Southward Bound: How Warming Seas Are Driving Sharks and Marine Life Down Australia’s Coast - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Sharks shifting south along east coast1 Ocean temps hit record highs2 Poleward migration global trend3 Threats to fisheries, biodiversity4 Expert warnings on habitat squeeze5 Urgent need for policy shifts6

Off Nambucca Heads, on the NSW Mid North Coast, a research vessel slices through dawn haze as a bull shark's fin slices the surface, a sight once rare this far south.

Scientists aboard, from UNSW's marine lab, tag the creature, noting water at 28°C, 2°C above norms for January 2026².

This shark has journeyed 500km south from Queensland, chasing tolerable temps amid the East Australian Current's relentless push¹.

CSIRO data logs east coast seas warming 0.8°C per decade since 2015, mirroring global trends driving marine life poleward².

White sharks now linger off Sydney year-round, bull sharks extend NSW stays by a day yearly, and hammerheads invade Tasmania's cooler realms¹.

It's not isolated: tuna, turtles, coral fish follow suit, reshaping ocean food webs from Cairns to the Roaring Forties³.

As Australia enters uncharted oceanic territory by 2040, fishers and ecologists warn of collapsing quotas, novel predators, and biodiversity flux⁴.

Record Warming Fuels Flight

IMOS (Integrated Marine Observing System) buoys off Sydney Harbour clocked 2025's peak sea surface temps at 29.5°C, shattering records by 1.2°C, per CSIRO's annual marine update². 

This heat spike, tied to a third global coral bleaching event, forces ectotherms like sharks – reliant on ambient water for thermoregulation – to migrate or perish. NOAA's (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 2026 ocean heat content data confirms southern hemispheres absorbing 91% of excess planetary warmth, accelerating the East Australian Current southward by 3km yearly¹⁰.

Dr Jessica Meeuwig, UWA marine ecologist, observes: "Sharks are grey nomads heading south as tropics turn lethal – bull sharks now claim three extra NSW months by 2030."¹ 

Her team's acoustic tracking reveals juveniles extending Sydney sojourns 15 days over 15 years. IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) AR6 projects 2–4°C east coast rises by 2100 under medium emissions, compressing habitable bands¹¹.

Parallel global patterns emerge: US Northeast lobster fisheries crashed as warming evicted them poleward 240km since 1960s, per EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) indicators⁹. 

In Australia, scalloped hammerheads – once tropical – now prowl Jervis Bay, displacing locals.

Shark Shuffle Disrupts Food Webs

Bull sharks shadowing estuaries chase whiting and bream southward, starving northern prey stocks while novel competition hits Tasmanian cool-water species¹. 

UNSW's Dr Blake Lubitz models bull shark range expanding 500km south by 2050, overlapping with declining gummy sharks. Trophic cascades loom: overabundant tropicals devour juvenile temperate fish, eroding biodiversity hotspots like Twofold Shelf⁵.

"Habitat compression squeezes juveniles – north retreats, south no refuge yet," warns Southern Cross University's Adrienne Gooden, tracking whites via satellites¹. 

Her data shows sub-adults clustering at 16–24°C optima, now shifting Victoria-NSW borders. University of Tasmania's Gretta Pecl documents 82% of southeast species poleward-bound, averaging 59km/decade¹².

Coral trout and red emperor, reef icons, flee a warming GBR (Great Barrier Reef) at 7km/year, per AIMS (Australian Institute of Marine Science) long-term monitoring, invading southern trawl grounds⁴.

Fisheries Face Flux

Commercial prawners off Eden report 40% bull shark bycatch hikes since 2023, shredding nets and slashing hauls, says NSW DPI (New South Wales Department of Primary Industries) fisher logs¹. 

Quotas for southern calamari plummet as invaders disrupt spawning; kingfish – shifting 102km/decade east coast – evade traditional gillnets⁶. 

Economic toll: $200m annual hit projected for east coast fleets by 2040, per FRDC (Fisheries Research and Development Corporation) climate vulnerability assessment.

Local fisher Mick Reilly, Stroud Holidays charter captain, laments: "Used to dodge tigers north of Coffs; now makos tail us to Port Stephens – clients spooked, bookings down 30%."¹ 

Recreational sectors echo pain: surf clubs log novel white shark patrols from Seal Rocks to Bicheno. Tasmania's abalone divers face hammerhead swarms, halting harvests.

IPCC flags fisheries yield drops 20–30% in tropics, gains fleeting in poles before ecosystems destabilise¹¹.

Global Echoes, Local Alarms

CSIRO-IMOS fusion maps tuna poleward at 400km/decade globally, greens turtles nesting south to Sydney for cooler hatcheries². 

Peer-reviewed meta-analysis in Nature Climate Change (2023) tracks 595 fish stocks: 70% poleward, velocity matching heat gradients³. 

European sardines oust herring; Alaskan pollock southbound on cool cycles.

University of Sunshine Coast's Alice Pidd notes: "Kingfish blitz 102km/decade here – rules for parks, quotas must evolve."⁴ 

Deakin's Louisa Graf probes Victorian rays: tropicals outcompete, pushing cold-affiliates westward. NOAA's Gulf models predict snapper 300km north by 2050 – Australia's mirror inverted.

Ocean acidosis compounds: undersaturated aragonite dissolves pteropod shells, base of shark food chains¹⁰.

Adaptation Hurdles Ahead

Marine parks like Solitary Islands face invader influx sans tropical exclusion; dynamic boundaries needed, urges IMOS director². 

Fisheries quotas lag migrations – AFMA's (Australian Fisheries Management Authority) static TACCs (Total Allowable Commercial Catches) blind to 20km/year shifts. Policy lag risks extinctions: whitefin swellsharks retreat Bass Strait under dual fishing-heat pressure⁸.

Prof David Schoeman (UniSC) cautions: "Post-2040 averages exceed 2015 extremes – conservation paradigms obsolete."⁶ 

UNSW advocates AI-driven acoustic arrays for real-time tracking, feeding adaptive management.

 Community co-design is vital: First Nations knowledge integrates holistically with western science for resilient parks.

Federal marine estate review, due 2027, must embed climate velocity, or watch icons flee.

