Twelve Years in the Making: How Goulburn Became the Nation's Community Energy Pioneer - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Goulburn's community solar farm, opened 21 March 2026, is Australia's first community-owned solar and battery project. 1 The Goulburn Community Energy Cooperative raised $3.2 million from 288 local investors alongside a $2.3 million state government grant. 2 A dedicated Community Fund directs profits to residents experiencing energy poverty, raising equity questions about access and administration. 3 The proposed 400 MWdc Gundary Solar Farm by Lightsource bp awaits a NSW planning decision, highlighting tensions between corporate and community energy models. 4 Australia lags Germany and the UK in community energy development, largely due to weak policy frameworks and grid access barriers. 5 Goulburn's project challenges assumptions about conservative regional resistance to renewable energy and offers a replicable national template. 6

In a paddock on the outskirts of a regional New South Wales city better known for its giant merino sheep statue than its clean energy ambitions, Australia quietly crossed a threshold it had been approaching for over a decade.

On 21 March 2026, the Goulburn Community Solar Farm was officially opened, becoming the country's first community-owned solar farm paired with a battery. ¹ 

The project is modest by utility standards: 1.4 megawatts of generating capacity, roughly 2,300 panels and a 4 megawatt-hour battery capable of powering approximately 500 homes. But its significance extends well beyond those numbers.

Twelve Years, One Cooperative

The path to that opening ceremony was neither straight nor smooth. The Goulburn Community Energy Cooperative began organising more than a decade ago, navigating a regulatory environment that had not been designed with community ownership in mind.

Grid connection rules, licensing requirements and the sheer complexity of establishing a cooperative energy company in Australia created friction at every stage. Financing was equally fraught: the project required patient capital from local residents, many of whom committed funds years before a single panel was installed.

In the end, 288 local investors contributed $3.2 million. ² 

A $2.3 million grant from the NSW state government bridged the remainder of the $5.5 million total cost. Without that public subsidy, the cooperative's financial case would have been precarious.

That dependence on government support raises a pointed question: if NSW policy settings shift, what happens to the business model? The grant appears structured as a one-off capital contribution rather than ongoing operational support, which offers some insulation. But the cooperative's long-term revenue depends on wholesale electricity prices and network tariffs, both of which remain subject to regulatory change.

Who Holds the Power?

Governance inside the GCEC follows cooperative principles: members hold voting rights, and the board is accountable to investors through annual general meetings. But with 288 members spread across varying levels of financial literacy and engagement, the practical exercise of oversight can be uneven.

Investor protections under Australian cooperative law are real but limited. If the cooperative underperforms or faces insolvency, members' recourse is broadly similar to that of shareholders in a small unlisted company. There is no government guarantee on returns.

The 4 MWh battery introduces a further technical risk. Battery storage systems degrade over time, typically losing capacity at a rate of one to two per cent per year. Whether the cooperative has set aside a replacement reserve, or built degradation into its financial projections, is not publicly disclosed.

Energy Poverty and the Limits of Community Benefit

One of the project's most distinctive features is its Community Fund, which directs a portion of profits toward residents experiencing energy poverty. ³ 

The intention is admirable: a clean energy project that explicitly addresses the affordability crisis affecting low-income households.

But the mechanism raises substantive questions. Energy poverty is not uniformly defined in Australian policy. Whether eligibility is tied to concession card status, household income thresholds or energy expenditure ratios appears to be determined internally by the cooperative rather than by an independent standard.

There is also a structural tension at the heart of the model. The residents most harmed by high electricity prices are typically renters, people in social housing, or those without the capital to invest in rooftop solar. Those same residents are unlikely to have been among the 288 investors who funded this project.

The Community Fund partially addresses that gap, but the proportion of profits allocated to it has not been made publicly explicit. Whether that figure is locked into the cooperative's constitution, or subject to annual discretion by the board, matters considerably for accountability.

Gundary: A Different Kind of Solar

Just to the southeast of Goulburn, a very different kind of solar project is working its way through the NSW planning system. Lightsource bp, a renewable energy company jointly owned by the oil major BP, has proposed the Gundary Solar Farm: a 400 megawatt project that would be roughly 280 times the generating capacity of the community farm. ⁴

A referral decision from the NSW Department of Planning is expected in the first half of 2026. The project is classified as a State Significant Development, a planning category that streamlines assessment but can limit the avenues available to local objectors.

The contrast between Gundary and the GCEC project is instructive. One was built from within the community over 12 years. The other is being developed by a multinational with a corporate community benefit framework that, while not without substance, is qualitatively different from a cooperative whose profits legally belong to its members.

Community engagement processes for large-scale commercial developments typically involve consultation periods, benefit-sharing agreements and local employment commitments. Whether those translate into genuine community ownership of outcomes, rather than managed community acceptance, is a distinction energy policy researchers have debated for years.

Scale, Reach and the Urban Export Question

Further north in the Upper Hunter, the Goulburn River Solar Farm, developed by Lightsource bp and constructed by DT Infrastructure, represents the utility end of the spectrum. At 585 megawatts of peak capacity, it is projected to supply enough electricity for 225,000 homes annually. ⁵

But how much of that power actually reaches households in regional NSW, rather than being dispatched into a grid serving Sydney and other urban markets, is a question the project's developers do not publicly address in detail. Australia's electricity grid does not work like a local circuit: power flows where prices and transmission capacity direct it, not necessarily where generation occurs.

This dynamic has fuelled a persistent frustration in regional communities: they host the turbines and panels, bear the visual and land-use impacts, and then watch the electricity move elsewhere. The community cooperative model directly addresses this grievance by ensuring that at least some of the economic benefit stays local.

Why Australia Lags

Community energy cooperatives have flourished in Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom for decades. Germany alone had more than 800 energy cooperatives by the mid-2010s, many of them rural. Australia, by contrast, has struggled to develop the policy infrastructure to support equivalent growth.

