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On paper, Australia looks like a climate convert, yet its coal ships still leave port day and night.1
The country has written a 43 percent emissions reduction target by 2030 and net zero by 2050 into law, signalling a break with a decade of climate wars.1
Its government has retooled industrial policy, tightened pollution baselines for big emitters and promised to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with Pacific neighbours on the front lines of rising seas.4
At the same time, official project lists show a large pipeline of new and expanded coal and gas developments that could keep Australian fossil fuel exports flowing well beyond mid‑century.2
International energy and climate agencies now agree that no new oil, gas or coal fields are compatible with limiting global heating to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the safer end of the Paris Agreement goals.3
Into this tension steps Australia’s bid, backed by Pacific leaders, to co‑host the United Nations climate summit COP31 in partnership with Türkiye later this decade.5
The question is whether a fossil fuel superpower still approving new projects can credibly claim climate leadership while presiding over the world’s premier climate negotiations.2
Climate Leader, Fossil Giant
Australia’s Climate Change Act 2022 for the first time locks in a national target to cut net greenhouse gas emissions 43 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and to reach net zero by 2050.1
The law aligns Canberra with peers like the European Union and the United States that have legislated or formally adopted long‑term decarbonisation goals, after years in which Australia was cast internationally as a laggard.1
Domestically, the government has overhauled the Safeguard Mechanism, a policy that sets emissions baselines for around 200 of the country’s largest industrial polluters, including coal mines, gas fields, aluminium smelters and cement plants.4
Under the reformed scheme, these facilities must cut or offset emissions in line with a declining cap intended to help deliver the national 2030 target, with flexibility through carbon credits but sharper penalties for non‑compliance.4
Yet Australia remains one of the world’s largest exporters of thermal and metallurgical coal as well as liquefied natural gas, meaning that most emissions linked to its fossil fuel production occur overseas when the fuels are burned.2
Those “Scope 3” emissions are many times larger than the pollution counted in Australia’s domestic inventory and are not regulated by any Australian climate law, even as they contribute to the same rising global temperature.4
A Pipeline Of New Projects
Federal government Resources and Energy Major Projects lists show a crowded pipeline of fossil fuel developments, including dozens of coal mines and gas fields at various stages of planning, approval and construction.2
Analysis by independent researchers of recent lists identified more than one hundred new or expanded coal and gas projects expected to begin production before 2030 if they proceed, representing a significant expansion of capacity rather than a simple replacement of declining fields.2
These projects span almost every producing basin, from thermal coal extensions in New South Wales and Queensland to offshore gas developments off Western Australia and the Northern Territory, many geared towards export markets in Asia.2
Campaigners note that approvals granted in recent years include long‑life mine extensions and gas fields with planned operating horizons stretching into the 2040s and 2050s, well beyond the date by which global emissions must reach net zero to meet Paris goals.2
Australia’s environment minister continues to assess new coal and gas proposals under national environmental law, and while some high‑profile projects have been refused or withdrawn, others have advanced with conditions attached.2
The result is a policy paradox in which the same government that legislated emissions targets also oversees a major expansion queue for fossil fuels, prompting criticism from climate analysts and Pacific partners who see a widening gap between rhetoric and reality.4
What The Science Says About Expansion
In 2021 the International Energy Agency, the Paris‑based body that advises governments on energy policy, released its first Net Zero by 2050 roadmap and concluded there was no need for new oil and gas fields or new coal mines and mine extensions beyond projects already approved at that time.3
That scenario has become a reference point for climate diplomacy because it outlines a pathway to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius without heavy reliance on speculative technologies, instead emphasising rapid declines in fossil fuel demand and steep growth in renewables.3
A subsequent update to the IEA net zero roadmap reinforced this message, projecting that fossil gas production and use would need to fall sharply on average each year through mid‑century, with coal declining even faster, leaving little room for investment in long‑lived new projects.7
The agency also pared back its expectations for carbon capture and storage, a technology often cited by industry as a way to prolong fossil fuel use, noting that deployment has repeatedly fallen short of plans and warning that over‑reliance would be risky and expensive.7
The Production Gap report, a recurring assessment led by the United Nations Environment Programme and research institutes, finds that governments globally are planning to produce far more coal, oil and gas in coming decades than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5 degrees.8
