03/11/2016

Four Environmental Reasons Why Fast-Tracking The Carmichael Coal Mine Is A Bad Idea

The Conversation -  |  |  |  | 

Abbot Point port would have to be expanded to ship coal from the proposed new mine. AAP Image/Greenpeace
Pressure is mounting for Adani’s Carmichael coal mine to proceed in inland Queensland. Recently the state government quietly gave the project “critical infrastructure” status to prioritise its development.
Providing this level of government status to a private enterprise is unusual – the last time it happened was in the early 2000s, and it is usually reserved for projects associated with national security, public education and health.
In response to delays and finance issues, Adani has also reportedly scaled back its initial proposal to increase the mine’s viability. There are also growing political calls to weaken the ability of environmental groups to challenge infrastructure projects.
Others have commented on the mine’s issues around employment, finance, and indigenous and rural communities. But as ecologists, there are four good reasons why we believe the mine should not go ahead.

Climate change
To meet the obligations under the Paris climate agreement to limit warming to well below 2℃, it is widely accepted that 90% of Australia’s coal will need to stay in the ground.
The proposed extraction of 2.3 billion tonnes of coal from the Carmichael mine flies in the face of global efforts to stop climate change. The emissions from the coal from this one mine would exceed 0.5% of the entire global carbon budget – the total amount of carbon than can be emitted without exceeding 2℃ warming.
Put another way, the 4.7 billion tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the mine will be equivalent to nine times Australia’s overall emissions in 2014.
Yet these emissions have been given little consideration in the mine’s approval process. Adani’s Environmental Impact Statement makes little reference to the mine’s “downstream” emissions, and Australia’s former environment minister Greg Hunt, in his reasons for approving the mine, said the emissions would be “managed and mitigated through national and international emissions control frameworks”, including in those countries that import the coal.
Following an appeal challenging Hunt’s assertion that these emissions would have no directly quantifiable impact on the Great Barrier Reef, the Federal Court found that the minister was entitled to find that the burning of the coal will have no relevant impact on the reef.

The Great Barrier Reef
The shipping of coal from the Carmichael mine is contingent upon redeveloping the shipping port at Abbot Point, which requires dredging the seabed.
Following public opposition to dumping dredge spoil at sea, the most recently approved proposal is to dredge 1.1 million cubic metres of the seabed and dump the spoil on land next to the Caley Valley Wetlands.
The wetlands are important habitat for at least 22 migratory shore birds listed under the national environmental legislation, so the current plan is still contentious.
The current plan to dump the dredge spoil on land still won’t save the reef because the actual dredging process removes the seabed, along with the seagrass and animals that survive there.
Dredging also releases fine sediments, reducing water quality while smothering surrounding seagrass beds and coral reefs, with some models predicting the spread of fine sediments up to 200km from where the activity took place, within 90 days.
Corals exposed to dredge material are twice as prone to suffer disease. Improving water quality is a key factor for increasing the resilience of coral reefs to major bleaching events.

Water
The Carmichael Mine as currently proposed would extract 12 billion litres of water each year. Removing this water to access the coal seam will reduce water pressure in the aquifer (rock that stores water underground), with knock-on effects. The mine is situated close to the Great Artesian Basin, a key resource for agriculture across inland Australia
For instance, this drawdown could reduce water reaching the Mellaluka and Doongmabulla Springs Complexes, which have exceedingly high conservation value. These springs are some of the largest examples remaining and provide habitat for many species of specialised plants that are only known from spring-fed wetlands.
If the springs go dry, even temporarily, endemic species will not survive and will become extinct at the site.
Removing groundwater is expected to increase the duration of zero- or low-flow periods in the Carmichael River system. The communities and ecosystems in the region are already highly reliant on groundwater, due to variable surface waters. This could also affect the acidity and salinity of soils.
Clearing the land for the mine itself – an area equivalent to Queensland’s Moreton Island - will likely reduce local rainfall considerably.
Due to the high uncertainty surrounding groundwater, the independent scientific committee recommended improvements in groundwater modelling and monitoring before proceeding with the project. The high degree of uncertainty and inadequate treatment of groundwater impacts in the Environmental Impact Statement were the subject of legal proceedings in the Land Court in 2015.

Threatened species
The Carmichael mine site is home to the largest known population of the endangered southern Black-throated finch (Poephila cincta cincta), which has lost 80% of its former habitat.
The intact areas of continuous habitat in this region - such as that at the mine site - have so far remained in good condition and relatively free of the invasive weed species that are contributing to the finch’s decline in other parts of its range.
The Black-throated Finch Recovery Team highlighted their concern over the Carmichael development with state and federal agencies.
Conservationists have expressed concerns over the mine’s impact on the black-throated finch. Eric Vanderduys, Author provided
Adani has proposed to offset the loss of finch habitat resulting from the mine by protecting alternative, nearby habitat. But losing the best remaining habitat means the most viable population will be compromised. Experts have warned that offseting the loss of habitat from mine development will not avoid serious detrimental impacts on the finch.
Keeping this habitat intact, continuous and unfragmented will be key to maintaining its suitability for the finch. The only way to avoid severely impacting the finch is to avoid destroying its high-quality habitat – which would mean not digging the mine in these areas.