The barriers are well-documented. Feed-in tariff structures have historically favoured large generators. Cooperative legislation varies by state and can be poorly suited to energy businesses. Grid connection rules impose costs that are prohibitive for small projects. ⁶

The fact that it took Goulburn 12 years to open what is described as the country's first project of its kind is itself a measure of how high those barriers remain. Advocates argue that three changes would make the most difference: standardised grid connection terms for community projects, a national feed-in framework that rewards local ownership, and federal co-investment vehicles modelled on the UK's community energy fund.

Politics, Place and a Shifting Electorate

Goulburn sits in a region that has historically returned conservative candidates to both state and federal parliaments. The fact that nearly 300 local residents chose to invest their own money in a solar cooperative, and that the project attracted bipartisan support in the lead-up to its opening, signals something about how the politics of energy is changing in regional Australia.

"What this farm shows is that Goulburn is not a backwards, conservative, country city," one of the project's proponents told the ABC. The remark was pointed, and deliberate. ¹

The CORENA fund listing for the GCEC notes that the farm sits on Gundungurra Country. Whether formal processes of free, prior and informed consent with the Gundungurra people were undertaken during the project's development is not addressed in publicly available material. That omission is notable, particularly as reconciliation and land rights frameworks become more central to infrastructure approval processes in NSW.

A Template, If the Policy Follows

Goulburn's community solar farm is genuinely significant: a proof of concept that resident-led clean energy is achievable in regional Australia, even against formidable structural headwinds. Its 12-year gestation is a caution, not a blueprint. The next community to attempt something similar should not need to wait as long.

Whether the NSW government will respond to Goulburn's milestone with the policy changes needed to make replication faster and cheaper remains unclear. A formal community energy strategy, dedicated co-investment funding, and reformed grid connection rules would each reduce the barriers substantially.

For now, the 2,300 panels southeast of Goulburn are turning sunlight into electricity, and directing a portion of the proceeds back to the people who paid for them. In a national energy market where households have often felt like passive consumers of decisions made elsewhere, that is not a small thing. 

The question is whether it remains a curiosity, or becomes a model.

References

1. ABC News: 'Electrons to the people' -- Neighbours build commercial solar farm (27 March 2026)  

2. Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals: Goulburn community celebrates Australia's first community-owned solar farm and battery (23 March 2026)  

3. Goulburn Community Energy Cooperative: What is community energy?  

4. Lightsource bp: Gundary Solar project page  

5. DT Infrastructure: Goulburn River Solar Farm 

 6. CORENA: Goulburn Community Energy Cooperative, NSW  

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Australia’s Climate Truth Gap: How Misinformation Shapes Policy, Trust, and the Path to Net Zero - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

In Australia, the battle over climate change is about science.
It's also about who controls the story.

Key Points

Climate misinformation in Australia persists through energy cost and reliability narratives1 Media ecosystems and political actors shape public understanding unevenly2 Digital platforms amplify misleading content faster than corrections3 Government responses remain fragmented and partially effective4 Public trust varies sharply across demographics and regions5 Misinformation risks undermining long-term climate policy and economic transition6

The Persistence of Climate Misinformation

Climate misinformation in Australia often centres on claims that renewable energy is unreliable, expensive, or insufficient to replace fossil fuels¹.

These narratives persist despite evidence from national energy markets showing growing renewable penetration alongside stable grid performance¹.

Research indicates that repeated exposure to misleading claims can erode public understanding of climate science, even when individuals encounter corrective information¹.

One prominent example involves debates over electricity prices, where rising costs are frequently attributed to renewables despite data linking price volatility to fossil fuel markets¹.

Media Influence and Information Ecosystems

Australia’s media landscape plays a decisive role in shaping climate narratives, with varying editorial approaches influencing public perception².

Analyses of coverage trends have shown that some outlets emphasise scientific consensus, while others amplify uncertainty or economic risk².

Differences in media consumption patterns, including commercial television, digital platforms, and independent journalism, create fragmented information environments².

These fragmented ecosystems allow misinformation to circulate within specific audiences, reinforcing existing beliefs rather than challenging them².

Political Actors and Industry Messaging

Political actors often play a central role in legitimising or contesting climate narratives, particularly during election cycles².

Statements that frame climate policy as economically harmful can resonate strongly in regions dependent on coal, gas, or mining industries².

Industry groups and lobbying campaigns have also contributed to messaging that emphasises energy security concerns while downplaying emissions impacts².

While some misinformation appears organic, investigations suggest that coordinated campaigns and strategic communications amplify certain narratives².

Digital Platforms and Algorithmic Amplification

Social media platforms have accelerated the spread of climate misinformation by prioritising engaging and emotionally charged content³.

Algorithmic systems can amplify misleading posts more rapidly than fact-checked material, increasing their reach and visibility³.

Short-form videos and influencer-driven content have further changed how climate information is consumed, often reducing complex issues to simplified claims³.

Data from international studies show that misinformation frequently outperforms factual content in engagement metrics, raising concerns about platform accountability³.

Government Response and Regulatory Gaps

The Australian government has introduced measures to counter misinformation, including public information campaigns and support for scientific communication⁴.

However, existing regulatory frameworks struggle to keep pace with the scale and speed of digital misinformation⁴.

Questions remain about whether climate misinformation should be treated as a distinct category due to its long-term societal risks⁴.

Transparency in government communication also affects public trust, with unclear policy messaging sometimes creating space for misleading interpretations⁴.

Public Trust and Climate Consensus

Public trust in climate science remains relatively high in Australia, yet varies across regions, age groups, and political affiliations⁵.

Surveys show strong overall support for climate action, though disagreements persist over the pace and economic implications of policy⁵.

Trust in scientists generally exceeds trust in politicians, shaping how different messages are received by the public⁵.

In resource-dependent communities, economic concerns often outweigh environmental priorities, influencing attitudes toward climate policy⁵.

