Singapore’s sky farms: how one city is rewriting the future of food - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Singapore targets producing 30% of its nutritional needs locally by 2030 through intensive urban farming.1 Rooftop, indoor and vertical farms already supply a significant share of eggs, vegetables and seafood in the city-state.2 Vertical farms can deliver many times the yield per square metre and cut water use by over 90% compared with conventional farming.3 Climate change is projected to reduce global yields of major crops such as wheat and maize without strong mitigation and adaptation.4 Australian broadacre crops face earlier flowering, shorter growing seasons and lower yields in many regions by mid-century.5 Urban farming policy must be integrated with land-use planning, water governance, infrastructure and insurance to protect communities.6

On a humid Singapore morning, trays of lettuce, basil and choy sum move slowly along a conveyor under LED lights, stacked in vertical columns above a multi-storey car park rather than a paddock.

In a city where less than one per cent of land is zoned for agriculture, Singapore has turned rooftops, warehouses and even car parks into a distributed network of high-tech farms designed to buffer its 5.9 million residents against increasingly fragile global food supply chains.¹

The city-state now positions urban farming not as a lifestyle trend but as critical infrastructure, backed by a national goal to meet 30 per cent of its nutritional needs locally by 2030, up from single-digit shares a decade ago.¹

Singapore’s hen shell egg farms already supply around one third of domestic egg consumption, while local vegetable and seafood farms contribute a smaller but strategically important share of fresh food, much of it grown in urban settings rather than rural hinterlands.²

As climate change disrupts rainfall, heats up growing seasons and raises irrigation demand for crops like wheat and canola, cities from Paris to Melbourne are testing their own models of rooftop gardens, community plots and commercial vertical farms.³

For Australia, where broadacre crops underpin export earnings yet face projected yield declines in hotter, drier regions by mid-century, Singapore’s experiment offers lessons in how urban land, policy and technology can be redeployed to protect food security.⁵

International climate assessments already project that, without stronger mitigation, global yields of wheat, maize and other staples could fall sharply by the end of the century, pushing food prices higher and amplifying rural distress and migration.⁴

Urban food systems researchers argue that cities need to be treated as active food-producing regions, not just consumers of rural harvests, with planning laws, water rules and infrastructure investment redesigned accordingly.⁷

Seen from Singapore’s rooftops, the story of urban farming is no longer about boutique herbs in recycled milk crates, it is about whether dense cities can shoulder more responsibility for feeding their populations in a harsher climate.

And as regional planners weigh where future wheat, barley, canola, cotton and horticulture production can viably sit, the rise of urban agriculture hints at a more distributed, resilient food system in which skylines, not just soil, do part of the heavy lifting.

Policy framework: Singapore’s “30 by 30” as food security strategy

Singapore’s government anchors its urban farming push in the “30 by 30” target, a commitment to build capacity to produce 30 per cent of the country’s nutritional needs locally by 2030, compared with about 10 per cent in 2019.¹

The Singapore Food Agency’s data show that by 2022 local farms supplied about 29 per cent of hen shell eggs, 8 per cent of seafood and 4 per cent of vegetables, with most of this production occurring in land-efficient urban or peri-urban systems rather than traditional broadacre farms.²

The government has backed these ambitions with an Agri-Food Cluster Transformation Fund of around AU$70 million and a separate AU$35x30 Express grant, designed to fast-track high-tech farms using vertical systems, hydroponics and automation to ramp up output within the city’s tight land envelope.⁸

Since 2020, authorities have tendered the rooftops of at least nine multi-storey public housing car parks for commercial food production, effectively rezoning infrastructure for agriculture and signalling that food security is now a core use of public urban space.¹¹

These policy levers dovetail with broader national strategies on climate resilience and import diversification, recognising that a city importing more than 90 per cent of its food is acutely exposed to trade disruptions, extreme weather and geopolitical shocks.¹

For planners in Australian capitals, the Singapore model underscores the importance of treating urban agriculture as a strategic asset to be enabled through grants, land access and long-term targets, rather than a peripheral green initiative.

Technological innovation: vertical farms, data and resource efficiency

Singapore’s dense urban form has pushed farmers towards vertical farming, where crops are stacked in tiers under controlled lighting, temperature and nutrients, with climate systems managed by sensors and algorithms rather than weather forecasts.⁸

Research on vertical farming indicates that such systems can produce many times the yield per unit of land compared with open-field farming, with some analyses suggesting water use reductions of up to about 90 per cent or more through recirculating hydroponics and closed irrigation loops.³

Scientific reviews of vertical farming report that precise control of light, carbon dioxide and nutrients allows year-round production, higher yields and better quality, while reducing pesticide use and avoiding seasonal shocks, making these systems attractive for climate adaptation in cities.³

In Singapore, firms like Sustenir use fully enclosed indoor farms to grow leafy greens under LED lights, illustrating how agritech companies are emerging as part of the city’s broader innovation and clean-tech ecosystem rather than as marginal primary producers.¹¹

From a climate risk perspective, these systems decouple yield from rainfall variability and heatwaves, but they are energy intensive, which means their long-term sustainability hinges on cheap, low-emissions electricity and careful integration with national decarbonisation plans.³

For Australian cities with rapidly expanding rooftop solar, pairing urban farms with on-site renewables and grid demand management could mitigate energy risks while delivering local food, jobs and new training pathways in controlled-environment agriculture.