A brighter future
Giving the mine “critical infrastructure” status allows special dispensations to ignore normal approval processes. And this decision sends a signal to the wider community that this type of short-term thinking is front and centre in the state government’s mind.
Given the clear environmental impacts this mine will have, not just for the region but for the whole planet, we question the effectiveness of Australia’s current environmental laws that have allowed it to be approved. We believe it is time to place the entire social and environmental costs and benefits of this mine on the public table, and ask the question of the politicians who are meant to make decisions in our best interest: is the short-term profit of selling some coal worth it?

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02/11/2016

We Don’t Need a ‘War’ on Climate Change, We Need a Revolution

New York Times - 
Shoes representing protesters at the climate talks summit in Paris last year. Credit Andre Larsson/NurPhoto, via Getty Images
This year is on track to become the hottest ever recorded, and a growing number of environmentalists are using a particular type of language in response. Some are calling for a huge "mobilization" to "combat" climate change. In an article in the New Republic in August, Bill McKibben, the unofficial spokesperson of the climate movement in the United States, insisted in very literal terms that, we are at war with climate change.
In the United States, we are familiar with war metaphors; and they are often politically useful. We have been through wars on poverty, drugs, cancer and even Christmas. In these cases, metaphors are understood as metaphors, but when McKibben points to territory ceded, space invaded, cultural loss and human suffering, he intends to be taken at face value: "It's not that global warming is like a world war," he writes. "It is a world war."
War rhetoric serves a valuable function. It stresses the seriousness of the harm, its structural nature and the need to struggle against it. Wars require people to sacrifice and to share responsibility for a joint effort larger than individual preferences and comforts. They can also motivate solidarity: The goal of defeating the enemy orients all activity, and whatever may divide or distract us from achieving that goal must be put aside. In the rhetoric-bag of political discourse, "war" is a forceful weapon.
McKibben is one of the most visible and motivating climate activists in North America. He has written an astounding number of influential articles and books, co-founded an organization leading an international fossil fuel divestment campaign, spoken across the country to full auditoriums and participated in high-profile protests, some leading to his arrest. Most recently, he called on all of us to unite with the Standing Rock Sioux against the Dakota Access pipeline. Our goal here is not to attack McKibben so much as the rhetorical strategy that he, along with others, have made increasingly popular.
The idea that climate change is a war is inaccurate, and a potentially counterproductive frame for organizing the resistance needed to secure a habitable planet. By stressing existential threat, war tends to divide the world into allies and enemies, against whom we need to risk all. McKibben insists that climate change is "a world war aimed at us all." But aimed by whom? It is variably polluting industries, tepid or two-faced politicians, our own political passivity, and even the laws of physics. McKibben often writes as if nature itself was a bellicose agent.
This approach ignores the environmental movement's earlier rhetorical and organizational strengths. As a political force, the movement grew from roots in the nonviolent soil of civil rights struggles, and was radicalized in antiwar protests and resistance against nuclear weapons. This legacy is not merely historical: it is alive and well in the language and action of ongoing resistance at Standing Rock.
Another problem with deploying such war metaphors is that doing so assumes a distinction between allies and enemies that disguises the unequal effects felt by "us all." McKibben, to his credit, does recognize this.
For instance, he admits that the "first victims, ironically, are those who have done the least to cause the crisis." Here he refers to the world's poor, who have contributed only a small amount of the total greenhouse gases while richer countries produce higher carbon emissions. And some even benefit from doing so. The affluent enjoy "cheap" fuel and other products of industry, and shareholders profit from such sales.
Meanwhile, the most recent International Panel on Climate Change report notes that the poor and marginalized face greater food scarcity and price insecurity, and the threat of violent conflict connected to this instability. In actual war, too, the poorest and marginalized often find themselves on the front lines while the richer are insulated or even benefit; McKibben himself explains how this was true of United States industrialists during World War II.
In other words, the first victims are not suffering from the relentless assault of the physical environment alone, but of other humans who leverage their social position to displace wider costs and extract private benefits. Given McKibben's dedication to protests like the one at Standing Rock reservation, he is well aware of these forces.
Humans are already divided into different groups or classes, with relative advantages and vulnerabilities. Climate change exacerbates this inequality, and our rhetoric ought to reflect this fact and resist false universalizations. Beyond the inherent injustice of disproportionate and unnecessary suffering, growing environmental inequality tends to the violences of displacement, resource-competition and actual war.