Emerging Risks in a Digital Age

Artificial intelligence and synthetic media are expected to intensify misinformation challenges by enabling more convincing false content⁶.

The speed of digital information flows continues to outpace efforts to verify and correct misleading claims⁶.

International comparisons suggest that coordinated strategies, including regulation and public education, can reduce misinformation impacts⁶.

However, overemphasis on misinformation risks overlooking structural barriers such as economic dependence on fossil fuels⁶.

References

1. CSIRO Climate Science and Energy Systems
2. The Guardian Climate Coverage Analysis
3. IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Synthesis
4. Australian Government Misinformation Framework
5. Lowy Institute Climate Poll
6. OECD Misinformation and Digital Policy

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Australia’s Climate Crossroads: Policy Instability and the High Cost of Uncertainty - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Australia’s climate ambitions are colliding
with a decade of political volatility that continues to shape
investment, industry decisions, and global credibility.

Key Points

Policy reversals have increased perceived sovereign risk for investors1 Political polarisation limits durable climate policy agreements2 Business faces conflicting signals on fossil fuels and net zero3 State and federal policies often diverge or compete4 Uncertainty raises costs for clean energy and industrial transition5 Delays risk more abrupt economic adjustment later6

A Decade of Reversals and Investor Memory

Australia’s climate policy landscape has been defined by abrupt reversals, most notably the repeal of the carbon pricing mechanism in 2014¹.

That decision continues to echo in boardrooms, where investors assess not only economics but also the durability of policy frameworks.

Financial institutions now routinely factor in what analysts call sovereign policy risk, the likelihood that governments may alter or dismantle climate policies before projects reach maturity.

This risk premium can increase the cost of capital for long-lived assets such as renewable energy infrastructure or green hydrogen facilities⁵.

Pricing Policy Risk Against Global Benchmarks

In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act has provided long-term tax incentives that reduce uncertainty for clean energy developers¹.

Similarly, the European Union’s emissions trading system offers a stable carbon pricing signal, supported by cross-party political backing.

By contrast, Australia’s shifting safeguard mechanism baselines and evolving emissions targets have created a more complex risk environment.

Global investors increasingly compare jurisdictions not only on resource potential but on policy reliability over decades.

The Cost of Constant Redesign

Repeated adjustments to mechanisms such as the safeguard mechanism have forced heavy industry to revise decarbonisation strategies multiple times⁵.

Each redesign introduces regulatory uncertainty, which can delay final investment decisions on major projects.

For sectors like steel, aluminium, and LNG, these delays translate into higher financing costs and slower emissions reductions.

Executives describe a planning environment where long-term capital allocation must remain flexible, often at the expense of efficiency.

Projects Waiting for Certainty

Several large-scale renewable and hydrogen projects have progressed slowly, not due to technological barriers but because of unclear future policy settings.

Transmission infrastructure, critical for integrating renewable energy into the grid, faces similar delays tied to regulatory complexity.

Investors seek consistent signals from Canberra, including stable emissions targets, predictable carbon pricing, and clear approval pathways.

Without these signals, capital often flows to jurisdictions perceived as more stable.

The Weight of Long-Lived Fossil Assets

Australia’s economy remains deeply tied to coal and liquefied natural gas exports, both of which involve infrastructure designed to operate for decades.

This creates a structural tension between existing investments and future decarbonisation goals.

Policy volatility complicates decisions about whether to extend, retire, or replace these assets.

Investors must weigh the risk of stranded assets against uncertain timelines for global energy transition.

Political Polarisation and Climate Policy

Climate policy in Australia has remained politically polarised despite rising public concern about climate change².

The issue has become intertwined with broader ideological divisions over economic management and regional development.

Electoral geography plays a role, with resource-dependent regions often resisting rapid transitions.

Media fragmentation and party dynamics further reinforce divergent narratives about climate action.

Party Positions and Internal Divisions

The Australian Labor Party has committed to net zero emissions by 2050 and introduced reforms to the safeguard mechanism.

The Liberal Party of Australia supports net zero in principle but differs on policy mechanisms and timelines.

Internal divisions within both parties often shape policy outcomes as much as inter-party conflict.

These divisions can lead to incremental policy changes rather than comprehensive reform.

Election Cycles and Long-Term Planning

Election cycles introduce a layer of uncertainty that complicates infrastructure planning over 20 to 30 years.

Projects such as transmission networks or industrial decarbonisation facilities require stable policy horizons that extend beyond electoral terms.

Frequent policy shifts can discourage long-term commitments from both public and private sectors.

This dynamic reinforces a cycle of cautious investment and delayed action.

The Case for Independent Oversight

Some analysts advocate for an independent climate authority with binding powers to provide continuity across political cycles.

The United Kingdom’s Climate Change Committee is often cited as a model for such an approach.

However, critics argue that even independent bodies operate within political constraints.

The debate reflects broader questions about how democracies manage long-term challenges.

Conflicting Signals for Business

Major emitters face conflicting signals as governments approve new fossil fuel projects while committing to net zero targets³.

This dual approach creates uncertainty about the future role of fossil fuels in the economy.

Companies must navigate regulatory frameworks that can shift with political priorities.

The result is often a cautious approach to investment and innovation.

Corporate Strategy Under Uncertainty

Businesses respond to policy ambiguity by diversifying investments across both traditional and emerging energy sources.

Some firms continue to invest in gas as a transitional fuel, citing unclear long-term policy direction.

Others accelerate investment in renewables to hedge against future regulatory tightening.

This divergence reflects the absence of a clear and consistent policy pathway.

Carbon Markets and Political Scrutiny

Australia’s carbon market and offset frameworks have faced increasing political scrutiny in recent years.

Questions about the integrity of offsets have prompted reviews and potential reforms.

For businesses, changes to these frameworks can alter the economics of emissions reduction strategies.

Uncertainty in carbon markets adds another layer of risk to corporate planning.

A Household and Regional Perspective

In regional communities dependent on coal mining, policy uncertainty translates into real economic anxiety.