Spatial strategy: turning rooftops and tunnels into farms

Singapore’s most distinctive move is its systematic repurposing of underused urban surfaces, from public housing car parks to industrial rooftops, as farming platforms negotiated through central planning rather than one-off pilots.¹¹

The government’s control over most apartment blocks allows it to allocate large contiguous rooftop areas for commercial farms like Comcrop and Citiponics, turning housing estates into mixed-use zones that host both residents and food production systems.¹¹

Paris has taken a different but complementary route with its Parisculteurs program, which aims to cover 100 hectares of rooftops, walls and urban spaces with vegetation, with roughly one third reserved for urban agriculture projects such as rooftop farms and social gardens.⁹

By 2020, Paris had more than 30 hectares of urban agriculture installed, supported by a “100 hectares charter” that binds public and private landowners into a partnership to open up roofs, walls and underground spaces to farming enterprises.¹⁰

Elsewhere, cities like London have converted disused underground tunnels into hydroponic farms, while other European centres are testing facade-grown systems, illustrating how built-form constraints can drive creative uses of basements, viaducts and industrial heritage sites.³

For state and local governments in Australia, integrating such spatial strategies into zoning codes, development approvals and infrastructure design standards is a practical step that can be taken now, rather than waiting for greenfield land to become available on the fringes.

Economic and social impact: prices, jobs and identity

Urban farming in Singapore is still a small share of total food supply by volume, yet it plays an outsized role in buffering price shocks, shortening supply chains and building public confidence that at least some essentials can be sourced domestically in a crisis.²

Local production of eggs, vegetables and seafood, even at modest percentages, can dampen exposure to sudden import restrictions, freight disruptions or extreme weather in supplying countries, which international food security experts warn are likely to intensify under climate change.⁴

Economically, Singapore’s move into high-tech agriculture has created new roles in agronomy, engineering, software and maintenance, recasting “farming” as an urban technology career rather than solely a rural, manual occupation.⁸

Socially, rooftop and community farms have been used as educational spaces, introducing school students and apartment residents to the realities of food production and making food systems more visible in daily city life.⁷

For regional Australia, where climate impacts threaten traditional jobs in rain-fed cropping, controlled-environment agriculture and urban farming could offer alternative employment in regional centres, including roles in managing greenhouses, packaging local produce and maintaining digital infrastructure.

However, the distributional impacts need careful management so that high-tech investment does not bypass smaller growers or low-income communities, which are often most exposed to food price rises and extreme weather.

Comparative context: four other paths to urban food

While Singapore leads on integrating national food security policy with dense, high-tech urban farming, other cities offer contrasting models that highlight different levers for success.

Paris’s Parisculteurs places greater emphasis on integrating agriculture into heritage buildings and public spaces, often through design competitions and partnerships with community groups, which strengthens public engagement and biodiversity outcomes as much as food supply.⁹

In North America, cities such as Vancouver and Detroit have focused on community-led gardens, allotments and social enterprises, using vacant lots to address food deserts and create local employment, though these systems rarely match Singapore’s yields or technological intensity.⁷

Tokyo and Hong Kong, like Singapore, experiment with building-integrated agriculture on rooftops and commercial towers, but face different regulatory and land-ownership structures that make coordinated, city-wide strategies harder to implement.¹⁴

These diverse approaches show that there is no single “right” model, but they also underline the importance of clear policy mandates, long-term land access and investment in skills if urban agriculture is to move beyond symbolic projects.

Worldwide context: climate risk and the case for city farms

Global climate assessments now conclude with high confidence that climate change is already affecting food security through reduced yields, disrupted supply chains and more frequent extreme events, and that risks increase with every increment of warming.⁴

Meta-analyses of crop studies suggest that under a high-emissions scenario similar to SSP5–8.5, global yields could decline by around 14 per cent for wheat and more than 20 per cent for maize by late century compared with 2015, while lower-emissions pathways substantially reduce these losses.¹²

Australian research on broadacre crops indicates that shifts in rainfall and hotter growing seasons will advance flowering dates and shorten growing periods, which can reduce yields for wheat, barley, canola and pulses, particularly in lower-rainfall zones in Western and south-eastern Australia by 2060.⁵

Other studies find that irrigation water requirements for wheat and canola can increase markedly under warmer scenarios, underscoring the risk that traditional irrigation districts may struggle to meet demand if inflows decline and competing water uses grow.¹³

Against this backdrop, urban farming will not replace broadacre agriculture, but it can diversify supply, reduce transport emissions, cut food waste and create local buffers against global price spikes, especially for perishable, high-value horticulture.

In practice, this means cities will need to integrate food system considerations into climate adaptation plans alongside heat mitigation, flood management and housing, rather than treating food supply as something that happens elsewhere.

Climate risk by region and crop: high, medium and lower risk

Climate vulnerability assessments for Australian agriculture suggest that hotter, drier conditions will place the greatest pressure on broadacre cropping regions in Western Australia’s wheatbelt and parts of inland New South Wales and Queensland, where rainfall is already marginal and temperature increases amplify heat stress and evaporation.⁵

These areas are typically classed as high risk because small percentage drops in rainfall can translate to disproportionately large yield losses for rain-fed wheat, barley and canola, and can undermine the reliability of water available for irrigated cotton.