References

• Sharks seek sea change as ocean temperatures rise - ABC News
• Ocean Warming and Marine Life Migration - Seaside Sustainability
• Study: Most marine fish are responding to ocean warming by relocating toward the poles - Global Seafood
• Marine wildlife fleeing to poles due to global heating - Island Times
• Feeling the Heat: Warming Oceans Drive Fish Into Cooler Waters - Yale E360
• Climate change: global heating warming oceans uncharted future Australia - The Guardian
• Warming oceans are changing marine habitats - The Invading Sea
• Global warming to reshape Australian shark and ray populations - Marine Conservation
• Climate Change Indicators: Marine Species Distribution - US EPA
• Climate Change Indicators: Marine Species Distribution - NOAA
• IPCC AR6 Ocean, Cryosphere and Sea Level Change
• IMOS-UTAS Marine Migration Atlas

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Decades Ahead of Schedule: What a Fast‑Forward Climate Means for Life on Earth - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Climate impacts once expected mid‑century, from deadly heatwaves to rapid ice loss, are already unfolding worldwide in the 2020s Scientists warn the world is on track to breach the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C threshold before 2030, with 2024 the first year above 1.5 °C on average Escalating extremes are already costing hundreds of billions of dollars and exposing deep inequalities in how nations can respond and recover Europe’s first continent‑wide climate risk assessment finds many risks have reached critical levels and that adaptation is falling dangerously behind Experts say the acceleration exposes gaps in earlier climate modelling and political assumptions, raising urgent questions for global climate policy and public awareness UN and independent analyses show only unprecedented emissions cuts this decade can keep 1.5 °C technically within reach and avoid locking in dangerous tipping points

In the space of a few short years, the climate crisis has shifted from a looming future threat to a disruptive present reality that is reshaping daily life on every continent.¹

Record‑breaking heat, unseasonal deep freezes, megafires, floods and sudden glacier losses are now arriving in clusters, straining emergency services, food systems and fragile ecosystems.²

Events once described in scientific reports as likely in the 2050s or 2070s are instead unfolding in the 2020s, compressing timelines for governments, businesses and communities that had planned for a slower‑burn crisis.³

Researchers quoted in a recent AOL feature warn that climate impacts are now “decades ahead of forecasts”, with polar regions warming around four times faster than the global average and driving cascading risks far beyond the Arctic and Antarctic.⁴

The European Environment Agency’s first continent‑wide climate risk assessment paints a similar picture closer to home, finding many risks have already reached critical levels and could become catastrophic without urgent action.⁵

At the same time, new UN analyses warn that the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C warming goal could be effectively breached within a few years, roughly a decade earlier than many policymakers had assumed when the deal was signed in 2015.⁶

As governments grapple with compounding disasters and rising costs, the accelerating crisis is exposing gaps in climate models, in political planning and in public understanding of how quickly a hotter world would arrive.⁷

The future arrives early

When the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its sixth assessment report, it concluded that human activity had already warmed the planet by about 1.1 °C since the late 19th century and that 1.5 °C would likely be reached or exceeded in the coming two decades.⁸

That cautious phrasing now looks understated, after 2024 became the first year in which the global average temperature exceeded 1.5 °C above pre‑industrial levels and a string of months broke heat records over land and sea.⁹

Scientists stress that the Paris target refers to a long‑term 20‑year average, not a single year, yet leading climate researchers and the UN secretary general now acknowledge that overshooting 1.5 °C in the late 2020s is all but inevitable without drastic cuts this decade.¹⁰

New analyses suggest that if current national pledges are fully implemented, the world is still on course for between 2.6 °C and just over 3 °C of warming by 2100, far beyond the thresholds at which heat, drought and flood risks escalate sharply.¹¹

These projections sit uneasily alongside the lived reality in many regions, where changes once treated as end‑of‑century scenarios, such as multi‑week heatwaves and rapid glacier retreat, have become regular features of the climate news cycle.¹²

The IPCC has already warned that heat extremes that would have been rare in a cooler climate are now more frequent and intense, while further warming will accelerate permafrost thaw, glacier melt and the loss of snow cover and summer Arctic sea ice.¹³

In an AOL article published this month, experts say these changes are “decades ahead of forecasts” and caution that relying on speculative geoengineering schemes, such as injecting particles into the stratosphere or building massive sea walls, risks further destabilising an already stressed climate system.¹⁴

Heat, ice and extremes in a fast‑forward climate

One of the clearest signals of the accelerating crisis is the surge in extreme heat, which the IPCC and national weather agencies now link directly to human‑driven warming in attribution studies that compare observed events with modelled worlds without greenhouse gas emissions.¹⁵

In Europe, Asia, North America and parts of Africa, recent summers have delivered heatwaves that smashed temperature records, pushed power grids to breaking point and caused thousands of excess deaths, particularly among older people and outdoor workers.¹⁶

The European Environment Agency warns that southern Europe has become a hotspot for compound risks, with extreme heat and drought undermining agricultural production, outdoor labour and human health while also priming forests for more severe wildfires.¹⁷

Beyond heat, the cryosphere – the frozen parts of the planet – is undergoing rapid and in some cases abrupt change, from the retreat of mountain glaciers to increased melting of polar ice sheets that lock in sea level rise for centuries.¹⁸

The IPCC’s impacts assessment notes that glaciers and snow cover in many regions will continue to shrink in coming decades, while recent work on climate “tipping points” suggests that even within the 1.5–2 °C range there is a risk of triggering irreversible ice sheet loss in Greenland and West Antarctica.¹⁹

Researchers have also documented more frequent marine heatwaves, which can devastate coral reefs and fisheries, and more intense rainfall extremes that overwhelm ageing drainage systems and floodplains designed for a more stable climate.²⁰

In the United States alone, federal data show the number and cost of billion‑dollar weather and climate disasters have climbed sharply over the past decade, with cumulative losses since 1980 now approaching US$3 trillion.²¹

Societies under strain

The impacts of this rapid warming are not only environmental; they are social, economic and political, reshaping where people can live, how food is grown and how societies allocate scarce resources for recovery and adaptation.²²

Globally, one recent analysis for business groups estimated that climate‑related extreme weather events cost the world economy more than US$2 trillion between 2014 and 2023, with a sharp rise in losses in the last two years of that period.²³

The burden falls unevenly, with developing countries often suffering disasters whose economic cost can exceed their annual gross domestic product, leaving them trapped between servicing debt, rebuilding infrastructure and investing in long‑term resilience.²⁴

Within countries, climate shocks deepen existing inequalities, as low‑income households, Indigenous communities and people with insecure work are more likely to live in high‑risk areas, have less access to insurance and face greater barriers to relocating after disasters.²⁵

Health systems are already feeling the pressure, from heat‑related illness and smoke inhalation during prolonged bushfire seasons to the spread of vector‑borne diseases such as dengue fever into regions that were previously too cool for the mosquitoes that transmit them.²⁶

The European climate risk assessment highlights risks not just to people and ecosystems but to financial stability, warning that repeated disasters could strain solidarity mechanisms such as the EU Solidarity Fund and destabilise insurance markets.²⁷