Workers face questions about job security and the pace of transition.

At the same time, households across Australia experience rising energy costs linked to infrastructure investment and market volatility.

These human impacts illustrate the broader consequences of policy inconsistency.

Federal and State Policy Tensions

State governments have often moved ahead with their own climate initiatives, creating a patchwork of policies across the country⁴.

New South Wales and Victoria have set ambitious renewable energy targets and established state-based schemes.

These efforts sometimes diverge from federal approaches, particularly in energy planning and project approvals.

The result is a complex regulatory environment for investors and developers.

Multiple Climate Regimes

Australia effectively operates multiple climate regimes, with differing targets, timelines, and mechanisms across jurisdictions.

This fragmentation complicates national coordination, particularly for transmission infrastructure.

Developers must navigate varying rules and approval processes in different states.

Such complexity can increase costs and delay project delivery.

Competition for Investment

States increasingly compete to attract clean energy investment through incentives and policy frameworks.

While competition can drive innovation, it can also lead to duplication and inefficiency.

Coordination through forums such as National Cabinet aims to address these challenges.

However, its effectiveness depends on political alignment across jurisdictions.

International Credibility and Structural Tensions

Australia’s position as a major fossil fuel exporter raises questions about its role as a climate leader⁶.

International observers assess not only emissions targets but also underlying policy consistency.

Participation in global forums such as UN climate negotiations places additional scrutiny on domestic policy coherence.

Inconsistencies can affect diplomatic influence and economic opportunities.

The Risk of Delayed Transition

Delays caused by political and policy friction may lead to more abrupt transitions in the future⁶.

Rapid policy shifts can impose higher economic costs and greater social disruption.

Early and consistent action is generally more cost-effective than delayed adjustment.

This dynamic underscores the importance of policy stability in managing long-term change.

Conclusion

Australia’s climate policy landscape reflects the tensions of a nation balancing economic legacy with environmental necessity.

The past decade has shown that policy reversals carry lasting consequences, shaping investor perceptions and influencing the pace of transition.

While recent reforms have sought to restore confidence, the underlying challenge remains: creating durable policy frameworks in a political system defined by change.

Businesses, communities, and governments must navigate this uncertainty while making decisions that will shape the economy for decades.

International experience suggests that stability, transparency, and bipartisan support are critical to attracting investment and achieving emissions targets.

Without these elements, Australia risks falling behind in the global transition to clean energy.

At the same time, the country’s abundant renewable resources and technical expertise offer significant opportunities.

Realising those opportunities will depend on whether policymakers can provide the certainty that investors and communities increasingly demand.

References

1. IEA Australia Energy Policy Review
2. Lowy Institute Climate and Politics in Australia
3. Climate Council Fossil Fuels and Net Zero
4. Australian Government Energy and National Cabinet
5. Clean Energy Finance Corporation Investment Insights
6. UNFCCC Paris Agreement Overview

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Australia's Climate Credibility Gap: Ambitious Targets, Fossil Fuel Billions, and a Mechanism Under Strain - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

The Albanese government has set a headline-making 2035 emissions target.
But independent analysts say the rate of cuts must triple, 
industrial baselines remain too generous, and 
$14.9 billion in annual fossil-fuel supports make the headline look hollow.

Key Points

Australia has set a 2035 target of 62–70% below 2005 emissions levels, but the CCA says the pace of cuts must triple by the early 2030s to achieve it. 1 Climate Action Tracker rates Australia's 2030 NDC "Insufficient" for 1.5°C, noting transport is projected to become the country's largest source of emissions by 2030 without stronger intervention. 2 The reformed Safeguard Mechanism's first full compliance year, FY2024, saw 219 covered facilities reduce gross emissions to 136 Mt CO2-e, with net emissions falling to 127.8 Mt CO2-e after offset surrenders. 3 Civil penalties for Safeguard non-compliance are capped at AUD$330 per tonne as of July 2024, which critics say is too low to force genuine capital investment in abatement. 4 Total fossil-fuel subsidies across all Australian governments reached $14.9 billion in 2024–25, equivalent to $28,381 per minute, driven mainly by the Fuel Tax Credits Scheme. 5 Australia gave final approval in September 2025 to Woodside's North West Shelf LNG facility to operate until 2070, with Climate Analytics estimating up to 4.3 billion tonnes of lifetime carbon emissions. 6

In September 2025, Australia told the world it would cut greenhouse gas emissions by 62 to 70 per cent below 2005 levels by 2035. 

On the same day, the Climate Change Authority warned that delivering even the lower end of that range would require the current pace of cuts to triple within a decade.¹

That tension, between an ambitious headline target and the structural barriers to achieving it, now defines the central challenge of Australian climate policy. 

Three interlocking problems have converged: 

• A target architecture that independent analysts say falls short of 1.5°C Paris alignment.
• A reformed industrial emissions scheme that is showing early results but carries serious design weaknesses.
• A government that simultaneously champions decarbonisation at home while subsidising fossil-fuel exports on a scale few peer nations match.

The 2035 Target: How It Was Set, and What It Will Take

The Climate Change Authority's final advice, submitted in September 2025, recommended a target range of 62 to 70 per cent below 2005 emissions levels by 2035.¹ 

The government accepted that advice in full, setting an identical range and submitting it to the United Nations as Australia's third Nationally Determined Contribution ahead of COP30 in Brazil.

The CCA's own annual progress report, released in November 2025, contextualised what the target demands. Annual emissions fell by 10 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in the year to June 2025, the largest drop outside of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹ 

But reaching the 2030 target requires accelerating that annual reduction to 18 million tonnes. Reaching the 2035 target will require cuts of 20 to 25 million tonnes per year throughout the remainder of the decade. That means the current pace must roughly triple.

The electricity sector has led the way. It contributed the majority of national emissions reductions in the past year, as coal-fired generation has been progressively displaced by large-scale solar and wind.¹ 

Renewables now make up over 40 per cent of Australia's two largest electricity grids, up from 13 per cent in 2015.