One thing we all share is that we secure existence in and through a relationship with our environment — all living things do. In recognition of this fact, Marx thought of the human body as part of the natural world and called nature an extension of our bodies. Following Marx, contemporary theorists like Jason Moore and John Bellamy Foster describe our changing, and dangerously unstable metabolic relationship with nature. Humans are a unique species in that we form complex relationships to regulate this metabolism as we produce our food, water, shelter and more robust needs.
As these relationships are organized today, and as the climate changes, the affluent can afford an increase in food prices, ship in bottled water during droughts and relocate businesses and homes when the seas rise, while those without access to such privileges have fewer options and disproportionately suffer.
What would winning a "war" against climate change even look like? McKibben suggests a huge mobilization to produce green technologies, solar panels, wind turbines and electric cars. He cites the public seizure and transformation of private factories during World War II that enabled the United States to produce bombers and other instruments that helped win the war.
Certainly greener technologies can help, but solar panels won't purify Flint's lead-ridden water or lower asthma rates in the Bronx, some of the highest in the country because of the proximity to trucking lanes. Technology alone can't address the environmental injustice disproportionately confronting minorities. However, if we understand that the enemy is not our physical environment, but the unjust social relations that allow some to gain at the expense of and risk to others, then technological solutions can be a part, but only a part, of the plan. Crucial to this plan is gaining social control over the private, exploitative and even irresponsible direction of the human-nature metabolism.
For this reason, Naomi Klein has called for solutions that go beyond the technological. She emphasizes, not just green energy, but also "people power." Her most recent book and film, "This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate," feature a number of grass-roots movements resisting the forces that threaten people's relationships with their environment — sometimes even in the name of "green" solutions, such as hydroelectric dam projects. We want to follow Klein's lead in shifting the conceptual focus from technologies of power to relations of power. Despite his recent rhetoric, McKibben follows a similar course.
We urgently need to motivate action, but given the ambiguities and dangers surrounding war rhetoric, we need better orienting language. Perhaps, as some have suggested, "revolution" is the better path.
While world wars aim to decimate enemies and their capacities for violence, "revolutions" aim to transform violence and oppression by empowering people. Instead of a war against physics, a revolution in the control and direction of climate, natural resources and energy policy could enable democratic participation to redress past harms and guide environmental goals of the future. Such a revolution would affirm the right to a clean, healthy environment for all people; it would transform the relationships that regulate our metabolism with nature, relationships that now allow some to profit by denying this right to others. Solar panels alone won't transform these relationships and secure this right.
McKibben worries that if the United States does not take the lead, China, already a significant developer of renewable energy, would win the renewables race. In this way American exceptionalism and national chauvinism lurks beneath the surface of so many universalist stances.
Like the arms races and technology gaps characteristic of the nearly catastrophic Cold War, such a national frame reinforces an us-versus-them mentality which reduces rather fosters much needed international coordination and popular organization. After all, even if we stop emitting today or if our renewable sector takes the lead, the world will continue to warm. A wider vision of global cooperation in which China, the United States and so many others work hand in hand to confront the global environmental challenges should supplant the narrow focus on American leadership. But is this likely within the context of nationalist war rhetoric?
"Revolution" can be just as motivating as "war," but a green revolution would center the human-nature metabolism over and against the drive for profits. It would answer the question McKibben leaves open, namely, how we get from green technology to more just ecological and social relations.
In this light, Exxon and its climate science obfuscation is not so much an enemy as a paradigmatic symptom of the worst kinds of behavior generated by profit-driven systems. The enemy is the violence perpetrated by racial, gendered, political, juridical and existing economic metabolisms with nature. Their exploitative organizations would remain unconcerned with climate justice even if the nation were mobilized to mass produce solar panels and wind turbines. In other words, Climate change demands not only a race to develop and deploy new energy technologies, but a revolution to democratize all forms of power — fossil fuels, wind, solar, but most important, economic and political power.

*Eric S. Godoy teaches in the department of social science and cultural studies at the Pratt Institute.
*Aaron Jaffe is an assistant professor of philosophy and liberal arts at The Juilliard School.

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These Antarctic Glaciers Have Experienced Staggering Ice Loss — And Scientists Think They Know Why

