation, although coal has declined.⁹

India’s emissions are growing rapidly from a lower base, as coal still dominates power generation and energy demand rises with industrialisation and urbanisation.⁹

The European Union’s emissions are falling overall, but gas‑fired power, industry and transport still produce substantial CO₂, and several member states remain reliant on imported fossil fuels.⁷

Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran stand out as major fossil fuel exporters whose domestic economies and state budgets are deeply tied to oil and gas production and associated emissions.⁵

Are the biggest emitters changing course

All of the top‑emitting countries have signed the Paris Agreement and pledged to reduce emissions, yet their actual policies on coal, oil and gas vary widely in ambition and credibility.⁵

China has committed to peak CO₂ emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060, has already met its 2030 non‑fossil electricity target early and is adding record amounts of solar and wind capacity, but it is also still approving and building new coal power plants.¹⁰

The United States has legislated major clean energy subsidies and standards through laws such as the Inflation Reduction Act, which are expected to cut power sector emissions and accelerate electric vehicles, yet federal leasing for oil and gas and continued exports undermine a full phase‑out trajectory.¹⁰

India has expanded renewables rapidly and announced a net zero target for 2070, alongside initiatives for green hydrogen and energy efficiency, but it continues to rely on coal for grid stability and affordable power for development.⁹

The European Union has adopted a 2040 climate target, strengthened its emissions trading scheme and set deadlines to phase out unabated coal in many member states, though gas infrastructure and political backlash threaten to slow reforms.⁷

Japan and South Korea have pledged carbon neutrality by mid‑century and are tightening electricity plans, joining international alliances to phase down coal, while still banking on technologies such as co‑firing ammonia and hydrogen in fossil plants.¹

Major producers like Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Indonesia continue to plan new oil, gas or coal projects, even as international institutions and civil society call for fossil fuel subsidy reform and clear end dates for extraction and combustion.⁵

What fossil fuel demand could look like in 2030

Energy outlooks from the International Energy Agency project that under today’s stated policies, global demand for coal, oil and gas will peak before 2030, largely due to rapid growth in renewables, electric vehicles and efficiency.⁴

In China, coal use is expected to plateau and then gradually decline this decade as solar, wind and nuclear expand, even though some new coal plants are being built for grid security and industrial demand.⁴

Oil demand in advanced economies including the United States, the European Union, Japan and South Korea is forecast to fall by 2030 as electric vehicles gain market share and fuel economy standards tighten.¹⁴

By contrast, oil and gas demand is projected to remain comparatively resilient in producer economies such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran, unless global climate policy and clean technology deployment move far faster than current trajectories.¹⁷

India and Indonesia are expected to see continued growth in energy demand overall, with scenarios showing coal and gas use peaking later if clean energy finance, technology transfer and grid upgrades fall short.⁸

Across all major emitters, announced pledges that fully implement net zero targets would cut fossil fuel use more sharply by 2030, but most countries have yet to align their detailed plans, investment decisions and subsidy regimes with those goals.⁴

The gap between declared ambition and concrete policy on fossil fuels will determine whether the world overshoots 1.5C in the early 2030s or manages a rapid, more orderly decline in emissions.⁹

Social and economic faultlines

The social consequences of continued fossil fuel use in the top‑emitting countries are already visible in worsening heat stress, lost labour productivity, food insecurity and mounting health impacts from air pollution.³

Farm workers in India and Indonesia are experiencing more days of dangerous heat and humidity, which reduce working hours and incomes while increasing the risk of heatstroke and kidney disease.³

In the United States, heatwaves and wildfire smoke linked to fossil fuel‑driven warming are straining health systems, raising mortality and adding billions of dollars in economic losses each year.⁶

China’s manufacturing regions and coastal cities face rising climate‑related disruption from typhoons, floods and droughts, threatening supply chains that serve global markets.⁹

Communities near coal mines, oilfields and gas export hubs from Russia to Saudi Arabia and Iran remain economically dependent on fossil fuel jobs and royalties, which exposes them to volatility as global demand shifts.⁵

Managing a just transition – where workers, regions and low‑income households are supported through reskilling, social protection and public investment – has become a central political challenge in each of these economies.⁸

Without deliberate planning, the eventual decline of fossil fuel industries could deepen inequality and trigger social unrest, especially in regions that lack economic diversification beyond coal, oil or gas.⁵

Ecological and cultural costs of endless combustion

Ecosystems in the major emitting countries are already under acute stress from the warming and weather extremes driven by continued fossil fuel combustion.³

Rising temperatures and changing rainfall are damaging forests, wetlands and croplands across China, India, Russia and the United States, increasing the risk of fire, pest outbreaks and crop failure.⁹

Ocean warming and acidification, fuelled by CO₂ from fossil fuels, threaten fisheries and coastal communities in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Iran, undermining food security and cultural practices tied to the sea.³

Indigenous communities from Siberia to the Persian Gulf and North America are seeing traditional lands and livelihoods transformed by melting permafrost, changing animal migrations and more intense storms.⁵