Transport is a different story. Climate Action Tracker projects that, absent stronger intervention, transport will surpass electricity to become Australia's largest single source of emissions by 2030.² 

Australia was among the last developed economies to adopt a vehicle efficiency standard, doing so only in 2024, alongside Russia. The government's own impact assessment estimates the New Vehicle Efficiency Standard will reduce cumulative emissions by 16 million tonnes between 2025 and 2030, or about 11 per cent below 2025 levels. Analysts consider that figure meaningful but insufficient.

Agriculture, heavy industry and the resources sector have shown little improvement. Emissions from fossil fuel production, agriculture and waste continue to flatline, according to the most recent national inventory data.² 

The Climate Change Performance Index found in November 2025 that Australia's government planning documents accompanying the 2035 NDC indicated an aim at the lower end of the announced range, with no measures in place to support delivery of the 70 per cent upper bound.⁷

The 2035 target remains unlegislated. The 2030 target of 43 per cent below 2005 levels was embedded in the Climate Change Act 2022, providing regulatory certainty for business and investors. The 2035 equivalent has not received the same treatment, leaving its enforceability dependent on successive governments' willingness to honour it.

The Gap Between Australia's Target and 1.5°C

Climate Action Tracker has rated Australia's 2030 target "Insufficient" against modelled domestic pathways for limiting warming to 1.5°C.² 

The assessment was issued after the government's December 2024 projections, which showed Australia tracking toward a 42.6 per cent reduction by 2030.

The CAT has also noted that continuous recalculations of land-use, land-use change and forestry projections have effectively reduced the apparent emissions reduction task for the energy, industry, agriculture and waste sectors.² 

Government projections of land-sector removals quadrupled between 2021 and 2024. The CAT has called for full transparency in land-sector modelling, cautioning that emissions reductions driven by revised forestry estimates represent statistical adjustments rather than structural economic change.

Climate Analytics, in a briefing published in August 2025, found that net emissions had dropped 29 per cent between 2005 and 2024, but that gross emissions had decreased by only two per cent over the same period.⁸ 

The organisation called for Australia to set separate targets for both net and gross emissions in its NDC to clarify the level of abatement required from the Australian economy.

The Climate Change Performance Index, published in November 2025, ranked Australia 56th globally, four places lower than the previous year, among the very low-performing countries.⁷ 

The index's national experts called for Australia to manage a phase-out of coal and gas extraction, and to end fossil-fuel subsidies.

The Safeguard Mechanism: First Results, Persistent Weaknesses

The reformed Safeguard Mechanism, which took effect on 1 July 2023, is Australia's primary tool for regulating emissions from large industrial facilities. It covers around 220 facilities emitting more than 100,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year, together responsible for a substantial share of national emissions.⁴

The mechanism sets declining baselines for each facility. The default rate of reduction is 4.9 per cent per year to 2030, after which baselines transition to industry-average benchmarks. Total net emissions from all covered facilities must not exceed 100 million tonnes in the 2030 financial year, against a cumulative cap of 1,233 million tonnes between 2021 and 2030.⁴

FY2024 was the first full compliance year under the reformed rules. The Clean Energy Regulator's data confirmed that total gross safeguard emissions fell from 138.7 Mt CO2-e in 2022–23 to 136.0 Mt CO2-e in 2023–24, across 219 covered facilities.³ 

Following the surrender of Australian Carbon Credit Units and Safeguard Mechanism Credits, net safeguard emissions fell to 127.8 Mt CO2-e. The CER issued the first Safeguard Mechanism Credits in February 2025, following that initial compliance reporting cycle.

Compliance was high overall, with 98 per cent of the 219 facilities not in an excess emissions situation by the April 2025 deadline.³ 

One notable exception was Fitzroy (CQ) Pty Ltd, the responsible emitter for two Queensland coal mines, which the Clean Energy Regulator confirmed was in an excess emissions situation of 583,079 tonnes CO2-e and accepted an enforceable undertaking after the company declared it lacked immediate financial capacity to purchase the required credits.

The penalty regime underpins compliance. Facilities that exceed their baseline without surrendering credits face a maximum civil penalty of one penalty unit per tonne of excess emissions. As of November 2024, one penalty unit equals AUD$330.⁴ 

Critics, including the Climate Change Performance Index's national expert panel, argue that even at that rate the penalty signal is too weak to compel large capital investments in abatement technology for facilities with high production values.

A structural concern centres on baselines for major gas facilities. The CCPI national experts assessed in November 2025 that the first public data released under the reformed mechanism showed emissions baselines are, especially for major gas facilities, more permissive than expected, with those facilities generating credits above what analysts had anticipated.⁷ 

The government committed to reviewing the mechanism's scope and design in 2026–27, once two years of post-reform data are available.

The mechanism currently applies to Scope 1 emissions only. It does not cover Scope 2 emissions from purchased electricity, nor Scope 3 emissions embedded in exported coal and gas. This matters acutely for Australia's LNG sector, where the combustion of exported gas by overseas buyers generates emissions that dwarf the facility's own operational footprint.

A carbon border adjustment mechanism is under active consideration. Consultation papers were published in November 2023 and November 2024, examining how to prevent carbon leakage as Australian industry faces competition from lower-regulation jurisdictions.⁴ 

Final recommendations are due to government in the near term, with cement, lime and clinker exports flagged as initial candidates for coverage.

The Subsidy Contradiction: $14.9 Billion and Growing

Consider the economics facing a small Queensland coal haulage company in 2024–25. Under the Fuel Tax Credits Scheme, the business received a refund on the excise it paid for diesel used off public roads. That refund is not incidental; it is the single largest item in Australia's fossil-fuel subsidy portfolio, worth $10.8 billion in 2025–26 and mainly benefiting multinational mining companies.⁵

When all federal and state supports are aggregated, Australian governments directed $14.9 billion in spending and tax concessions toward fossil-fuel producers and major users in 2024–25, a three per cent increase on the $14.5 billion recorded in 2023–24.⁵ 

The Australia Institute, which compiles the annual estimate, calculates that figure equates to $28,381 per minute, every minute of every day of the year.