Washington Post - Chelsea Harvey

Part of the eastern flank of Crosson Ice Shelf (center left) and Mount Murphy (foreground) as viewed during a NASA IceBridge flight in 2012. Thwaites Ice Shelf lies beyond the highly fractured expanse of ice (center). (Image credit: John Sonntag)
Few regions of the world are as unstable in the face of advancing climate change as frozen West Antarctica, where rapidly melting glaciers have scientists on edge about the potential for huge amounts of future sea-level rise.
Now, a new study has pinpointed some of the most rapid ice losses observed in the region in the past 15 years — and it supports a growing scientific belief that warm ocean water is behind the melting.
“[The study] seems to provide a strong piece of evidence to support a general hypothesis about what’s happening in the Amundsen Sea,” said Ala Khazendar, a polar scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the new paper’s lead author.
Much of the focus on West Antarctica centers around the Amundsen Sea region, whose glaciers may already be experiencing irreversible ice loss. The glaciers backing up to this sea have the potential to cause about 4 feet of sea-level rise, and the ice contained in West Antarctica as a whole could raise sea levels by 10 feet.
Several of the region’s largest glaciers have inspired some of the greatest concern. Just last week, U.S. and British science agencies announced a joint multimillion-dollar research mission to study the massive Thwaites Glacier, which scientists believe may already be contributing about 10 percent of all global sea-level rise. And a recent study on the nearby (and slightly smaller) Pine Island Glacier has documented recent rapid retreat.
Now, research increasingly suggests it’s not just atmospheric warming that’s causing all the problems in West Antarctica, but the influence of the ocean as well. Many glaciers in this region back right up to the edge of the sea, terminating in what’s known as an ice shelf — a ledge of floating ice that’s disconnected from the bedrock and juts out into the water, helping to stabilize the glacier and hold back the flow of ice behind it.
Scientists now believe that rising water temperatures may be helping to weaken ice shelves by seeping into the cavities beneath them and lapping up against the exposed ice. If an ice shelf thins or breaks, the glacier behind it begins to pour ice into the ocean and retreat inland. The point where the bottom of the glacier actually joins to the bedrock is known as the grounding line, and scientists often use it as a point of reference to measure how far a glacier has retreated over time.
Scientists believe this is what’s driving the retreat of the Pine Island and Thwaites glaciers. But while these glaciers hold some of the greatest potential to raise sea-levels, smaller glaciers in the area can also offer some important insights into the processes driving ice loss in the region.
The new study, just out on Tuesday in the journal Nature Communications, focuses on the Smith, Pope and Kohler glaciers, which are buttressed by the Dotson and Crosson ice shelves, not far from Thwaites Glacier. Previous research had already suggested that these glaciers had experienced unusually rapid retreat in the mid-2000s, Khazendar said. For the new study, he and his colleagues were interested in taking a closer look at what was happening to the glaciers below the surface of the water in the hopes of getting a better grasp on the physical processes causing the ice loss.
“I was really curious about what would we see in a place where the grounding line was retreating so fast,” Khazendar said.
Image of flow speeds (Credit: NASA Earth Observatory)
The researchers analyzed radar survey data collected by NASA research aircraft at various points between 2002 and 2014, which provided direct measurements of ice loss below the surface of the ocean. They found that, between 2002 and 2009, the glaciers experienced some of the fastest ice loss observed in decades. This was especially true for Smith Glacier, whose ice shelf thinned below the surface by 40 to 70 meters per year for a total loss of nearly half a kilometer during the study period.
The researchers attribute this extreme melting to an influx of warm water in the Amundsen Sea during that time period, the reasons for which are still not completely understood. Some scientists have suggested that changes in wind patterns and atmospheric circulation carried in more warm water from other parts of the ocean, and that this effect slacked off near the end of the decade.
As a result, between 2009 and 2014 the ice loss slowed significantly, and both Pope and Kohler glaciers seemed to stabilize. Smith Glacier, on the other hand, continued to retreat. The researchers attribute this behavior to differences in the topography at the three study sites. As Smith Glacier retreated, it moved into deeper terrain where the encroaching ocean water had greater access to the exposed ice beneath the surface. Pope and Kohler glaciers, on the other hand, retreated into shallower areas.
The study is the latest installment in a “long line of papers that show how important ocean melting can be to the evolution of these glaciers and ice sheets, both in Greenland and Antarctica,” said Martin Truffer, a physics professor and glacier expert at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, who was not involved with the new study. “And this is a particularly drastic or impressive example of how much ice melting from the ocean can impact the glacier directly.”
He added that the study also demonstrates that the worrisome patterns observed at Pine Island and Thwaites glaciers are not just local effects — they’re happening throughout West Antarctica.
The dramatic effect observed in this case “lets us examine a greater envelope of glacier response behavior than we have yet observed at [Pine Island] and Thwaites,” said Knut Christianson, a glaciologist at the University of Washington in Seattle who was not involved with the new study, in an emailed comment to The Washington Post.
He added that “this study also highlights the difficulty of assessing future ice sheet behavior, as grounding line position is dependent on environmental forcing (ocean heat content), bed geometry, and glaciological setting…which must all be considered to understand a system’s current behavior and future evolution.”
In the near future, scientists’ primary focus will likely remain on the region’s largest glaciers, especially as the joint U.S and British research mission at Thwaites Glacier progresses. But continued research on other ice shelves in the surrounding area may provide important insight into the processes contributing to their destabilization.
“The changes are so big in these ice shelves and the glaciers that feed them that we definitely can learn a lot about the underlying processes by looking there,” Khazendar said.