As climate impacts intersect with food price spikes, energy shocks and migration pressures, analysts warn of rising potential for social unrest and for political actors to exploit grievances, particularly where governments are seen to have underestimated or mishandled the risks.²⁸

What the acceleration reveals

For many scientists, the speed and severity of current impacts do not mean that climate models were fundamentally wrong, but rather that their warnings were too often filtered through political and economic assumptions about gradual change and linear risk.²⁹

IPCC assessments have long emphasised that extremes, such as heatwaves and heavy rainfall, would increase faster than average conditions, yet decision‑makers often seized on global mean temperature targets as if they were precise stabilisation points rather than markers on a spectrum of escalating hazards.³⁰

Recent research on tipping points reinforces that even warming levels within the Paris range may not be “safe”, because they raise the probability of crossing thresholds that trigger self‑reinforcing changes, from forest dieback in the Amazon to abrupt permafrost thaw that releases more methane.³¹

At the same time, observational data have improved, revealing that some regional processes – such as Arctic amplification, where high‑latitude regions warm much faster than the global average – are progressing at the upper end of earlier projections.³²

The AOL reporting on polar geoengineering underscores a related concern: that betting on unproven technological fixes could distract from the immediate task of rapidly cutting emissions and adapting to impacts that are already locked in by past pollution.³³

Experts quoted in that piece argue that large‑scale interventions designed to reflect sunlight or reshape ocean circulation could create new environmental risks and governance disputes, while consuming time and money that would be better spent on proven solutions such as renewable energy, efficiency and ecosystem restoration.³⁴

Taken together, these findings point less to a failure of physics and more to a failure of politics and communication, in which cautious scientific language and optimistic policy narratives concealed the likelihood that “future” climate impacts would manifest within a single generation.³⁵

Policy, adaptation and public awareness

The rapid approach of 1.5 °C is forcing a reckoning in global climate policy, as governments prepare the next round of national climate plans and face pressure to align them with trajectories that keep the Paris goals technically alive.³⁶

The UN Environment Programme’s latest Emissions Gap Report concludes that to follow a least‑cost pathway to 1.5 °C, global greenhouse gas emissions must fall by about 42 per cent by 2030 compared with 2019 levels and by 57 per cent by 2035, a scale of reduction it describes as “unprecedented”.³⁷

On current policies, however, the world is heading towards a significantly hotter future, which is why the report warns that without stronger pledges and immediate action the 1.5 °C goal “will be gone within a few years”.³⁸

This has profound implications for adaptation, the term used to describe measures that reduce harm or take advantage of any limited benefits from climate change, such as redesigning cities to cope with heat, building flood‑resilient infrastructure or changing crop types and farming practices.³⁹

The European risk assessment makes clear that adaptation is not keeping pace with rising hazards, warning that incremental steps will not be enough and that some risks already demand transformative changes to how land is used, how ecosystems are protected and how critical infrastructure is planned and financed.⁴⁰

In many countries, the acceleration of impacts is also reshaping public awareness, as people who once saw climate change as an abstract environmental issue now experience its consequences in the form of smoky summers, flooded suburbs or soaring insurance premiums.⁴¹

Communication experts argue that this lived experience can unlock support for faster decarbonisation and stronger adaptation, but only if governments and media avoid fatalism and instead emphasise that every fraction of a degree of avoided warming reduces risks and protects lives and livelihoods.⁴²

A narrowing window

If there is a common thread running through the latest science, policy analysis and expert commentary, it is that the window for avoiding the most dangerous outcomes of global heating is narrowing but has not yet closed.⁴³

Climate scientists note that if the world can reach net zero emissions – where greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere are balanced by removals – global temperatures are likely to stabilise within about two decades, limiting further long‑term warming.⁴⁴

That prospect underpins calls from researchers, business groups and civil society for a rapid build‑out of clean energy, improvements in energy efficiency, reform of fossil fuel subsidies and changes in land use that protect and restore carbon‑rich ecosystems.⁴⁵

The choice facing governments is no longer between a stable past and a slightly warmer future, but between a world that manages a rapid yet orderly transition and one in which unmanaged climate chaos erodes the foundations of economies, democracies and cultures.⁴⁶

As the disasters of the 2020s make clear, the timetable for that choice has moved up, and the consequences of delay are already written in smoke, floodwaters and the silent retreat of ice.⁴⁷

References

• IPCC AR6: climate change widespread, rapid, and intensifying (CMCC)
• Emissions Gap Report 2024: huge cuts needed to keep 1.5 °C alive (UNEP/UNEP‑CCC)
• UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2024 summary (PBL)
• As we breach 1.5 °C, we must replace temperature limits (Nature)
• The 1.5 °C temperature target explained (WRI)
• Billion‑dollar weather and climate disasters (NOAA)
• 2020 US billion‑dollar disasters in context (NOAA Climate)
• Extreme weather events cost economy US$2 trillion over the last decade (ICC/Oxera)
• European Climate Risk Assessment (EEA)
• Europe is not prepared for rapidly growing climate risks (BGC Jena)
• The first EU climate risk assessment report (PSI)
• IPCC Sixth Assessment Report: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (Zero Carbon Analytics)
• IPCC AR6: climate change widespread, rapid, and intensifying (CMCC)
• ‘Climate change is here’: experts warn environmental crisis is decades ahead of forecasts (AOL / The Independent)
• “Unprecedented cuts” needed to keep 1.5 °C alive: Emissions Gap Report 2024 (IISD)
• Emissions Gap Report 2024: pledges must deliver (UNEP‑CCC)
• UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2024 summary (PBL)
• The 1.5 °C temperature target explained (WRI)
• Exceeding 1.5 °C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points (Science)
• Researchers warn that we can’t engineer our way out of the climate crisis (AOL)

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January 2026: a brutal preview of Australia’s hotter future - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

January 2026 delivered one of Australia’s most intense and widespread summer heatwaves in years, supercharged by human-driven climate change 1 Extreme heatwaves are now hotter, longer and more frequent across Australia, and climate change has made the latest events several times more likely 2 The January heat pushed fire danger to extreme and even catastrophic levels in parts of south-east Australia, with large bushfires in Victoria 3 Heatwaves are Australia’s deadliest natural hazard, driving spikes in hospital admissions and straining power, transport and workplace safety 4 Rising temperatures are reshaping rivers, water security and ecosystems from the Murray–Darling Basin to northern Australia’s wetlands 5 Without rapid emissions cuts and serious adaptation, Australian agriculture, energy systems and cities face escalating heat risks 6

Before dawn in Mildura, the air already feels spent, as if the sun has been up for hours, and residents are bracing for yet another day above 40C in what has become a week-long siege of heat across south-eastern Australia.¹ 