The longer-term picture is starker. The forward-estimates value of fossil-fuel subsidies across all federal programs reached $55.5 billion in 2024–25, an increase of $1.2 billion on the previous year's estimate.⁵ 

The most recent figure, incorporating 2025–26 data, has risen further still. By March 2026, The Australia Institute calculated that total subsidies had grown to $16.3 billion, a 9.4 per cent increase on the prior year, growing faster than spending on the National Disability Insurance Scheme.

The Petroleum Resource Rent Tax, which applies to offshore oil and gas projects including those operated by Woodside, contributed a further $2.1 billion in concessions at the federal level in 2024–25.⁵ 

The total forward-estimates value of $55.5 billion is approximately 11.7 times the balance of Australia's national disaster response fund.

The Woodside Decision: A Defining Signal

On 12 September 2025, Environment Minister Murray Watt gave final federal approval for Woodside Energy's North West Shelf LNG facility to continue operating until 2070. The decision extended the plant's life by 40 years beyond its originally scheduled closure.⁶

Climate Analytics estimated that the extension, including the broader Woodside Burrup Hub development, could generate cumulative greenhouse gas emissions of approximately 6.0 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent between 2026 and 2070. That figure represents roughly 80 per cent of the total 1.5°C-aligned pathway emissions for Australia as a whole.⁶ 

A separate estimate, used in regulatory filings and cited by Mining Weekly, put the lifetime carbon emissions from the NWS extension alone at up to 4.3 billion tonnes.

The scope 3 problem is acute. Woodside has indicated the project extension would emit about 80 million tonnes of scope 3 emissions annually when exported gas is combusted by overseas buyers. Those emissions do not count toward Australia's national greenhouse gas accounts but contribute substantially to global warming.⁹ 

Under Australian national environment law, the federal government is not required to consider the climate harm a project causes globally, a legal loophole that continues to enable approvals.

The approval placed visible strain on Australia's bid to co-host COP31 with Pacific nations in 2026. Climate Analytics CEO Bill Hare described the decision as a "dangerous decision that gaslights the nation" and warned it would qualify as a "wrongful act" under the recent International Court of Justice advisory opinion on climate change.⁶ 

The Climate Change Performance Index noted that Australia's economic interests in maintaining fossil-fuel trade ecosystems "continually undermine its ambitions" in international climate diplomacy.⁷

What Credible Progress Would Look Like

Independent analysts broadly agree on the direction of reforms needed. The Safeguard Mechanism requires tighter baselines post-2030, with stronger constraints on offset use in sectors where on-site abatement is technically feasible.⁷ 

The CCPI experts specifically called for the mechanism to be strengthened by tightening baselines and limiting offsets where abatement is achievable, to secure deeper industrial cuts during this decade.

The price cap on government-held Australian Carbon Credit Units, set at $75 per tonne in FY2024 and indexed to CPI plus two per cent annually, is due for formal review in 2026–27.⁴ 

Many analysts argue the effective carbon price signal remains too low to drive deep decarbonisation in heavy industry.

The 2035 target needs legislative protection. Without that step, subsequent governments retain the legal authority to revise or abandon the commitment. The CCA's 2025 annual progress report recommended seven priority actions, including streamlining approvals for renewable energy projects and extending the Capacity Investment Scheme to maintain deployment momentum.¹

Fossil-fuel subsidy reform presents a harder political challenge. The Fuel Tax Credits Scheme has broad support from mining, farming and transport sectors. A phased reduction, structured to protect small operators and fund transition support for affected regional communities, would require sustained political will that neither major party has signalled. 

The Australia Institute noted in March 2026 that the Australian government itself had signed the Belém Declaration on the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels at COP30, recognising "the need to phase-out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies as soon as possible."⁵

On the international front, the government's Future Made in Australia agenda, which commits $22.7 billion in clean industry support over 10 years, offers a potential model for export diversification. Green hydrogen, critical minerals processing and low-emission manufacturing have been identified as areas where Australia holds competitive advantages. 

Analysts note, however, that the total value of those commitments remains substantially smaller than the forward-estimates value of fossil-fuel subsidies.

Conclusion

Australia's climate policy landscape in 2025 and 2026 is defined by a gap between ambition and structure. The 2035 target of 62 to 70 per cent below 2005 levels is the most ambitious the country has ever set. 

The institutional architecture, including the reformed Safeguard Mechanism, the Net Zero Plan and the Future Made in Australia agenda, represents a more coherent policy framework than Australia has previously assembled. Yet the pace of actual emissions reduction remains well below what the targets require.

Two structural problems dominate. The first is enforcement: baselines under the Safeguard Mechanism decline at 4.9 per cent per year to 2030, a rate designed to meet that nearer-term objective but not the steeper gradient needed in the years beyond it. 

Civil penalties remain modest relative to the capital costs involved in industrial decarbonisation, and many facilities continue to meet obligations through offset purchases rather than on-site abatement. 

The second is the fossil-fuel subsidy architecture, which continues to direct almost $15 billion per year toward the industries that domestic climate policy is simultaneously trying to constrain.

The Woodside North West Shelf extension crystallised that contradiction in its starkest form. A government that set a landmark 2035 target and a government that approved 40 more years of gas processing are not two separate governments. 

They are the same government, and that tension will define Australia's climate credibility for decades to come. 

How the country resolves it, through policy reform, legislative accountability or mounting international and legal pressure, will matter not just for Australia but for the Pacific communities and global climate trajectory directly affected by the choices made in Canberra.