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Historic Milestone: Renewables Now Largest Source Of Installed Power In The World

Climate Council

Renewables surpassed coal last year to become the largest source of installed power in the world, new data from the International Energy Agency data has revealed.
The historic milestone prompted the IEA to significantly boost its five-year forecast for renewables growth amid sharp cost reduction and significant policy support in key countries.
Renewables are expected to cover more than 60% of global power capacity growth over the next 5 years, according to the IEA.

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01/11/2016

Climate Change Wars Are Coming And Building Walls Won’t Help, Top General Warns

The Independent - Ian Johnston

The effects of global warming ‘are becoming so severe they hold tremendous conflict potential’ in some areas and the world should prepare for millions of refugees
Major General Munir Muniruzzaman pointed to the recent diplomatic row between bitter regional rivals India and Pakistan Reuters
Climate change is threatening to force millions of people to become refugees and spark major wars that could “completely destabilise” the world, a leading general has warned.
And countries which attempted to deal with the coming crisis by resorting to “narrow nationalistic instincts” – for example, by building walls to keep out refugees – will only make the problem worse, according to Major General Munir Muniruzzaman, chairman of the Global Military Advisory Council On Climate Change (GMACCC).
He added that, while countries had talked a lot about the problems posed by global warming and how to address them, there did not seem to be “much action” on the ground.
The GMACCC was set up in 2009 to investigate the security implications of climate change and its members include serving and retired military officers from around the world, such as the UK’s Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti and Brigadier General Stephen Cheney, a former US Marine.
Speaking ahead of the United Nations climate summit in Marrakesh next month, General Muniruzzaman said it was time to make good on the promises made at last year’s historic meeting in Paris with global warming already contributing to flooding and droughts, threatening financial security and affecting people's health.
“In our analysis, we are seeing the risk is now becoming all-pervasive from climate change in the sense that it is touching multiple sectors … many of the sectors are being gravely challenged,” he said.
“In some areas of the world, some of the issues we are touching on are becoming so severe they hold tremendous conflict potential."
He pointed to the recent diplomatic row between bitter regional rivals India and Pakistan, which both have large militaries and nuclear weapons, over water supplies.
“There was a possibility of a break down [of diplomacy] … which could have led to the first major water conflict of the world,” he said.
The events of the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war were also connected to unrest caused by droughts and crop failures.
General Muniruzzaman pointed to projections that sea-level rise could result in the loss of 20 per cent of Bangladesh’s territory as early as 2050, which would force up to 30 million people to look for a new home.
“Imagine, with an international community unable to cope with a few thousand Syrian refugees, what will happen when millions of people are on the move,” he said.
The reaction to the refugee crisis by some European countries – such as Hungary, Norway and the UK – has been to build walls and fences to keep people out.
But General Muniruzzaman said: “I’m very strongly of the opinion that walls are never a solution. You cannot build walls to stop people when they want to go to safety.
Turkey has two million Syrian refugees.
“If you build walls and high fences, they will break them and cross over. The risk people are taking when they cross the water [the Mediterranean] … many have drowned.”
Instead of trying to hold back the tide of climate refugees, General Muniruzzaman said it would be better for the world to work out “international understanding and mechanisms” to enable mass movements of people to take place peacefully. 
But the solution might need a significant rethink of the whole concept of the modern nation, which is said by some historians to have been born out of the Peace of Westphalia treaty in 1648.
“People have moved before. Environmental changes have forced people to relocate themselves historically,” he said.
Refugees welcome here: Protesters demand UK resettle more migrants in response to refugee crisis.
“What has become more difficult now is we have boxed ourselves into the Westphalian system of states.
“That is in conflict with nature, with the movement of people … we need to find a common ground.
“We need leaders with vision … we have to have a global solution to the problem, this is a civilisational problem.
“If we want to solve [these problems] with narrow nationalistic instincts, we will be adding more problems, not solving them.”
Refugees break through Macedonia border fence in February.
Major wars and mass migration had the potential to “completely destabilise” not just countries and regions, but the entire world, the general said.
But he warned that most countries and most armed forces were “ill-prepared to meet the challenge for which they will be called upon to meet somebody and not too long away”.
“We have to understand and meet the challenge, so we are not completely overwhelmed when they happen on the ground,” General Muniruzzaman said.
“We don’t have the proper strategies and policies in place to meet the security impacts of climate change.
Calais refugee camp evacuation.
“I  would like to warn everybody we are way behind schedule to trying to find a solution to the problems we can see. In most cases we have been shying away from the problems we can absolutely identify and see.
“For a long time, we have been talking about the issues, but on the ground we don't see much action. As a soldier, I have a more action-orientated approach."

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Amitav Ghosh: Where Is The Fiction About Climate Change?