From inland South Australia to western New South Wales and Victoria, maximum temperatures have climbed into the mid to high 40s, part of a severe to extreme heatwave that forecasters say may break long-standing records in multiple locations.¹ 

Along the north-west coast of Western Australia, temperatures near 50C earlier in January set new local January records and came close to Australia’s all-time highs, underlining how little room remains before physical limits are reached.¹ 

At the same time, authorities in Victoria declared a state of disaster as hot, dry winds and parched fuels drove fast-moving bushfires that burned hundreds of thousands of hectares.³ 

Climate scientists now say the early-January heatwave that set the stage for these fires was made around five times more likely by human-caused global warming, compared with a pre-industrial climate.² 

Hospitals and emergency services have reported spikes in heat-related admissions, while power demand for cooling has surged and outdoor work has become dangerous in many regions.² 

For many Australians, the January 2026 heat is not just another uncomfortable spell, it is a clear sign that climate change is reshaping the country’s summer and magnifying the risks that come with extreme heat.²

How climate change drives extreme Australian heat

Climate change increases extreme heat in two main ways: it raises the average temperature, and it alters weather patterns in ways that make heatwaves more intense and persistent.⁷ 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and multiple Australian studies have found that human greenhouse gas emissions have warmed the continent by about 1.4C since 1910, meaning that heatwaves now develop on a much hotter baseline than they did a century ago.⁷ 

A landmark analysis of Australian heatwaves by the Climate Council, drawing on Bureau of Meteorology data, shows that heatwaves have become hotter, longer, more frequent and are occurring earlier in the season since the 1950s.⁸ 

This trend is consistent with global attribution studies that compare the real world with modelled worlds without human emissions to determine how much climate change has altered the odds of extreme events.⁹

In January 2026, those background changes combined with short-term weather drivers to produce exceptional heat.¹ 

A strong, slow-moving high-pressure system over Western Australia generated sinking, drying air that allowed temperatures in the north-west to climb close to 50C, before that heat was transported east across the continent by hot north-westerly winds.¹ 

From 5 to 10 January, south-eastern Australia recorded its most severe heatwave since 2019–20, with temperatures above 40C in major population centres and prolonged periods of high overnight temperatures that prevented homes and infrastructure from cooling down.² 

An attribution analysis released in late January concluded that this early-January event was roughly five times more likely because of anthropogenic climate change and would have been significantly cooler in a pre-industrial climate, even with the same large-scale weather pattern.² 

CSIRO’s event attribution work has found similar human fingerprints on previous Australian heatwaves, including record-breaking events in 2013 and 2019, reinforcing the conclusion that climate change is now the dominant driver of extreme heat risk in Australia.⁹

The geography and physical character of the January heat

The January 2026 heatwave has not been a single, uniform event but a rolling sequence of extreme conditions affecting different regions in turn.¹ 

In the first half of the month, the focus was on Western Australia’s north-west, where Shark Bay recorded a new January record near 49C and Carnarvon reached its hottest January day on record at about 48C under a stagnant upper high.¹ 

As this heat dome shifted east, inland South Australia, western New South Wales and north-west Victoria endured days on end above 40C, with forecast peaks up to 48C in the Murraylands, Riverland, Mallee and lower western districts of New South Wales.¹ 

Cities such as Adelaide and Melbourne saw temperatures rebound into the low 40s on multiple days as relief from weak cool changes failed to reach far inland, trapping hot air over the interior.¹

These conditions translated directly into heightened bushfire danger.¹ 

In South Australia, soil moisture levels were already extremely low after several years of below-average rainfall, meaning fuels were dry and highly flammable.¹ 

As hot, dry north-westerly winds strengthened, fire danger ratings climbed to extreme in many districts and were forecast to reach catastrophic on the Yorke Peninsula, a level associated with fast, unpredictable fires that can overwhelm even well-prepared homes.¹ 

In Victoria, strong winds and severe heat helped several fires burn out of control, ultimately scorching more than 400,000 hectares and destroying hundreds of structures, including homes, prompting a state of disaster declaration.³ 

CSIRO and the Bureau of Meteorology have previously projected that climate change will increase the number of days with extreme fire danger by 5–25 per cent by 2020, relative to 1990, for a modest 0.4C of global warming, suggesting that risks will continue to escalate as temperatures climb further.¹⁰

Heat, health and the economy

Heatwaves already kill more Australians than any other natural hazard, and January 2026 has underlined why health experts describe extreme heat as a “silent emergency”.⁸ 

A 2025 scoping review of extreme heat and health in Australia found strong evidence that hot days and heatwaves increase deaths and hospitalisations from cardiovascular disease, diabetes, respiratory illness and mental health conditions, particularly among older people, those with chronic disease and people in low-quality housing.¹¹ 

The review reported, for example, that people with kidney disease in the Northern Territory faced a 29 per cent higher risk of heat-associated hospitalisation during extreme heat, and that heatwaves were linked to higher rates of stroke admissions in Brisbane.¹¹ 

 During the early-January 2026 heatwave, one major hospital reported a 25 per cent jump in emergency department presentations, highlighting the stress that even a single event can place on the health system.²

The economic impacts of extreme heat are similarly broad but less visible.¹¹ 

The same 2025 review noted estimates that more than 10 million Australians are exposed to hazardous heat, with potential losses of about $211bn in agriculture and labour productivity by 2050 under current warming trajectories, as well as large projected losses in the property sector from climate extremes including heatwaves.¹¹ 

January’s heat has already affected productivity by forcing outdoor work to pause during the hottest hours, increasing cooling costs for households and businesses, and adding pressure to electricity networks as demand for air conditioning surged.² 

In some regions, authorities issued public health alerts urging people to stay indoors, check on neighbours and limit physical activity, measures that are essential for safety but that also curtail economic activity and social life.²⁰

Ecology, wildlife and culture under stress

Australia’s plants and animals are adapted to heat and fire, but the intensity and frequency of recent heat extremes are pushing many species beyond their limits.¹² 

Previous heatwaves have caused mass deaths of flying foxes, fish kills in inland rivers and coral bleaching on the Great Barrier Reef, and scientists warn that similar impacts are likely when air and water temperatures spike for prolonged periods.¹³ 

The January 2026 heat has coincided with high fire danger across forested regions of south-eastern Australia, raising the risk of habitat loss for species still recovering from the 2019–20 Black Summer fires.³ 

CSIRO has noted that hotter, longer fire seasons and more frequent extreme heat will make it harder for ecosystems to recover between disturbances, leading to shifts in species composition and, in some cases, permanent loss of biodiversity.¹⁰