References

1. Climate Change Authority, 2025 Annual Progress Report

2. Climate Action Tracker, Australia Country Assessment

3. Clean Energy Regulator, 2023–24 Safeguard Mechanism Data Insights

4. International Carbon Action Partnership, Australian Safeguard Mechanism Profile

5. The Australia Institute, Fossil Fuel Subsidies in Australia 2025

6. Climate Analytics, Australian Government Approves Woodside North West Shelf to 2070, September 2025

7. Climate Change Performance Index, Australia Assessment 2025

8. Climate Analytics, 1.5°C-Aligned Targets for Australia, August 2025

9. The Conversation, Woodside's North West Shelf Gas Extension Is Being Challenged in the Courts, February 2026

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NSW will continue to greenlight coalmine expansions – ignoring a warning from its own climate agency: The Guardian

The Guardian - Adam Morton  Penry Buckley

Minns Labor government criticised over strategy
as no new mines have been proposed for several years

NSW premier Chris Minns and natural resources minister Courtney Houssos. The government will no longer consider proposals for standalone greenfield coalmines. Photograph: Dean Lewins/AAP

The New South Wales government will continue to greenlight coalmine expansions, effectively rejecting a warning from its climate agency that approving new developments would be inconsistent with the state’s legislated emissions targets.

Releasing a statement on the coal industry’s future, the Labor government said it would no longer consider proposals for “standalone greenfield coalmines” on undeveloped sites, but would continue to allow expansions and time extensions at existing mines.

It said this balanced “energy security, jobs and regional development with the need to reduce emissions and meet NSW’s net zero targets”.

The NSW Minerals Council said the announcement was “very positive”, noting it had been several years since a greenfield mine had been proposed through the state’s planning system.

The state’s natural resources minister, Courtney Houssos, said the strategy meant NSW would remain a reliable coal supplier “where market demand exists”.

“Coal has powered NSW for more than a century, and it will continue to support our economy for decades to come,” she said. “We are providing workers and communities confidence about the road ahead, supported by new opportunities as global markets evolve.”

In December, the NSW Net Zero Commission said the government should consider the climate impact when making coalmine planning decisions, including the “scope 3” emissions released after the coal was exported and burned overseas.

It concluded new expansions were not consistent with the state’s legislative emissions reduction commitments, including a 50% cut by 2030, a 70% cut by 2035 compared with 2005 levels, and reaching net zero by 2050.

Georgina Woods, head of research and investigations at the Lock the Gate Alliance, said the 18 coal projects in NSW’s planning pipeline were all expansions and extensions, with no greenfield projects.

She said the proposed expansions and extensions would create hundreds of millions of tonnes of greenhouse gas pollution.

Woods said the strategy acknowledged global demand for coal was reducing, but did not provide a clear pathway to support communities most affected by the decline, and effectively rejected the advice of the Net Zero Commission ahead of a formal government response expected in June.

“The NSW government is using semantics to mask the truth that coal project approvals will continue as business as usual while everyone else in the state must work harder to reduce pollution and bear the costs of damaging climate change,” she said.

At least eight expansion approvals since 2023 election

The government has approved at least eight coal expansions and extensions since the 2023 election.

The NSW Minerals Council’s chief executive, Stephen Galilee, said the support for further extensions would be welcomed by “thousands of coalmining workers”.

Nearly 90% of the coal extracted in NSW is thermal coal, burned in power plants to generate electricity. It is lower quality than metallurgical coal, which is used in steelmaking and is considered likely to be phased out more rapidly due to clean alternatives.

The government said that while global demand for coal is expected to decline over time, it will remain an important part of the NSW economy as renewable energy and industrial processes are deployed.

The strategy was published as the state’s Environment Protection Authority released rules requiring major coalmines to directly reduce fossil methane pollution, one of the most powerful greenhouse gases driving global warming.

The EPA said high-emitting coalmines would need to capture, treat or convert leaking methane so it is less potent when released into the environment.

“Reducing fossil methane is one of the fastest ways we can limit climate impacts in the near term,” said the EPA’s chief executive, Tony Chappel.

Lock the Gate said the rules had been weakened since a consultation draft last year, and argued the changes breached a duty to protect communities from climate change.

Australian Conservation Foundation campaigner Freja Leonard said the fastest way to manage the state’s carbon budget was “cutting emissions off at the source”, and welcomed the commitment not to consider greenfield coalmine applications.

“The NSW government should now plan for the orderly phase-out of coalmining and support for coal workers.”

References

• NSW to ban new coalmines but allow expansions, despite climate warnings  
• NSW Coal Industry Strategy 2026–2050  
• NSW coalmine expansions would breach climate targets, Net Zero Commission warns
• Review of EPA’s Proposed Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Guide for NSW Coal Mines 
• Proposed Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Guide for NSW Coal Mines (Consultation Draft)  
• Breakneck Speed: Summer of Climate Whiplash in Australia

Climate Whiplash: Australia and the World Brace for La Niña - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

The global climate system may be preparing for a sharp reversal, 
one that could redraw weather patterns from Sydney to São Paulo.

Key Points

La Niña is the cool phase of ENSO, shifting global heat and rainfall patterns1 Forecast models suggest a possible transition from El Niño to La Niña within a year2 Eastern Australia faces elevated flood risk during La Niña periods3 Global weather extremes intensify, including hurricanes and droughts4 Food systems and supply chains experience uneven disruption and benefit5 Climate change may amplify ENSO volatility and compound risks6

Understanding La Niña

La Niña is the cool phase of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation, a recurring climate cycle driven by interactions between the Pacific Ocean and the atmosphere¹.

During La Niña, sea surface temperatures in the central and eastern Pacific become cooler than average, while trade winds strengthen and push warm water westward toward Australia and Southeast Asia¹.

This stands in contrast to El Niño, when weakened trade winds allow warm water to spread eastward, altering rainfall and heat distribution across the globe¹.

The oscillation operates like a vast planetary engine, redistributing heat between ocean and atmosphere, with transitions triggered by shifts in wind strength, ocean currents, and internal variability¹.