Medium-risk regions include higher-rainfall grain belts in south-eastern Australia and some irrigated valleys, where projected changes include shorter growing seasons and increased irrigation demand but where adaptation options, such as changing sowing dates, varieties and rotations, are more readily available.⁵

Lower-risk zones tend to be cooler, higher-rainfall areas and some southern coastal regions, where moderate warming may even improve potential yields for certain crops if water is sufficient, though this depends heavily on emissions pathways and local water management.⁴

Across all regions, scientists stress substantial uncertainty ranges due to differences between climate models and emissions scenarios, but the direction of change is clear enough to inform planning of new infrastructure, insurance products and support programs now.⁴

Major crops to mid-century: shifting yields and geographies

Modelling for Australian broadacre systems shows that wheat remains relatively resilient compared with more sensitive crops, but still faces median yield declines in drier locations and advancing flowering dates of up to several weeks by 2060, which increase the risk of heat and frost damage.⁵

Barley and canola share similar exposure to rainfall declines and heat stress, though some higher-rainfall regions may maintain or even increase yields if management practices change and new varieties are adopted.

Field pea and some other pulses appear more sensitive in existing studies, with ensemble projections in parts of Western and south-eastern Australia showing yield declines of 12 to 45 per cent depending on location, highlighting the vulnerability of certain rotations.⁵

Cotton, largely irrigated, is directly exposed to water availability, and international work on irrigation demand indicates that warmer conditions can substantially increase crop water requirements, making secure entitlements and efficient delivery systems critical for future viability.¹³

Horticulture, which often involves perennial crops and high-value vegetables, is highly sensitive to heatwaves, changed chill hours and water stress, but can also benefit from protected cropping and urban farming models that bring production closer to consumers.

For planners, this suggests that some production may shift geographically towards cooler or better-watered regions, while urban and peri-urban protected cropping and vertical farms pick up a greater share of fresh produce demand.

Policy gaps: land, water, infrastructure, insurance and transition

Despite growing evidence on climate risks, land-use planning in many jurisdictions still treats food production and urban development as competing, rather than complementary, priorities, with peri-urban farmland often fragmented by housing and industrial expansion.⁷

Singapore’s experience shows that clear policy direction and cross-agency collaboration can reframe rooftops and underused sites as agricultural assets, whereas many Australian cities lack explicit zoning or building codes that enable agriculture on roofs, car parks or facades.¹⁴

On water governance, climate projections of higher irrigation requirements for crops such as wheat and canola sit uneasily alongside existing competition between cities, industry and the environment, yet most urban planning frameworks do not explicitly consider the water needs of emerging urban farms.¹³

Infrastructure planning often overlooks local food logistics, such as cold storage, short-haul freight and market facilities, even though studies on urban food systems emphasise that improved infrastructure can cut losses, support informal and local markets and strengthen resilience for low-income communities.¹

Insurance products for farmers and regional businesses are still catching up with compounding risks from droughts, fires and floods, and there is little tailored coverage for controlled-environment agriculture or rooftop farms despite their different risk profiles.

Transition support for affected communities remains patchy, with some national programs addressing drought resilience and on-farm adaptation, but fewer tools designed to help workers and small businesses move into new roles in protected cropping, urban agriculture or climate services.

Actionable recommendations for governments

First, federal and state governments can embed food system resilience, including urban agriculture, into climate adaptation and disaster risk strategies, drawing on the same evidence base used in national climate assessments for other critical infrastructure.⁴

This means treating selected urban farms, distribution hubs and protected cropping clusters as essential assets, with clear support in planning, funding and emergency management arrangements.

Second, planning systems can be updated to allow and encourage agriculture on rooftops, podiums, car parks and industrial estates, with design standards that address structural loading, safety, access and water reuse, building on examples from Singapore and Paris.⁹

Local governments can identify priority zones near transport and markets where urban agriculture would deliver the greatest benefits for low-income communities, and can use development contributions or incentives to secure long-term access for food production rather than only short-term pop-ups.

Third, water governance reforms can recognise urban and peri-urban agriculture as a legitimate user of recycled water and stormwater, with clear allocation frameworks, quality standards and infrastructure funding that enable farms to use treated wastewater and capture roof runoff safely.¹³

At the same time, regional water planning can incorporate projected increases in crop water requirements and the potential for technology, such as drip irrigation and soil moisture monitoring, to reduce demand and maintain yields for key crops.

Fourth, governments can co-invest in controlled-environment agriculture training, research and demonstration sites in regional centres and city fringes, ensuring that farmers, workers and students can gain the skills needed to manage high-tech greenhouses and vertical farms.³

Targeted transition packages, including retraining and relocation support, will be essential for communities where traditional broadacre cropping becomes less viable due to water scarcity, heat stress or market shifts.

Economic and social implications for regions

Regional economies built around broadacre crops are exposed not only to yield changes but also to knock-on effects for employment in storage, transport, input supply and processing, which can be destabilised by more frequent climate shocks.⁵

As climate impacts accumulate, variability in yields and water availability can drive greater volatility in farm incomes and local spending, with consequences for small towns already grappling with population loss and service decline.

At the same time, new opportunities may emerge in value-added processing, protected cropping and regional logistics for urban and peri-urban food systems, particularly if policy and investment deliberately direct some urban farming and controlled-environment agriculture to regional hubs.¹

Where urban farms supply nearby city markets, there is potential for shorter supply chains to reduce transport emissions and food loss, and to stabilise prices for certain foods, though this will depend on how costs, including energy, are managed and who has access to the resulting produce.³

Community resilience will hinge on ensuring that climate adaptation and urban farming strategies are designed with local input, so that new investments do not bypass the most vulnerable regions or entrench inequalities between city cores and regional areas.