These changes also carry deep cultural consequences.¹⁴ 

First Nations communities whose traditions are tied to specific landscapes, seasonal cycles and species face the prospect of losing key cultural practices as fire regimes, water availability and wildlife distributions change.¹⁴ 

In some regions, extreme heat has already disrupted community events, ceremonies and sporting fixtures, with summer activities cancelled or shifted to early morning or night to avoid dangerous conditions.²⁰ 

For many Aboriginal ranger groups, intense heat waves can limit the window for cultural burning and land management work, even as the need to reduce fuel loads and manage Country becomes more urgent in a warming climate.¹⁴

Heat, rivers and water security

Extreme heat does not operate in isolation from Australia’s water systems; it interacts with rainfall, evaporation and land management to shape river flows, water quality and the security of supplies for towns, farms and ecosystems.¹⁵ 

In the Murray–Darling Basin, which supports much of the country’s irrigated agriculture, higher temperatures increase evaporation from rivers, dams and soils, reducing the efficiency of rainfall and increasing the risk that moderate dry spells turn into severe droughts.¹⁶ 

During intense heatwaves, low, slow-moving rivers can warm rapidly, reducing dissolved oxygen levels and raising the risk of hypoxic fish kills, particularly when combined with nutrient run-off or sudden changes in flow.¹⁶ 

Heat also increases water demand from irrigators, towns and ecosystems at the same time as supply is constrained, a tension that plays out in water markets and environmental flow decisions long after the immediate event has passed.¹⁶

Northern Australia’s wet-dry tropics face a different but related set of challenges.¹⁷ 

Projections suggest that while total wet-season rainfall may not decline strongly in some northern basins, higher temperatures will increase potential evaporation and may shorten the period of high flows, concentrating ecological stress into longer, hotter dry seasons.¹⁷ 

Wetlands and floodplains that depend on seasonal inundation, including culturally significant sites for Indigenous communities, become more vulnerable when extreme heat accelerates drying between floods.¹⁷ 

For remote communities that rely on shallow groundwater or small surface storages, heatwaves can also worsen water quality by promoting algal growth and increasing the concentration of contaminants as volumes drop, adding to existing infrastructure and health challenges.¹⁵

Long-term implications for key sectors

The conditions Australians have faced in January 2026 are consistent with what climate models project will become far more common unless global emissions fall steeply.⁷ 

Under a high-emissions scenario, much of inland Australia could experience several additional weeks per year of days above 35C by mid-century, with large increases in the number of days above 40C, particularly in already hot regions.⁷ 

For agriculture, this means more frequent heat stress on crops and livestock, reduced yields during key growth stages and increased irrigation demand at the same time that water resources are under strain.¹⁸ 

CSIRO has warned that without adaptation, heat and water stress will erode productivity in sectors such as grains, cotton, dairy and horticulture, and could force shifts in where some industries are viable.¹⁸

For the energy sector, rising temperatures create a dual challenge of soaring demand for cooling and reduced capacity of some generation and transmission assets to operate in extreme heat.¹⁹ 

 Coal and gas plants can become less efficient at high temperatures and may face cooling water constraints during drought, while transmission lines can carry less power when air temperatures are very high, increasing the risk of blackouts during heatwaves.¹⁹ 

At the same time, distributed rooftop solar performs well during sunny heatwaves, although output can dip slightly on the hottest days, and storage and demand management will be critical to smoothing evening peaks when residual heat lingers but solar generation falls.¹⁹ 

Urban planning will also need to confront a much hotter future, as more frequent days above 35C make existing housing, transport systems and public spaces increasingly uncomfortable and, at times, unsafe.¹⁸ 

Strategies such as tree planting, reflective surfaces, better building insulation and design, and accessible cool refuges will be central to reducing urban heat islands and protecting vulnerable residents.¹⁸

What planners and policymakers must do now

For regional planners and policymakers, January 2026 is less a surprise than a stress test for systems that were largely designed for a cooler climate.⁷ 

The first priority is rapid emissions reduction, because every fraction of a degree of additional warming will compound the risks of extreme heat, bushfire, water insecurity and ecosystem loss documented by Australian and global assessments.⁷ 

In practice this means phasing out coal and gas power, supporting the rapid build-out of renewables and storage, and integrating heat risk explicitly into national and state climate targets and sector plans.¹⁹

At the same time, governments must treat extreme heat as a core planning constraint, not a seasonal inconvenience.⁸ 

Heat-health action plans that identify vulnerable populations, establish cool refuges, set work and school protocols, and improve housing quality can reduce deaths and illness, but they need consistent funding and coordination across health, housing, education and workplace safety agencies.¹¹ 

 Land-use and bushfire planning should incorporate the latest projections of fire weather and extreme heat, limiting development in the most exposed areas and strengthening building standards, evacuation routes and early warning systems.¹⁰ 

 Water planning in basins such as the Murray–Darling must assume higher evaporation and more intense heatwaves, securing environmental flows and town water supplies under a hotter, drier climate, while involving First Nations communities in decisions about Country and cultural water.¹⁶ 

The January 2026 heatwave shows that Australia still has choices: the more decisively it cuts emissions and designs for a hotter world, the less brutal its future summers are likely to be.²

References

1. ABC News, Seven-day heatwave to engulf south-east states, raising bushfire danger (22 January 2026)
2. Earth.org, Climate change made Australia’s early-January 2026 heatwave five times more likely (20 January 2026)
3. Earth.org, Heightened fire risk and bushfires during the January 2026 heatwave
4. Climate Council, Heatwaves: hotter, longer, more often (2014)
5. Murray– Darling Basin Authority, Climate change and the Basin’s water resources
6. CSIRO, Climate Change: Science and Solutions for Australia – climate impacts and sectors
7. IPCC, Sixth Assessment Report Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis (2021)
8. Climate Council, Summary of Australian heatwave trends and risks
9. CSIRO, Climate change attribution – calculating the role of climate change in extreme events (2022)
10. CSIRO, Climate Change: Chapter 4 – Climate change impacts and fire weather
11. Nitschke et al, Impact of extreme heat on health in Australia: a scoping review (2025)
12. Department of the Environment, Climate change impacts on biodiversity in Australia
13. Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, Climate change and the Reef
14. Central Land Council, Climate change policy and impacts on Aboriginal communities
15. Bureau of Meteorology, State of the Climate – Australia’s changing water resources
16. Murray–Darling Basin Authority, Climate change and its impacts on the Basin (2020)
17. CSIRO, Climate change information for northern Australia
18. CSIRO, Climate change impacts on Australian agriculture
19. AEMO, Integrated System Plan – climate and heat implications for the energy system
20. ABC News, What makes a heatwave in Australia and why they are so dangerous (23 January 2026)