The Guardian - Amitav Ghosh*

The climate crisis casts a much smaller shadow on literary fiction than it does on the world. We are living through a crisis of culture – and of the imagination
In the eye of the storm … a tornado in Kansas. Photograph: NZP Chasers/Getty Images 
It is a simple fact that climate change has a much smaller presence in contemporary literary fiction than it does even in public discussion. As proof of this, we need only glance through the pages of literary journals and book reviews. When the subject of climate change occurs, it is almost always in relation to nonfiction; novels and short stories are very rarely to be glimpsed within this horizon. Indeed, it could even be said that fiction that deals with climate change is almost by definition not of the kind that is taken seriously: the mere mention of the subject is often enough to relegate a novel or a short story to the genre of science fiction. It is as though in the literary imagination climate change were somehow akin to extraterrestrials or interplanetary travel.
There is something confounding about this peculiar feedback loop. It is very difficult, surely, to imagine a conception of seriousness that is blind to potentially life-changing threats. And if the urgency of a subject were indeed a criterion of its seriousness, then, considering what climate change actually portends for the future of the Earth, it should surely follow that this would be the principal preoccupation of writers the world over – and this, I think, is very far from being the case. But why?
It is as though, in the literary imagination, climate change were akin to extraterrestrials or interplanetary travel
Why does climate change cast a much smaller shadow on literature than it does on the world? Is it perhaps too wild a stream to be navigated in the accustomed barques of narration? But the truth, as is now widely acknowledged, is that we have entered a time when the wild has become the norm: if certain literary forms are unable to negotiate these waters, then they will have failed – and their failures will have to be counted as an aspect of the broader imaginative and cultural failure that lies at the heart of the climate crisis.
Clearly, the problem does not arise out of a lack of information: there are surely very few writers today who are oblivious to the current disturbances in climate systems the world over. Yet, it is a striking fact that when novelists do choose to write about climate change it is almost always outside fiction. A case in point is the work of Arundhati Roy: not only is she one of the finest prose stylists of our time, she is passionate and deeply informed about climate change. Yet all her writings on these subjects are in various forms of nonfiction.
When I try to think of writers whose imaginative work has communicated a more specific sense of the accelerating changes in our environment, I find myself at a loss; of literary novelists writing in English only a handful of names come to mind: Margaret Atwood, Kurt Vonnegut Jr, Barbara Kingsolver, Doris Lessing, Cormac McCarthy, Ian McEwan and T Coraghessan Boyle. No doubt many other names could be added to this list, but even if it were to be expanded to 100, or more, it would remain true, I think, that the literary mainstream, even as it has become more engagé on many fronts, remains just as unaware of the crisis on our doorstep as the population at large.
Viggo Mortensen, left, and Kodi Smit-McPhee in the 2009 film adaptation of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road.
I have been preoccupied with climate change for a long time, but it is true of my own work as well, that this subject figures only obliquely in my fiction. I have come to be convinced that this discrepancy is not the result of personal predilections: it arises out of the peculiar forms of resistance that climate change presents to what is now regarded as serious fiction.
In his seminal essay “The Climate of History”, Dipesh Chakrabarty observes that historians will have to revise many of their fundamental assumptions and procedures in this era of the Anthropocene, in which “humans have become geological agents, changing the most basic physical processes of the Earth”. I would go further and add that the Anthropocene presents a challenge not only to the arts and humanities, but also to our common sense understandings and beyond that to contemporary culture in general.
There can be no doubt, of course, that this challenge arises in part from the complexities of the technical language that serves as our primary view of climate change. But neither can there be any doubt that it derives also from the practices and assumptions that guide the arts and humanities. To identify how this happens is, I think, a task of the utmost urgency: it may well be the key to understanding why today’s culture finds it so hard to deal with climate change. Indeed, this is perhaps the most important question ever to confront culture in the broadest sense – for let us make no mistake: the climate crisis is also a crisis of culture, and thus of the imagination.
Culture generates desires – for vehicles and appliances, for certain kinds of gardens and dwellings – that are among the principal drivers of the carbon economy. A speedy convertible excites us neither because of any love for metal and chrome, nor because of an abstract understanding of its engineering. It excites us because it evokes an image of a road arrowing through a pristine landscape; we think of freedom and the wind in our hair; we envision James Dean and Peter Fonda racing toward the horizon; we think also of Jack Kerouac and Vladimir Nabokov. When we see an advertisement that links a picture of a tropical island to the word paradise, the longings that are kindled in us have a chain of transmission that stretches back to Daniel Defoe and Jean-Jacques Rousseau: the flight that will transport us to the island is merely an ember in that fire. When we see a green lawn that has been watered with desalinated water, in Abu Dhabi or southern California or some other environment where people had once been content to spend their water thriftily in nurturing a single vine or shrub, we are looking at an expression of a yearning that may have been sparked by the novels of Jane Austen. The artefacts and commodities that are conjured up by these desires are, in a sense, at once expressions and concealments of the cultural matrix that brought them into being.