Researchers estimate that existing and planned fossil fuel infrastructure already imply carbon dioxide emissions that exceed the budget for a 50 percent chance of meeting the 1.5 degree goal, implying that no new coal mines or oil and gas fields can be developed unless offset by early retirement of existing assets.8
Australia’s COP31 Ambition
Australia has sought to recast itself as a constructive player in international climate diplomacy, throwing its weight behind a joint bid with Pacific island countries to host a “Pacific COP31” and securing agreement that Türkiye will hold the formal presidency while Canberra leads negotiations with partners.5
Pacific leaders have welcomed the chance to bring global attention to the region’s climate vulnerabilities and to secure stronger commitments on issues like climate finance and loss and damage, while also reiterating their longstanding calls for an end to new coal and gas projects worldwide.5
Hosting a COP is about more than logistics, because the incoming presidency is expected to drive ambition, broker compromises and shepherd collective decisions that shape global energy investment for years to come.9
Diplomats and analysts note that countries taking on this role face heightened scrutiny of their domestic policies, with perceived inconsistencies between climate rhetoric and fossil fuel expansion plans quickly seized upon by both vulnerable nations and civil society groups.9
Australia’s bid emphasises partnership with Pacific states, including a dedicated pre‑COP meeting in the region and a focus on mobilising finance for resilient development, in part to answer criticism that it has historically prioritised fossil fuel exports over climate solidarity.5
Whether that narrative holds will depend heavily on what happens to the domestic fossil fuel project pipeline in the years before the summit, and whether Canberra can show that its legislated emissions targets are matched by decisions to constrain supply as well as demand.2
What Must Change In The Next Five Years
Climate policy analysts argue that for Australia to credibly present itself as a climate leader and prospective COP31 convener, it would need to adopt a clear framework to phase down fossil fuel production in line with scientific advice from bodies such as the IEA and the Production Gap research.3
That would mean ruling out new coal mines, mine extensions and greenfield oil and gas fields that are inconsistent with a 1.5 degree pathway, and instead prioritising investment in renewable energy, storage, electrification and demand‑side efficiency.8
Reforms to the Safeguard Mechanism could be strengthened by placing tighter limits on the use of offsets, requiring more on‑site emissions cuts and broadening coverage to better reflect the full climate impact of export‑oriented fossil fuel projects.4
Independent modelling has warned that an unchecked wave of new fossil fuel developments risks overwhelming the scheme’s declining cap, potentially “blowing” the policy’s effective carbon budget and making the 2030 target much harder to meet.4
Regional planners and infrastructure agencies face parallel choices about where to direct billions of dollars in transport links, ports and transmission lines, decisions that can either lock communities deeper into fossil fuel‑dependent economies or enable diversification into cleaner industries.8
Experts in transition planning caution that over‑building fossil fuel capacity in the 2020s risks creating stranded assets, sudden job losses and fiscal stress for regions if global demand falls faster than companies expect, especially as major trading partners accelerate their own climate policies.3
Legal scholars note that governments and project proponents already face rising litigation risk, ranging from challenges to environmental approvals to investor actions over climate‑related disclosure, as courts increasingly weigh climate science and international commitments when assessing new fossil fuel developments.9
A more precautionary approach to approving long‑lived coal and gas projects, combined with robust transition support for affected workers and communities, is seen as a way to reduce the likelihood of costly disputes and abrupt policy reversals.9
Over the next five years, analysts say, the tasks for policymakers are clear: set explicit, time‑bound limits on new fossil fuel extraction, align industrial and infrastructure planning with those limits, and expand support for clean industries and regional transition packages to manage change fairly and predictably.3
For regional planners, that means prioritising projects that build renewable energy zones, grid upgrades, low‑carbon manufacturing and climate‑resilient infrastructure rather than new export coal terminals or gas pipelines whose economic lifetimes may be cut short by global decarbonisation.8
Such steps would not just lower long‑term climate risk, they would also reduce the legal and economic exposure associated with stranded fossil fuel assets and strengthen Australia’s claim to climate leadership if and when it takes up the COP31 gavel.9
References
- Climate Change Act 2022 (Cth) s 10
- New fossil fuel projects on the Australian Government’s Resources and Energy Major Projects list and their climate impact
- Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector
- New and expanded fossil fuels risk blowing the Safeguard Mechanism carbon budget
- Australia unites with Pacific leaders on regional priorities
- 2023 Production Gap Report: Phasing down or phasing up?
- IEA’s 2023 Net Zero Roadmap reinforces urgent need for a fossil fuel phase-out
- The Production Gap
- Conference of the Parties (COP)
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