Cultural heritage sites and historic cities in Europe, the Middle East and Asia face increasing risk from sea‑level rise, flooding and heatwaves, challenging conservation efforts and tourism‑based economies.⁷

These ecological and cultural losses are cumulative and often irreversible on human timescales, which means every additional year of high fossil fuel emissions narrows the space for effective adaptation.⁹

The burden falls disproportionately on vulnerable groups – including low‑income households, Indigenous peoples and small‑scale farmers – who have contributed least to historic fossil fuel emissions.⁵

Politics of delay and transition

Fossil fuel politics in the top‑emitting countries are shaped by powerful incumbents, from national oil companies and utilities to industrial lobbies and regions reliant on coal and gas revenue.⁵

At recent UN climate summits, more than 80 countries have pushed for a clear global roadmap to phase out fossil fuels, while major producers and petrostates have fought to weaken or delay commitments.⁴

In the European Union and parts of the United States, political backlash against climate policies has emerged as parties capitalise on concerns about energy prices, jobs and cultural identity.⁷

China and India argue that developed countries should move fastest to cut emissions and provide more finance and technology for clean energy, highlighting historical responsibility and per‑capita disparities.¹²

Producer economies such as Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran depend heavily on oil and gas export revenue, which creates strong incentives to resist rapid global decarbonisation without credible pathways for diversification.¹⁷

International initiatives like Just Energy Transition Partnerships and emerging campaigns for a Fossil Fuel Non‑Proliferation Treaty aim to co‑ordinate finance, policy and oversight for a fair phase‑down.²

Yet current pledges and funding remain far short of what is needed to support coal regions in South Africa and Indonesia, oil‑dependent economies in the Middle East, and gas‑linked communities in Russia and the United States.⁵

What planners and policymakers must do now

For regional planners and policymakers in the world’s major emitting countries, reducing long‑term climate risk now depends on deliberately managing the decline of fossil fuel use rather than assuming markets will solve it.⁸

Planning systems need to embed carbon budgets and climate risk assessments into decisions on new power stations, industrial zones, housing developments, ports and transport corridors.⁵

Regulators and treasuries must phase out fossil fuel subsidies and reorient public spending toward energy efficiency, public transport, storage, grid upgrades and distributed renewables that cut both emissions and household bills.⁵

Labour market and education policies should support workers in coal mines, oilfields, gas plants and heavy industry with retraining, income support and early‑warning systems for industrial restructuring.⁸

Urban planners in megacities from Beijing to Delhi, Jakarta and Houston can reduce fossil fuel dependence by prioritising compact, transit‑oriented development, building standards that cut energy demand and heat‑resilient public spaces.³

Critically, planners must involve affected communities, Indigenous groups and workers in decision‑making, to build legitimacy for transition plans and reduce the risk of political backlash.⁵

Coordinated regional planning that aligns land‑use, transport, energy and industry can lock in lower‑carbon pathways now and avoid expensive retrofits or stranded assets later this century.⁴

Stopping the burn: adaptation, policy and the end of fossil fuels

Even with rapid emissions cuts, climate impacts will intensify in the coming decades, which means adaptation must happen alongside an accelerated phase‑out of coal, oil and gas in the top‑emitting countries.⁹

Adaptation priorities include heat‑resilient housing and workplaces, upgraded drainage and flood defences, climate‑smart agriculture, coastal protection and disaster‑ready health systems in vulnerable regions.³

To stop burning fossil fuels, governments need clear timelines to end new exploration, halt approvals for unabated coal plants and retire existing fossil infrastructure in line with 1.5C‑consistent carbon budgets.⁵

National climate plans should spell out how and when coal, oil and gas production and consumption will decline, backed by laws, economic instruments and public investment that make clean energy the default choice.⁵

Internationally, richer high‑emitting countries have a responsibility to provide far more climate finance and technology support to emerging economies, so they can leapfrog to renewables instead of locking in fossil‑fuelled growth.¹²

Ultimately, phasing out fossil fuels is less a question of technical feasibility than of political will, public pressure and the speed at which governments decide to shift power, money and planning away from coal, oil and gas.¹

The decisions taken this decade in Beijing, Washington, Delhi, Brussels, Moscow, Riyadh, Jakarta, Tehran, Tokyo and Seoul will determine whether future generations inherit a liveable climate or a dangerously destabilised one.⁹

References

1. Global Carbon Project – Fossil CO₂ emissions at record high in 2023
2. World Resources Institute – Countries phasing out coal the fastest
3. NASA – Emissions from fossil fuels continue to rise
4. Carbon Brief – IEA: Fossil‑fuel use will peak before 2030
5. IISD – Next generation national climate plans must phase out fossil fuels
6. Stanford – Global carbon emissions from fossil fuels reached record high in 2023
7. Climate Action Tracker – EU policies and action
8. UNFCCC / IISD – Fossil fuel phase‑out and a just transition
9. EDGAR – GHG emissions of all world countries 2024 report
10. Climate Council – Power Shift: The US, China and the race to net zero
11. List of countries by greenhouse gas emissions
12. IEA – Oil 2025: Analysis and forecast to 2030
13. IEEJ – A global energy outlook to 2035 with strategic considerations

Back to top