What global cities can learn from early adopters

Singapore’s approach shows that when urban farming is backed by clear national targets, funding, land-access reforms and a strong technology ecosystem, it can contribute meaningfully to food security even in a land-scarce city.¹

Paris, Tokyo and other cities demonstrate how heritage buildings, tunnels and rooftops can be reimagined as productive landscapes when local governments act as conveners between landowners, farmers, designers and communities.⁹

For Australian planners and policymakers, the next five years will be decisive, they must integrate food systems into climate adaptation and urban planning, protect and repurpose land and water for both rural and urban agriculture, invest in skills and infrastructure for controlled-environment and community-based farming, and build transition support for regions so that as climate risks intensify, Australia’s cities and country towns share the responsibility and opportunity of feeding the nation.

References

1. Singapore Food Statistics 2022 – Singapore Food Agency
2. Singapore Food Statistics 2023 – Strengthening Singapore’s Food Resiliency
3. Applications of vertical farming in urban agriculture – European Journal of Horticultural Science
4. IPCC AR6 Working Group II – Food security and climate impacts
5. Climate change impacts on phenology and yields of five broadacre crops in Australia – Anwar et al 2015
6. IPCC AR6 Working Group III – Urban systems and other settlements
7. Tackling the climate–food–migration nexus through urban food systems – IAI
8. Unconventional Business: Farming in Urban Singapore – IGPI report
9. Paris is opening the world’s largest urban rooftop farm – Global Center on Adaptation
10. Parisculteurs case study – ISO/AFNOR 37101
11. Singapore shows what serious urban farming looks like – Reasons to be Cheerful
12. Predicting changes in agricultural yields under climate change scenarios – 2025 meta-analysis
13. Modelling the effects of climate change on irrigation water requirements of wheat and canola – Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems
14. Vertical farming: An assessment of Singapore City – Wong et al 2020

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Why the world’s food system is at risk and what a renewable future could look like - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

The modern food system is highly efficient yet structurally fragile, with climate shocks, water stress, and market volatility capable of triggering cascading failures.1 Regions already facing water scarcity, heat extremes, and weak governance, including parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, are most exposed to food disruption.2 Climate change acts as a threat multiplier, amplifying risks created by biodiversity loss, fossil fuel dependence, monocultures, and concentrated supply chains.3 Regenerative and renewable food systems, built around healthy soils, diversified production, and lower inputs, can boost resilience and cut emissions.4 Benefits of a global shift include improved public health, rural employment, biodiversity recovery, and more stable climates and food prices.5 The next decade is critical, with planners needing to invest in water‑resilient agriculture, social protection, and governance reforms to avoid systemic food crises.6

The world’s food system feeds more people than at any point in history, yet scientists warn its underlying structures are fragile in a hotter, more unequal century.¹

Climate change, water stress, soil degradation, and dependence on fossil fuels and imported inputs are converging to raise the risk of systemic disruption, rather than isolated harvest failures.³

At the same time, economic shocks, conflicts, and pandemics have shown how quickly global supply chains can seize up, pushing up prices and deepening hunger for millions.⁷

UN agencies estimate that hundreds of millions of people are already food insecure, with climate extremes one of the major drivers of recent acute hunger emergencies.⁸

Regions that rely heavily on food imports, or on a narrow range of climate‑sensitive crops, are particularly exposed to price spikes and trade disruptions.²

For Australia, which exports large volumes of wheat, beef, and dairy, mounting climate and water risks overseas also have implications for trade, regional stability, and humanitarian obligations.⁹

Scientists and policy analysts increasingly argue that a shift towards regenerative and “renewable” food systems, which restore ecosystems rather than deplete them, is essential for long‑term food security.⁴

These models emphasise soil health, diversified cropping, lower fossil fuel inputs, and fairer access to land and markets, while still needing to deliver affordable, nutritious diets.¹⁰

The choices governments, investors, and communities make in the next five to ten years will shape whether the food system bends under pressure or breaks in ways that are difficult to reverse.⁶

For regional planners and policymakers, the question is less whether change is coming, and more how to steer it towards resilience, equity, and climate stability.¹¹

The fragility of the modern food system

Researchers increasingly describe the global food system as a complex, tightly coupled network, where shocks in one part can cascade rapidly through prices, trade, and politics.¹

Industrial agriculture has delivered high yields through synthetic fertilisers, pesticides, irrigation, and long supply chains, but at the cost of degraded soils, biodiversity loss, and high greenhouse gas emissions.³

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that agriculture, forestry, and other land use contribute about a fifth of global emissions, binding food production tightly to the climate crisis it must now withstand.¹²

At the same time, crop and livestock production rely heavily on fossil fuels for fertilisers, machinery, processing, refrigeration, and transport, making food prices sensitive to energy markets and geopolitical tensions.¹³

Economic analysis of recent crises has shown how export restrictions by major producers, or conflict in key grain regions, can quickly reduce availability on world markets and push millions towards hunger.⁷

This structural dependence on a few staple grains, a handful of global trading companies, and vulnerable fossil fuel‑based inputs underpins concerns about systemic rather than localised food risk.¹⁴