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Cooper Creek under pressure: how climate change is reshaping an iconic desert river - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Cooper Creek is one of Australia’s longest inland river systems, stretching more than 1400 kilometres from Queensland into South Australia and feeding the Lake Eyre Basin.1 Its “boom and bust” hydrology supports vast wetlands, waterbird colonies and permanent waterholes that act as drought refuges for fish and other wildlife.2 Climate change is increasing temperatures and evaporation, reducing the persistence of waterholes and altering the timing and extent of floods.3 Water is allocated mainly to stock and domestic use, with limited irrigation, while environmental flows remain largely unregulated but vulnerable to future extraction.4 Existing water‑sharing plans aim to protect natural flow variability and connectivity between waterholes, yet climate‑driven drying threatens long‑term water security.5 Future basin management must prioritise protecting permanent refuges, minimising new infrastructure on flood paths, and integrating Indigenous knowledge into drought‑resilience planning.6

Cooper Creek snakes across some of the driest country on Earth, yet it pulses with life when floods arrive from the north. ¹

Stretching more than 1400 kilometres from central Queensland into northern South Australia, it is one of the continent’s longest inland river systems and a critical artery of the Lake Eyre Basin. ¹

For thousands of years Aboriginal people have relied on its waterholes, floodplains and trade routes, embedding the creek deep in cultural memory. ¹¹

Today it also sustains pastoral stations, small towns, tourism and a globally significant network of wetlands that host millions of waterbirds in big flood years. ²

Climate change is now altering the rhythm of these floods, lengthening droughts and threatening the delicate balance between people, livestock and wildlife. ³

Water‑sharing rules, built around highly variable natural flows, face mounting pressure as temperatures rise and evaporation soaks up more of the system’s limited water. ⁵

How Cooper Creek is managed over the coming decades will determine whether it remains a resilient desert lifeline or becomes another river system stressed beyond its limits. ⁶

Geography and physical character

Cooper Creek begins in the Channel Country of western Queensland, fed by tributaries such as the Barcoo and Thomson rivers that carry monsoonal rains from the north and east. ¹

From there it meanders southwest across low‑gradient plains, eventually crossing into South Australia and feeding the Kati Thanda–Lake Eyre terminal basin. ¹

The total catchment covers more than 29 million hectares, making it one of the largest unregulated river systems in Australia. ²

Across much of its length the creek is ephemeral, with long stretches dry for years at a time and only a few permanent or near‑permanent waterholes. ²

When floods arrive, water spreads across wide, shallow channels and swamps, creating a braided network of flows that can take weeks or months to move through the system. ²

Geomorphological studies show that sand dunes, alluvial fans and low‑relief plains shape how floodwaters move, with lakes and swamps acting as “sinks” that slow and store water. ²

This slow, diffuse flow regime is what allows wetlands such as the Coongie Lakes to fill and support huge populations of waterbirds and native fish. ²

Economic, ecological and cultural importance

Ecologically, Cooper Creek is an international reference site for how intermittent desert rivers function. ²

Its “boom and bust” cycles drive explosive growth in aquatic plants, fish and invertebrates during floods, followed by a contraction into deep, permanent waterholes that sustain species through drought. ²

The Coongie Lakes in South Australia are listed under the Ramsar Convention for their global importance to waterbirds, with surveys recording up to several million birds in major flood events. ²

Permanent refuges such as Cullyamurra and Nappa Merrie waterholes shelter at least 13 native fish species and other aquatic fauna when the wider system dries. ²

Economically, the creek underpins extensive pastoral leases where cattle graze on natural floodplain pastures after big rains. ²

Oil and gas operations in the Cooper Basin draw on groundwater resources linked to the same basin, while tourism around Innamincka and the Channel Country relies on the river’s dramatic floods and wildlife. ²

Culturally, Cooper Creek has been a trade and travel corridor for Aboriginal groups for tens of thousands of years, with sites along its banks marking meeting places, ceremonial grounds and resource‑rich refuges. ¹¹

Climate change and the shifting hydrology

Climate projections for the Lake Eyre Basin indicate rising temperatures, higher evaporation and more erratic rainfall, all of which affect Cooper Creek’s flow patterns. ³

Mean annual pan evaporation in the South Australian section already exceeds 3500 millimetres, far outstripping the region’s median rainfall of about 100–150 millimetres. ²

Hydrological modelling suggests that even modest reductions in flow or increases in evaporation can shorten the time waterholes remain full, shrinking the number of drought refuges. ³

Studies of similar arid‑zone waterholes show that higher temperatures and evaporation are likely to reduce waterhole persistence, making native fish and other aquatic species more vulnerable. ¹⁹

At the same time, climate models indicate that when rain does fall it may come in more intense bursts, potentially leading to larger but less frequent floods that can alter sediment and vegetation patterns. ³

These changes threaten the finely tuned “boom and bust” ecology that many plants and animals depend on, including waterbirds whose breeding is tightly linked to flood timing and extent. ²

Water allocation and use

Water in the Cooper Creek system is governed by state‑based water‑sharing plans that distinguish between surface water, overland flows and groundwater. ⁴

In Queensland, the Water Plan (Cooper Creek) 2011 defines availability, sets rules for taking water and seeks to maintain the variability and seasonality of natural flows. ⁵

Most surface‑water entitlements are for stock and domestic use, with only small‑scale irrigation occurring in the upper catchment and limited infrastructure such as weirs or dams. ⁵

In South Australia, the Cooper Creek Water Allocation Plan similarly prioritises existing stock and domestic needs while recognising the ecological value of unregulated flows. ¹⁷

Environmental water is largely implicit in the system’s natural variability rather than allocated through formal “environmental entitlements”, because the river remains largely unregulated. ²

Urban and industrial uses are minor compared with pastoral demands, though growing mining and tourism activity increase pressure on local groundwater and surface‑water access points. ²

Climate change and future water security

As climate change reduces the reliability of floods and lengthens dry periods, the same water‑sharing frameworks that once assumed highly variable but broadly stable flow regimes now face a different reality. ³

Existing plans emphasise maintaining connectivity between waterholes and avoiding significant extraction from permanent refuges, but they were not designed for a consistently hotter, drier climate. ⁵

Higher evaporation and reduced flow persistence could shrink the pool of water available for stock, domestic use and environmental function, particularly in the lower Cooper where water already becomes saline in prolonged droughts. ²

Any expansion of irrigation or new large‑scale extractions would further stress the system, especially if they occur in parts of the catchment that currently provide critical flood pulses downstream. ⁵

Infrastructure such as raised roads, bridges and mine access tracks can also disrupt natural flow paths, changing where and how floodwaters spread and potentially isolating wetlands and waterholes. ²