Scientists describe La Niña as a cool phase not because the planet stops warming, but because heat is temporarily stored in deeper ocean layers rather than released into the atmosphere¹.

Timing and Climate Signals

Climate models suggest a growing likelihood that a La Niña event could emerge within months of the current El Niño weakening, though forecasts remain uncertain².

Typically, La Niña develops in late winter or spring in the Southern Hemisphere and can persist for nine months to two years².

Multi-year La Niña events, such as those between 2020 and 2023, occur when ocean-atmosphere feedbacks reinforce cooling patterns².

A rapid transition from a strong El Niño to La Niña is not unprecedented, but it signals heightened volatility in the climate system².

Australia’s Flood Cycle

In Australia, La Niña often brings above-average rainfall to eastern states, including New South Wales and Queensland³.

Strengthened trade winds draw moisture-laden air toward the continent, fuelling persistent rain systems and increasing flood risk³.

The Murray-Darling Basin becomes particularly vulnerable, as saturated soils and full rivers leave little capacity to absorb additional rainfall³.

During the 2022 floods, entire communities in northern New South Wales were inundated, illustrating how repeated La Niña years can compound damage.

At the same time, bushfire risk often declines during La Niña due to wetter conditions, although heavy vegetation growth can later increase fuel loads³.

Farmers experience mixed outcomes, with strong crop yields in some regions offset by waterlogged fields, livestock losses, and disrupted harvests.

Shifting Global Weather Patterns

La Niña reshapes atmospheric circulation by intensifying trade winds and altering jet streams across the Pacific⁴.

These changes can suppress storm formation in the eastern Pacific while enhancing activity in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean regions⁴.

In the Atlantic, La Niña reduces wind shear, creating favourable conditions for more intense hurricane seasons⁴.

Conversely, parts of South America and East Africa often experience drought as rainfall patterns shift westward⁴.

Monsoon systems in India and Southeast Asia can strengthen, bringing heavier seasonal rains that support agriculture but also increase flood risks.

Infrastructure Under Pressure

Extreme rainfall during La Niña can overwhelm transport networks, damaging roads, rail lines, and ports in vulnerable regions.

Floodwaters frequently disrupt freight corridors in eastern Australia, delaying exports of coal, grain, and other commodities.

Global shipping routes can also be affected, as storms and altered currents complicate navigation and port operations.

Aviation faces challenges from shifting wind patterns and increased turbulence, which can alter flight paths and fuel consumption.

Food Systems and Uneven Outcomes

La Niña’s influence on agriculture is uneven, benefiting some regions while harming others⁵.

Australia and parts of Southeast Asia often see improved yields for crops such as wheat and rice due to increased rainfall⁵.

However, excessive moisture can damage crops, delay planting, and increase the spread of pests and diseases.

In contrast, drought conditions in South America can reduce maize and soybean production, tightening global supply⁵.

These opposing effects ripple through global markets, affecting food prices and food security in vulnerable regions.

In 2011, La Niña-driven floods in Queensland disrupted sugar production, highlighting how local weather events can have global economic consequences.

Health Risks and Human Impacts

Increased rainfall and flooding during La Niña create conditions for waterborne diseases, including cholera and leptospirosis.

Standing water also expands mosquito breeding grounds, raising the risk of diseases such as dengue and malaria.

Meanwhile, drought conditions in other regions can lead to food shortages and malnutrition.

Prolonged extreme weather events can take a toll on mental health, particularly in communities repeatedly affected by floods or crop failure.

In regional Australia, residents rebuilding after consecutive flood years report heightened stress and uncertainty about the future.

Climate Change and ENSO Volatility

Climate change is not expected to eliminate ENSO cycles, but it may influence their intensity and variability⁶.

Some studies suggest that extreme El Niño and La Niña events are becoming more frequent, though scientific consensus remains cautious⁶.

Warmer oceans can amplify rainfall during La Niña, increasing the likelihood of severe flooding in already vulnerable regions.

The interaction between long-term warming and natural variability creates a more complex and less predictable climate system.

Climate Whiplash and Historical Lessons

A rapid shift from El Niño to La Niña can produce what scientists describe as climate whiplash, where regions swing from drought to flood within short periods.

This pattern strains infrastructure, ecosystems, and emergency response systems.

Historically, La Niña events have shaped economies and societies, influencing crop yields, commodity prices, and migration patterns.

The 1973–74 La Niña contributed to widespread flooding in Australia and reshaped agricultural output across multiple regions.

Preparing for the Next Phase

Governments and industries are increasingly focused on resilience, investing in flood mitigation, early warning systems, and climate-informed planning.

In Australia, infrastructure upgrades and land-use planning aim to reduce exposure to repeated flood events.

Farmers are adapting through diversified crops, improved drainage, and more flexible management strategies.

Yet preparation remains uneven, particularly in regions with limited resources or high exposure to climate extremes.

Conclusion

The prospect of a rapid shift from El Niño to La Niña underscores the volatility of a climate system already under strain from global warming.

For Australia, the transition could mean a return to familiar patterns of flooding and disruption, even as communities continue to recover from recent extremes.

Globally, the effects will be uneven, redistributing risk across regions and sectors, from agriculture to infrastructure and public health.

The challenge lies not only in forecasting these shifts, but in managing their cascading consequences across interconnected systems.

As climate change intensifies, the line between natural variability and human influence becomes increasingly blurred, raising difficult questions about preparedness and responsibility.

The coming months may offer an early indication of how well governments and societies have learned from recent cycles, or whether they remain exposed to the same recurring shocks.

References

1. Bureau of Meteorology – ENSO Overview

2. NOAA – El Niño Southern Oscillation Forecasts

3. Geoscience Australia – Flood Risk

4. UK Met Office – ENSO Impacts

5. FAO – Climate Impacts on Agriculture

6. IPCC Sixth Assessment Report

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