Who is most vulnerable – and why

Vulnerability to food system disruption is shaped by climate exposure, water availability, soil health, trade dependence, inequality, and governance capacity.²

Studies identify parts of sub‑Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia as hotspots where high climate risk intersects with high rates of poverty and food import dependence.²

Agriculture accounts for roughly 70 per cent of global freshwater withdrawals, and regions already facing physical water scarcity, such as North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, are particularly exposed to crop failure and conflict over water allocation.¹⁵

Water‑resilience research warns that, without improved governance, the gap between water supply and demand is likely to widen significantly in coming decades, especially where population is growing quickly.¹⁶

Small island developing states and low‑lying delta regions face additional risks from sea level rise, saltwater intrusion into farmland, and cyclone‑driven flooding, which can damage both production and infrastructure.¹⁷

For many low‑income countries, limited fiscal space, weak social protection systems, and restricted access to borrowing make it harder to absorb price shocks or invest in adaptation, increasing the risk of humanitarian crises and instability.¹⁸

Climate change as a threat multiplier

Climate change does not act in isolation; it intensifies existing stresses in food, water, and ecological systems, turning what might have been manageable shocks into cascading crises.³

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports high confidence that heat extremes, heavy rainfall, and agricultural droughts have already increased in frequency and intensity in many regions, affecting crop yields and livestock health.³

Maize, wheat, and rice yields have shown region‑specific declines linked to observed warming, particularly in lower‑latitude regions, while marine and inland fisheries are under pressure from warming waters and ocean acidification.¹⁹

Biodiversity loss, including the decline of pollinators and soil organisms, further undermines resilience, reducing the ability of ecosystems to buffer extreme events and recover from disturbance.²⁰

Monoculture farming systems, which rely on a narrow set of high‑yielding varieties, can produce efficiently under stable conditions but are more vulnerable to pests, diseases, and climatic extremes than more diverse landscapes.²¹

Financialisation and concentration in global supply chains, where a small number of firms dominate trade and input provision, can amplify volatility, as disruptions or speculation in these nodes translate quickly into price spikes for consumers.¹⁴

Consequences of systemic food failure

When food systems falter, the effects ripple through human health, ecosystems, and political stability, often in ways that reinforce one another.²²

Modern analyses of famine emphasise that mass hunger is typically driven less by absolute food shortage than by conflict, economic collapse, and state failure that prevent people from accessing available food.²¹

Historical episodes, from the Bengal famine of the 1940s to more recent crises in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, show how war, trade disruption, and policy choices can turn climate shocks into catastrophic mortality.²³

Food price spikes have been linked with social unrest, including during the period before the Arab uprisings, highlighting the political sensitivity of bread, fuel, and basic staples.²⁴

For non‑human animals and ecosystems, food system breakdown can mean habitat conversion as desperate communities clear more land, over‑fish coastal waters, or exploit wildlife to meet immediate needs.²⁵

In extreme cases, combined climate and food stress can trigger migration within and across borders, putting further pressure on urban areas and neighbouring states and complicating humanitarian response.¹⁸

What a regenerative or “renewable” food system looks like

Regenerative and so‑called renewable food systems aim not just to reduce harm but to restore soil, water, and biodiversity while maintaining viable livelihoods and adequate food supply.⁴

The FAO describes regenerative agriculture as a holistic approach that improves water and air quality, enhances ecosystem biodiversity, produces nutrient‑dense food, and stores carbon, while remaining economically viable for farmers.²⁶

Common practices include reduced or no‑till farming, cover cropping, diverse crop rotations, integration of trees and livestock, and reduced reliance on synthetic fertilisers and pesticides.⁴

Evidence from field trials and meta‑analyses suggests that improving soil organic matter can increase water infiltration and retention, buffer crops against drought, and in some cases maintain or improve yields over time.²⁷

Regenerative systems can reduce emissions by sequestering carbon in soils and biomass and by lowering energy‑intensive input use, though sequestration potential depends on local conditions and may saturate over time.²⁷

More broadly, regenerative food systems extend beyond the farm gate, encompassing shorter supply chains, local and regional markets, equitable access to land and finance, and dietary shifts towards less resource‑intensive foods.²³

Technologies, practices, and social innovations

Technologies central to a renewable food transition range from on‑farm practices to digital tools, irrigation technologies, and new forms of governance and finance.¹⁰

Precision agriculture, solar‑powered irrigation, drought‑tolerant crop varieties, and improved water storage can help farmers use inputs more efficiently and adapt to variable rainfall, including in low‑ and middle‑income countries.²⁸

Social innovations such as farmer cooperatives, community‑supported agriculture, public procurement for healthy and sustainable food, and Indigenous land and water management knowledge are also seen as key to resilience.²⁹

Analysts caution that while many regenerative practices are technically scalable, access to finance, secure land tenure, extension services, and data often determine whether smallholders and poorer regions can take them up.³⁰

Corporate interest in regenerative agriculture is growing, partly driven by climate and nature‑related disclosure rules, but raises questions about who captures the benefits of carbon credits and other payments for ecosystem services.⁴

Researchers argue that without safeguards and participation, there is a risk that regenerative branding could entrench existing power imbalances rather than deliver a more equitable food system.²⁹

Broader benefits of a renewable food transition

A transition to regenerative and renewable food systems could deliver wide co‑benefits for health, employment, biodiversity, and climate stability, in addition to nutrition.⁵