Indigenous and local knowledge, combined with hydrological monitoring, will be essential to detect early signs of change and adjust management before key refuges are compromised. ¹¹

What planners and policymakers must focus on

To safeguard Cooper Creek, regional planners and policymakers must treat permanent waterholes and key wetlands as non‑negotiable ecological assets, restricting any new extraction that would reduce their reliability. ²

Water‑sharing rules should be periodically reviewed against updated climate projections and hydrological data, with explicit triggers for tighter extraction limits during extended droughts. ³

New infrastructure on flood paths, including roads, bridges and mining facilities, must be designed to allow natural flow patterns and avoid fragmenting the system’s connectivity. ²

Integrated groundwater‑surface water management is needed to prevent over‑reliance on bores that could deplete aquifers linked to the river’s refuges. ⁵

Finally, formalising the role of Aboriginal knowledge and local pastoral experience in drought‑planning and monitoring will strengthen the evidence base for decisions that affect both people and ecosystems. ¹¹

If these steps are taken, Cooper Creek can continue to function as a resilient desert river, even as climate change reshapes the arid landscapes it flows through. ⁶

References

1. Cooper Creek | Research Starters – EBSCO
2. Managing the High Ecological Value Aquatic Ecosystems – SAAL
3. Climate Change Impacts on the Water Resources of the Cooper Creek Catchment – MODSIM
4. Cooper Creek water resource planning area – WetlandInfo
5. Water Plan (Cooper Creek) 2011 – Queensland Legislation
6. Innamincka/Cooper Creek State Heritage Area – SA Environment
7. Water Resource (Cooper Creek) Plan 2011 – Queensland Legislation
8. Climate change effects on waterhole persistence in rivers – ScienceDirect
9. Water Sharing Plan for the Coopers Creek Water Source 2003 – NSW Legislation
10. Water Resource (Cooper Creek) Plan 2011 – Queensland Government
11. Innamincka/Cooper Creek State Heritage Area – SA Environment (Aboriginal heritage)
12. Cooper Creek – Wikipedia (contextual overview)

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When insurance becomes a climate faultline: how global heating is reshaping Australia’s safety net - Lethal Heating Editor BDA

Key Points

Extreme weather in 2025 caused about $3.5 billion in insured losses across Australia.1 Home insurance premiums have surged, with 1.24 million households now facing acute affordability stress.2 Climate change is driving heavier downpours, harsher fire weather and more intense tropical cyclones, increasing loss risks.3 A Senate inquiry has warned that some communities face uninsurability without stronger mitigation and planning reforms.4 Government schemes such as the cyclone reinsurance pool and Hazards Insurance Partnership aim to curb premiums in high‑risk areas.5 Insurers are reshaping products, data and capital to cope with mounting climate risk and guide adaptation.6

Insurance used to sit quietly in the background of Australian life, a renewal notice paid and forgotten, but climate change has pushed it to the centre of a national cost and security crisis.¹

In 2025 the Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) reported that extreme weather disasters generated nearly $3.5 billion in insured losses, from roughly 264,000 claims across the country.¹

That bill was driven by cyclones, floods and storms, led by Ex‑Tropical Cyclone Alfred in March, which alone accounted for more than $1.5 billion in insured losses and over 130,000 claims.¹

By mid‑2025 three declared disasters had already produced more than $1.8 billion in claims, underlining how quickly the climate‑charged damage tally is rising.²

As payouts escalate, premiums have surged, with new Actuaries Institute analysis showing average home insurance costs jumping 28 per cent in the year to March 2025, to $1,894, and the highest‑risk properties up by around 50 per cent.³

About 1.24 million households are now in “affordability stress”, spending roughly nine weeks of income on home insurance, concentrated in flood and cyclone‑exposed regions of northern Queensland, the Northern Territory and northern New South Wales.³

Behind these numbers sits a deeper structural faultline, as government, regulators and the industry grapple with the risk that entire postcodes – and eventually whole regions – could become functionally uninsurable in a warming world.³

Climate signals behind the loss surge

The escalation in losses is anchored in observed climate trends, not just bad luck from a run of wet or windy years.⁴

CSIRO’s latest State of the Climate findings show Australia has warmed by more than 1.4 degrees since 1910, with more frequent extreme heat and more intense short‑duration heavy rainfall events, even in regions where average rainfall is flat or falling.⁴

Those downpours drive flash flooding in cities and regional towns, overwhelming stormwater systems and inundating homes and businesses that were never mapped as high‑risk when they were built.⁴

Fire weather has become more severe with a longer fire season across much of southern and eastern Australia, compounding insurance exposure by stacking bushfire risk on top of flood and storm losses.⁴

CSIRO and the Bureau of Meteorology project that tropical cyclones may become less frequent overall but more intense on average, with higher rainfall rates and storm surges due to rising seas, which can produce higher loss events when they make landfall.⁴

This shift is already visible in claims data, with the ICA noting that Alfred’s 2025 deluge, and a series of East Coast storms and floods, fitted the pattern of slower‑moving, wetter systems delivering outsized damage over large catchments.¹

For insurers and reinsurers, the result is a step change in the expected frequency and severity of losses, forcing a rapid repricing of risk and raising hard questions about what remains insurable on commercial terms.¹

Premium pain and the edge of uninsurability

The human face of this repricing is a swelling cohort of households for whom comprehensive cover is either barely affordable or out of reach altogether.³

The Actuaries Institute’s 2025 home insurance affordability update estimates that 12 per cent of households – around one in eight – are now experiencing “extreme affordability pressure”, up from 10 per cent a year earlier.³

On average these households spend 8.8 weeks of their income on home insurance, but the burden is far higher in the most exposed riverine floodplains and cyclone belts, where premiums for some properties have doubled or more in recent years.³

Earlier modelling for the New South Wales Government highlighted that inland towns with combined flood exposure and lower incomes – including parts of the Northern Rivers and central west – are now hotspots for underinsurance and non‑insurance.⁵

The NSW climate risk analysis found vulnerable households in northern Queensland, the Northern Territory and northern New South Wales were disproportionately likely to face affordability problems, especially where old housing stock and inadequate mitigation compound climate hazards.⁵

Without intervention, the Actuaries Institute warns that climate change and shifting exposure could push many more properties into the highest‑risk, highest‑premium categories over coming decades, deepening what it calls an “insurance protection gap” between rich and poor communities.³

This raises the spectre of effective uninsurability, where cover technically exists but at prices far beyond the reach of average households, depressing property values and undermining access to finance in those areas.³