This culture is, of course, intimately linked with the wider histories of imperialism and capitalism that have shaped the world. But to know this is still to know very little about the specific ways in which the matrix interacts with different modes of cultural activity: poetry, art, architecture, theatre, prose fiction and so on. Throughout history these branches of culture have responded to war, ecological calamity and crises of many sorts: why, then, should climate change prove so peculiarly resistant to their practices?
New York freezes in director Roland Emmerich’s The Day After Tomorrow. 
From this perspective, the questions that confront writers and artists today are not just those of the politics of the carbon economy; many of them have to do also with our own practices and the ways in which they make us complicit in the concealments of the broader culture. For instance, if contemporary trends in architecture, even in this period of accelerating carbon emissions, favour shiny, glass-and-metal-plated towers, do we not have to ask, what are the patterns of desire that are fed by these gestures? If I, as a novelist, choose to use brand names as elements in the depiction of character, do I not need to ask myself about the degree to which this makes me complicit in the manipulations of the marketplace?
In a substantially altered world, when sea-level rise has swallowed the Sundarbans and made cities such as Kolkata, New York and Bangkok uninhabitable, when readers and museum-goers turn to the art and literature of our time, will they not look, first and most urgently, for traces and portents of the altered world of their inheritance? And when they fail to find them, what can they do other than to conclude that ours was a time when most forms of art and literature were drawn into the modes of concealment that prevented people from recognising the realities of their plight? Quite possibly, then, this era, which so congratulates itself on its self-awareness, will come to be known as the time of the Great Derangement.
On the afternoon of March 17, 1978, when I was 21, I was stuck in the middle of the first tornado to hit Delhi in recorded meteorological history. As is often the case with people who are waylaid by unpredictable events, for years afterwards my mind kept returning to my encounter with the tornado. Why had I walked down a road that I almost never took, just before it was struck by a phenomenon that was without historical precedent? To think of it in terms of chance and coincidence seemed only to impoverish the experience: it was like trying to understand a poem by counting the words. I found myself reaching instead for the opposite end of the spectrum of meaning –for the extraordinary, the inexplicable, the confounding. Yet these too did not do justice to my memory of the event.
Novelists inevitably mine their own experience when they write. No less than any other writer have I dug into my own past while writing fiction. It is certainly true that storms, floods and unusual weather events do recur in my books, and this may well be a legacy of the tornado. Yet oddly enough, no tornado has ever figured in my novels. Nor is this due to any lack of effort on my part. Indeed, I have returned to the experience often over the years, hoping to put it to use in a novel, only to meet with failure at every attempt.
I was stuck in the middle of the first tornado to hit Delhi – but no tornado has ever featured in my novels Amitav Ghosh
On the face of it there is no reason why such an event should be difficult to translate into fiction; after all, many novels are filled with strange happenings. Why then did I fail, despite my best efforts, to send a character down a road that is imminently to be struck by a tornado?
In reflecting on this, I find myself asking, what would I make of such a scene were I to come across it in a novel written by someone else? I suspect that my response would be one of incredulity; I would be inclined to think that the scene was a contrivance of last resort. Surely only a writer whose imaginative resources were utterly depleted would fall back on a situation of such extreme improbability?
Before the birth of the modern novel, wherever stories were told, fiction delighted in the unheard-of and the unlikely. Narratives such as those of The Arabian Nights, Journey to the West and The Decameron proceed by leaping blithely from one exceptional event to another. Novels too proceed in this fashion, but what is distinctive about the form is precisely the concealment of those exceptional moments that serve as the motor of narrative. This is achieved through the insertion of what Franco Moretti, the literary theorist, calls “fillers”. According to Moretti, “fillers function very much like the good manners so important in Austen: they are both mechanisms designed to keep the ‘narrativity’ of life under control – to give a regularity, a ‘style’ to existence”. It is through this mechanism that worlds are conjured up, through everyday details, which function “as the opposite of narrative”.
It is thus that the novel takes its modern form, through “the relocation of the unheard-of toward the background ... while the everyday moves into the foreground”. As Moretti puts it, “fillers are an attempt at rationalising the novelistic universe: turning it into a world of few surprises, fewer adventures, and no miracles at all”.
This regime of thought imposed itself not only on the arts but also on the sciences. That is why Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle, Stephen Jay Gould’s brilliant study of the geological theories of gradualism and catastrophism is, in essence, a study of narrative. In Gould’s telling of the story, the catastrophist recounting of the Earth’s history is exemplified by Thomas Burnet’s Sacred Theory of the Earth (1690) in which the narrative turns on events of “unrepeatable uniqueness”. As opposed to this, the gradualist approach, championed by James Hutton (1726‑97) and Charles Lyell (1797–1875), privileges slow processes that unfold over time at even, predictable rates. The central credo in this doctrine was: “Nothing could change otherwise than the way things were seen to change in the present.” Or, to put it simply: “Nature does not make leaps.”