Public health research links current diets, dominated in many countries by ultra‑processed foods and cheap fats and sugars, with rising rates of obesity, cardiovascular disease, and some cancers.³¹

Shifting towards diets rich in whole grains, legumes, fruits, and vegetables, produced in agroecological systems, is associated with lower environmental footprints and better long‑term health outcomes at the population level.³¹

Rural economies could gain from more labour‑intensive regenerative practices, value‑added processing, and local food enterprises, although this requires supportive policy to ensure decent work and fair wages.⁵

Conserving and restoring habitats within agricultural landscapes, such as riparian zones, native vegetation, and wetlands, can improve water quality, support pollinators, and store carbon, contributing to national biodiversity and climate goals.²⁰

By reducing exposure to climate shocks, input price volatility, and degraded soils, regenerative food systems may also help stabilise food prices and reduce the risk of social unrest linked to food insecurity.²²

Barriers, pathways, and lessons from history

Despite growing interest, political, cultural, and institutional barriers continue to slow the shift towards more regenerative food systems.¹⁰

These include subsidies that favour input‑intensive monocultures, trade rules that encourage export‑oriented commodity production, corporate concentration, and limited recognition of Indigenous and local knowledge in formal policy.¹⁴

Researchers argue that governance for food system resilience requires stronger water institutions, social protection, early warning systems, and participatory decision‑making from local to global scales.¹⁶

Historical episodes, such as the US Dust Bowl of the 1930s, show that policy can drive both degradation and recovery, with conservation programs, land retirement, and new farming practices helping to restore damaged landscapes over time.³²

However, other crises, including famines in colonial India and conflicts in modern war economies, underline that without accountable institutions and attention to rights and distribution, food system reforms can leave the poorest behind.²¹

Experts emphasise that the risks of delay are substantial, because continued investment in high‑emission, high‑input systems can lock in infrastructure and practices that are difficult to change before climate impacts intensify.⁶

In contrast, early action on climate mitigation, water‑resilient agriculture, and social safety nets can reduce long‑term costs and create space for more orderly transitions when shocks do occur.²⁵

What planners and policymakers must do now

Over the next five years, regional planners and policymakers face a narrow but critical window to reduce long‑term food system risk by aligning climate, water, and agricultural policies with resilience goals.¹⁶

Key priorities identified in the literature include investing in water‑resilient infrastructure and governance, reorienting subsidies and public procurement towards regenerative and diversified production, and strengthening social protection to cushion vulnerable households from shocks.²⁵

Building robust early warning systems that integrate climate, market, and conflict data, and embedding local and Indigenous knowledge in planning, can improve the ability of communities and governments to anticipate, rather than simply react to, emerging food crises.¹⁸

Ultimately, evidence suggests that reducing long‑term risk will require treating food not just as a commodity but as part of a shared ecological and social system, and reshaping institutions accordingly.²²

References

1. Feast and Famine: The Global Food Crisis – Origins, Ohio State University
2. Global Water Governance and Food System Transformation – PRISM
3. IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land
4. What Are Regenerative Food Systems? – The Nature Conservancy
5. FAO, The Future of Food and Agriculture: Trends and Challenges
6. Elevating the role of water resilience in food system transformations – Matthews et al., 2022
7. World Bank, Food Security Update
8. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023
9. ABARES, Agricultural Commodities and Trade Outlook
10. FAO, Transforming agrifood systems: A synthesis of country pathways
11. UNEP, Food Systems and the Environment – Policy Options
12. 12 IPCC AR6 Working Group III, Mitigation of Climate Change
13. 13 International Energy Agency, Agriculture and Energy
14. UNCTAD, Trade and Environment Review: Wake up before it is too late
15. UN World Water Development Report: Nature‑Based Solutions for Water
16. 16 Water Governance for Climate‑Resilient Food Systems – IWMI and partners
17. IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate
18. IPCC AR6 Working Group II, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability
19. IPCC SRCCL, Chapter 5: Food Security
20. IPBES Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
21. Hunger in global war economies: understanding the decline – de Waal, 2024
22. Stockholm Resilience Centre, Planetary boundaries research on food and stability
23. Friends of the Earth, Food and Climate Justice (global food systems overview)
24. Food Prices and Political Instability – IFPRI
25. Friedlingstein et al., Soil and climate feedbacks in food systems – Nature Sustainability
26. The Benefits of Regenerative Agriculture – SLR (citing FAO definition)
27. Montgomery, Soil health and the sustainability of agriculture – Nature Sustainability
28. CGIAR, Climate‑Smart Agriculture
29. IPES‑Food, Towards a Common Food Policy for the EU
30. World Bank, Scaling up Climate‑Smart Agriculture
31. The Lancet Commission on Obesity, Undernutrition and Climate Change
32. US National Park Service, The Dust Bowl

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Do electric and hybrid vehicles really cut Australia’s transport emissions? - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Electric vehicles have lower lifecycle emissions in Australia even on today’s grid[1] Battery electric vehicles make up about 1.3 percent of the light vehicle fleet[2] Conventional hybrids now account for about 3.5 percent of light vehicles[2] Public fast charging is expanding rapidly but regional gaps remain[3] Vehicle to grid trials show potential benefits for grid stability and households[4] Policy, affordability and data gaps will shape emissions outcomes more than technology alone[5]

Australia’s transport sector is one of the country’s fastest growing sources of greenhouse gas emissions.