Senate inquiry: climate risk as a systemic threat

These pressures prompted the Senate in 2024 to establish a Select Committee on the Impact of Climate Risk on Insurance Premiums and Availability, tasked with examining whether parts of Australia are drifting towards an uninsurable future.⁶

The committee, which tabled its final report in November 2024, heard extensive evidence from disaster‑affected communities, consumer groups, industry and experts about the intersection of climate change, planning decisions and insurance markets.⁶

Submissions highlighted that insurance unaffordability is not confined to cyclone‑exposed northern coasts but is emerging across floodplains, bushfire‑prone peri‑urban fringes and erosion‑threatened coasts, where legacy planning rules allowed high‑risk development.⁷

The Housing Industry Association, for example, told the inquiry that governments must do more to retrofit existing homes for natural hazards and reconsider where rebuilding occurs after repeat disasters, rather than simply shifting costs to new home buyers.⁷

Actuarial evidence to the inquiry underscored that climate‑driven natural peril risks are a substantial and rising component of premiums, with the heaviest burden falling on a relatively small share of households in high‑risk locations.³

The committee’s report called for better data on insurance affordability and availability, targeted mitigation funding, and exploration of tools such as means‑tested subsidies or risk‑based stamp duty reform to ease pressure on low‑income households in high‑risk zones.⁶

Its findings sit alongside an Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) climate vulnerability assessment, which is building an affordability metric in “weeks of income” to track how climate and transition risks could reshape general insurance markets by 2050.⁸

Government interventions: reinsurance pools and partnerships

In response to mounting concern, federal policy has begun to move from crisis‑by‑crisis disaster relief towards more systematic efforts to stabilise premiums and reduce risk.⁹

Central to this is the cyclone reinsurance pool, operated by the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation (ARPC) and backed by a $10 billion government guarantee, which allows insurers to transfer cyclone and cyclone‑related flood risk to the public balance sheet.⁹

The pool covers household, strata and small business property policies nationwide but targets support to cyclone‑prone regions, and has been fully operational since January 2025, with all large insurers on board and smaller insurers joining in line with reinsurance renewals.¹⁰

Early data from Far North Queensland indicates that around 78 per cent of households hold home insurance, and ARPC plans to use the pool’s granular data to track coverage and affordability over time in high‑risk regions.¹⁰

Alongside the pool, the Albanese government has set up the Hazards Insurance Partnership (HIP), an enduring forum between government and major insurers, managed by the National Emergency Management Agency.¹¹

The partnership is designed to share data on natural hazard risk, co‑design mitigation priorities and provide transparent updates on measures to improve insurance affordability and availability in exposed communities.¹²

The 2024–25 federal budget also allocated additional funding to disaster resilience, including the Disaster Ready Fund and targeted resilience programs, which are intended to complement insurance measures by cutting physical risk rather than merely subsidising prices.¹³

Advocates argue that every dollar spent on risk‑reducing infrastructure, such as levees, buybacks, house raising or fire‑resistant retrofits, can save many times more in avoided disaster losses and help bring premiums back within reach over time.⁵

How insurers are adapting to a riskier climate

While governments adjust policy levers, insurers themselves are reshaping products, capital and data to live with a more volatile climate.¹⁴

KPMG’s 2025 general insurance insights report notes that strong growth in gross written premiums has been driven partly by higher rates reflecting worsening natural disaster risk, rising reinsurance costs and ongoing supply chain pressures in rebuilding and repairs.¹⁴

Insurers are experimenting with more granular risk‑based pricing, using improved flood and cyclone models, property‑level data and remote sensing to distinguish between homes on the same street with markedly different hazard profiles.¹⁴

Many insurers are also refining underwriting rules, tightening coverage in repeated‑loss locations, increasing excesses for some perils, or in some cases declining cover where they judge the risk as beyond tolerable bounds.¹⁴

At the same time, the industry is under pressure from regulators and investors to decarbonise its own portfolios, disclose exposure to climate risks, and support resilience measures that can reduce long‑term claims costs.⁸

Insurers are working with governments through HIP and other forums to link premium discounts to mitigation – for example, lowering premiums for homes elevated above projected flood levels, re‑roofed to cyclone standards or retrofitted with ember‑resistant features in bushfire zones.¹²

Industry action plans released in response to inquiries into the 2022 floods outline commitments to improve claims handling, invest in community engagement and support better land‑use planning so that future development avoids the worst hazards rather than locking in new pockets of high risk.¹⁴

What planners and policymakers must do next

Insurance is ultimately a signal, not a solution, and the signals from 2025’s loss data and 2026’s early disasters are stark.¹

To preserve insurance as a functioning safety net, regional planners and policymakers will need to focus on four core tasks: 

• Stop putting new assets in harm’s way, 
• Aggressively reduce risk to existing homes and infrastructure, 
• Target support to affordability‑stressed households in high‑risk areas, and 
• Align emissions cuts with adaptation so that today’s hazards do not become tomorrow’s uninsurable extremes.³

That means: 

• Tightening planning controls in floodplains, firegrounds and eroding coasts, 
• Accelerating buybacks and relocations in the most exposed pockets, and 
• Embedding resilience standards in building codes and retrofits at scale.⁷

It also requires: 

• Stable, long‑term funding for mitigation infrastructure, 
• Robust data on insurance availability and affordability, and 
• Social policies – from targeted subsidies to consumer protections – that ensure low‑income and regional households are not left without cover as climate risks rise.⁵

If those steps are taken, insurers can continue to pool and price risk, communities can rebuild with more confidence, and the country can avoid a slide into patchwork “insurance deserts” where the impacts of global heating are carved into the housing market as clearly as any flood line.³

References

1. Insurance Council of Australia data on 2025 extreme weather losses (via Artemis)
2. Insurance Council of Australia: Extreme weather losses in 2025 exceed $1.8 billion
3. Actuaries Institute: Home Insurance Affordability Update and Funding for Flood Costs (2025)
4. CSIRO State of the Climate 2024 – key findings summary
5. NSW Government: Rising climate risks – why accessible, affordable home insurance is under threat
6. Senate Select Committee on the Impact of Climate Risk on Insurance Premiums and Availability – Final Report (2024)
7. Housing Industry Association submission to Senate inquiry on climate risks and insurance premiums
8. APRA Insurance Climate Vulnerability Assessment – information paper (2024)
9. Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation: The Cyclone Reinsurance Pool
10. Joint Committee on Northern Australia: Cyclone Reinsurance Pool inquiry – current situation (2025)
11. Minister for Emergency Management: Landmark partnership to improve disaster insurance
12. Hazards Insurance Partnership – Terms of Reference
13. Highlights of the 2024–25 Federal Budget and insurance implications
14. KPMG: General Insurance Insights & Analysis 2025

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