A satellite image of the Ganges delta, which is vulnerable to flooding as sea levels rise. Photograph: UniversalImagesGroup/UIG via Getty Images 
The trouble, however, is that Nature does certainly jump, if not leap. The geological record bears witness to many fractures in time, some of which led to mass extinctions and the like: it was one such, in the form of the Chicxulub asteroid, that probably killed the dinosaurs. It is a fact that catastrophes waylay both the Earth and its individual inhabitants at unpredictable intervals and in the most improbable ways.
Distinctive moments are no less important to modern novels than they are to any other forms of narrative, whether geological or historical. It could not, of course, be otherwise: if novels were not built upon a scaffolding of exceptional moments, writers would be faced with the Borgesian task of reproducing the world in its entirety. But the modern novel, unlike geology, has never been forced to confront the centrality of the improbable: the concealment of its scaffolding of events continues to be essential to its functioning. It is this that makes a certain kind of narrative a recognisably modern novel.
Here, then, is the irony of the “realist” novel: the very gestures with which it conjures up reality are actually a concealment of the real. What this means in practice is that the calculus of probability that is deployed within the imaginary world of a novel is not the same as that which obtains outside it; this is why it is commonly said, “If this were in a novel, no one would believe it”. Within the pages of a novel an event that is only slightly improbable in real life – say, an unexpected encounter with a long-lost childhood friend – may seem wildly unlikely: the writer will have to work hard to make it appear persuasive.
If that is true of a small fluke of chance, consider how much harder a writer would have to work to set up a scene that is wildly improbable even in real life. For example, a scene in which a character is walking down a road at the precise moment when it is hit by an unheard-of weather phenomenon?
To introduce such happenings into a novel is in fact to court eviction from the mansion in which serious fiction has long been in residence; it is to risk banishment to the humbler dwellings that surround the manor house – those generic out-houses that were once known by names such as the gothic, the romance or the melodrama, and have now come to be called fantasy, horror and science fiction.
So far as I know, climate change was not a factor in the tornado I experienced. But the thing it has in common with the freakish weather events of today is its extreme improbability. And it appears that we are now in an era that will be defined precisely by events that appear, by our current standards of normality, highly improbable: flash floods, hundred-year storms, persistent droughts, spells of unprecedented heat, sudden landslides, raging torrents pouring down from breached glacial lakes, and, yes, freakish tornadoes.
This, then, is the first of the many ways in which the age of global warming defies both literary fiction and contemporary common sense: the weather events of this time have a very high degree of improbability. Indeed, it has even been proposed that this era should be named the “catastrophozoic” (others prefer such phrases as “the long emergency” and “the penumbral period”). It is certain in any case that these are not ordinary times: the events that mark them are not easily accommodated in the deliberately prosaic world of serious prose fiction.
An Indian woman pulls a prawn fishing net from the mud embankment on the Matla river, in the Sundarbans delta. Photograph: Deshakalyan Chowdhury/AFP 
Poetry, on the other hand, has long had an intimate relationship with climatic events: as Geoffrey Parker points out, John Milton began to compose Paradise Lost during a winter of extreme cold, and “unpredictable and unforgiving changes in the climate are central to his story. Milton’s fictional world, like the real one in which he lived, was ... a ‘universe of death’ at the mercy of extremes of heat and cold.” This is a universe very different from that of the contemporary literary novel.
I am, of course, painting with a very broad brush: the novel’s infancy is long past, and the form has changed in many ways over the last two centuries. Yet, to a quite remarkable degree, the literary novel has also remained true to the destiny that was charted for it at birth. Consider that the literary movements of the 20th century were almost uniformly disdainful of plot and narrative; that an ever greater emphasis was laid on style and “observation”, whether it be of everyday details, traits of character or nuances of emotion – which is why teachers of creative writing now exhort their students to “show, don’t tell”.
Yet fortunately, from time to time, there have also been movements that celebrated the unheard-of and the improbable: surrealism for instance, and most significantly, magical realism, which is replete with events that have no relation to the calculus of probability.
There is, however, an important difference between the weather events that we are now experiencing and those that occur in surrealist and magical realist novels: improbable though they might be, these events are neither surreal nor magical. To the contrary, these highly improbable occurrences are overwhelmingly, urgently, astoundingly real. The ethical difficulties that might arise in treating them as magical or metaphorical or allegorical are obvious.
But there is another reason why, from the writer’s point of view, it would serve no purpose to approach them in that way: because to treat them as magical or surreal would be to rob them of precisely the quality that makes them so urgently compelling – which is that they are actually happening on this Earth, at this time.

*Amitav Ghosh’s The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable is published by University of Chicago.

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