Electric and hybrid vehicles are often presented as an obvious solution, yet their real climate value depends on electricity generation, manufacturing emissions, and how quickly the national fleet actually changes.

Australia’s car fleet is large, old and geographically dispersed, raising questions about whether electrification can deliver meaningful emissions cuts this decade.

New vehicle sales are changing quickly, but the vehicles already on the road turn over slowly.

At the same time, Australia’s electricity grid is decarbonising, but fossil fuels still supply a substantial share of power.

These factors complicate claims that electric vehicles automatically solve transport emissions.

This investigation examines whether electric and hybrid vehicles genuinely reduce climate change in the Australian context.

It analyses fleet data, lifecycle emissions, charging infrastructure, grid impacts and policy settings.

The evidence shows progress, limits, and risks that policymakers must confront now. (BITRE)

Australia’s vehicle fleet and why percentages matter

As at 31 January 2025, Australia had about 22.3 million registered motor vehicles, according to the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE)^[2].

Passenger vehicles accounted for about 16.1 million of these, while light commercial vehicles such as utes and vans added another 4.2 million.

Together, these categories form a light vehicle fleet of about 20.3 million vehicles.

This is the most relevant base for assessing the climate impact of electric and hybrid vehicles.

Using this denominator avoids overstating progress by focusing only on new sales.

How many electric and hybrid vehicles are on Australian roads

BITRE data show around 259,700 battery electric vehicles registered nationally as at January 2025^[2].

This represents about 1.28 percent of Australia’s light vehicle fleet.

Conventional hybrid electric vehicles numbered about 709,100, equivalent to roughly 3.5 percent of light vehicles.

Plug in hybrid vehicles are not separately enumerated in BITRE’s national registration tables.

This lack of disaggregated data limits precise assessment of their fleet share and emissions impact.

Even when battery electric and conventional hybrids are combined, fewer than 5 percent of light vehicles use electric drivetrains.

The overwhelming majority of vehicles on Australian roads still rely solely on petrol or diesel.

Sales momentum versus slow fleet turnover

New vehicle sales tell a very different story from fleet composition.

Battery electric vehicles accounted for about 13 percent of new passenger vehicle sales in 2024, according to the National Transport Commission^[6].

Hybrid vehicles captured an even larger share of new sales, driven by fuel savings and lower upfront costs.

Despite this momentum, Australia’s average vehicle age exceeds 10 years.

Slow turnover means emissions reductions lag behind sales trends.

Policies that focus only on new vehicles risk overstating near term climate benefits.

Do electric vehicles reduce emissions on Australia’s grid

Lifecycle emissions include vehicle manufacturing, fuel or electricity use and end of life impacts.

Australian studies consistently find that battery electric vehicles produce lower lifecycle emissions than comparable petrol vehicles, even on the current grid^[1].

The Electric Vehicle Council estimates that a medium electric car in Australia produces around 30 to 40 percent fewer emissions over its lifetime than a petrol equivalent.

As renewable energy expands, this advantage increases.

Manufacturing emissions for electric vehicles are higher, mainly due to batteries.

These emissions are typically offset after several years of driving.

Hybrids also reduce emissions compared with conventional vehicles, but by a smaller margin.

Electricity generation and future benefits

Australia’s electricity sector is undergoing rapid change.

Renewables now supply more than one third of national electricity generation, according to the Australian Energy Market Operator^[7].

Coal still plays a major role, particularly in some states.

This means the emissions benefit of electric vehicles varies by location.

Drivers in states with higher renewable shares see greater emissions reductions.

Over time, grid decarbonisation is expected to amplify the climate benefit of electric transport.

Charging infrastructure and regional Australia

Public charging infrastructure has expanded rapidly in recent years.

Australia now has more than 1,270 public fast charging locations, according to industry tracking^[3].

Most chargers are concentrated in major cities and along key highways.

Regional and remote areas still face coverage gaps.

These gaps affect confidence for long distance travel and regional adoption.

Home charging remains the primary method for most electric vehicle owners.

Renters and apartment residents face greater barriers.

Vehicle to grid and vehicle to home systems

Electric vehicles can do more than consume electricity.

Vehicle to grid and vehicle to home systems allow cars to export power back to homes or the grid.

ARENA supported trials in Australia show these systems can improve grid stability and reduce household energy costs^[4].

Widespread adoption would require compatible vehicles, chargers and regulatory reform.

At present, only some models support these functions.

The long term potential is significant but uncertain.

Economic and equity challenges

Upfront cost remains a major barrier to electric vehicle adoption.

Although running costs are lower, purchase prices are higher than comparable petrol vehicles.

Government incentives vary by state and are subject to change.

Lower income households are less able to access new vehicles of any type.

Without targeted policy, electrification risks widening transport inequality.

Hybrids currently offer a more accessible emissions reduction pathway for many buyers.

Minerals, recycling and supply chains

Electric vehicle batteries rely on minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt.

Australia is a major lithium producer, linking transport electrification to domestic resource policy^[5].

Battery recycling systems are still emerging.

Clear national frameworks are needed to manage waste and recover materials.

Supply chain transparency will influence public acceptance.

What policymakers and planners must do next

The evidence shows electric and hybrid vehicles can meaningfully reduce emissions in Australia.

However, benefits depend on grid decarbonisation, infrastructure rollout and equitable access.

In the next five years, governments must accelerate renewable energy, expand regional charging and improve data transparency.

Standards for vehicle emissions, apartment charging and battery recycling will shape outcomes.

Without coordinated policy, fleet electrification will be slower and less effective.

References

1. Electric Vehicle Council, Lifecycle emissions of electric vehicles in Australia
2. Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics, Road Vehicles Australia January 2025
3. Australian EV Infrastructure data summary
4. Australian Renewable Energy Agency, Vehicle to grid trials
5. Australian Government, Critical Minerals Strategy
6. National Transport Commission, New vehicle sales trends
7. Australian Energy Market Operator, Integrated System Plan

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Two Years to 1.7°C: the “Prediction Game” We Can’t Afford to Lose - Gregory Andrews

Author Gregory Andrews is: Founder and Managing Director of Lyrebird Dreaming A former Australian Ambassador and High Commissioner in West Africa Australia’s first Threatened Species Commissioner A leader in Indigenous policy

Australia’s sweltering through another early-summer heatwave, and I’m trying to decide whether to write about the weather outside my window - or the bigger climate system we’re reengineering on this planet.

I’ve chosen the bigger one.

This week, Professor James Hansen and colleagues published projections that the global temperature record could reach +1.7°C by 2027. That’s not a throwaway line from a pundit. It is a blunt forecast from one of the world’s most influential climate scientists - the former Director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

And if that number lands in your gut the way it landed in mine, good. It should.

Hansen expects the 12-month running average global temperature to dip for a few months - down toward about +1.4°C - before rising again as El Niño kicks back in during 2026. This will set up a potential new record in 2027.

So what’s the “so what”?

The “so what” is that our climate system is now at the edge of thresholds we once talked about as “mid-century” problems. And the warming is accelerating - not merely continuing.

Even if you treat the +1.7°C as a forecast with uncertainty (as all forecasts are), it’s the direction and the time horizon that matter. Two years is nothing in climate time. It’s less than a federal election cycle. It’s the span between Year 10 and Year 12 for a student who will live through what we’re locking in now.

A crucial note about baselines (because people will weaponise confusion)

Hansen’s figures are expressed relative to 1880–1920. The Paris and IPCC framing of 1.5°C and 2°C warming is typically relative to 1850–1900.  Those aren’t identical baselines, and the difference isn’t just academic - people will use it to dismiss, downplay, or “gotcha” this whole warning.

The honest way to say it is: Hansen’s +1.7°C isn’t automatically the same as “Paris +1.7°C.” But it’s still a massive flashing red light, because it describes a near-term world with global temperatures pressing into territory where impacts escalate sharply.

Why I’m taking this seriously

Hansen isn’t playing a parlour game. He explicitly says he’s playing a “prediction” game to test understanding and accelerate scientific progress. That matters, because the default mode of public climate discussion is still: understate, hedge, soften, reassure, defer.

But in the real world - outside seminar and Ministerial meeting rooms - every fraction of a degree is lived experience: 

• heat that drags on the body, 
• fire weather that sharpens, 
• floods that arrive with less warning and more violence, 
• reefs that bleach again before recovering from the last bleaching, and 
• ecosystems and species that run out of “adaptive capacity” long before the modelling graphs look scary enough.

If we are flirting with +1.7°C in the next two years, it means the “window” we keep talking about is not a metaphorical one. It is an actual closing aperture, with real consequences.

The political temptation: shrug and move on

Here’s what worries me more than the number itself: the way the world is learning to ignore or absorb these numbers without action.

We’ve become skilled at living with cognitive dissonance:

• That “record year” is becoming an annual headline.
• That “unprecedented” is now a familiar adjective.
• That “once-in-a-century” events are being rebranded as the new normal.

The human mind adapts to almost anything. That is a gift but also a curse. The climate system doesn’t negotiate with our coping mechanisms.

So we need to treat the next two years as a mobilisation window, not a period to wait for better news. Whether we hit +1.7°C on one dataset or another is less important than whether we keep adding to what’s driving the trend.

It’s time to hold our leaders to the speed of physics. If the climate can shift meaningfully in two years, then “net zero by 2050” without strong near-term cuts isn’t a plan - it’s just a slogan. And slogans don’t cool the planet!

I don’t know whether we will see +1.7°C in 2027 exactly as Hansen projects. But I do know what it means that such a projection is plausible enough to publish, sign, and stand behind.

In a sane political culture, this would be treated like an emergency briefing. 

Instead, it will compete with culture wars, cricket scores and Christmas shopping. That’s the real scandal.

Links

• James Hansen predicts 1.7 degrees Celsius warming by 2027 due to El Niño
• Global Temperature in 2025, 2026, 2027 – James Hansen et al. projection
• Earth is now expected to cross 1.5 °C warming by 2027, WMO warns
• WMO Global Annual to Decadal Climate Update (2025–2029)
• 2026 outlook: likely another year above 1.4°C (Met Office)
• Top Findings from the IPCC Climate Change Report 2023 (WRI)
• AI predicts Earth’s peak warming (Stanford Report)
• New climate pledges only slightly lower dangerous global warming projections (UNEP)
• New research reveals dramatically higher loss of GDP under 4 °C warming (Phys.org / UNSW) 
• Global warming has accelerated: Are the United Nations and the public well‑informed? (Hansen et al. 2025)
• Global warming in the pipeline
• 2025 Global Temperature Analysis by Hansen & Kharecha (PDF)