08/04/2020

Climate Responsibility

NewClimate Institute

To address the climate crisis, rapid decarbonisation is urgently needed across all sectors. Existing climate pledges and policies fall far short of what is needed to transition to sustainable, low-carbon economies (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).

Organisations increasingly recognise that their activities are drivers of this problem and feel compelled to step up and take responsibility for their impact on the climate. Common approaches to address this responsibility – such as shadow carbon pricing or the concept of offsetting – are challenging to implement in a way that ensures transparency and effective climate impact in-line with the Paris Agreement objectives.

Our climate responsibility approach addresses our own climate footprint in a transparent and constructive way. We set out to do the following:
 
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We do not intend to offset our emissions and do not strive for carbon neutrality, based on offsets. We aim to create a transparent mechanism that reduces our direct climate impact and channels resources to initiatives that currently deliver real impact in addressing climate change or have great potential to do so in the future. In this document we hope to outline a transparent mechanism that can be followed by others.

 Detailed overview

To address the climate crisis, rapid decarbonisation is urgently needed across all sectors. Existing climate pledges and policies fall far short of what is needed to transition to sustainable, low-carbon economies (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).

Organisations increasingly recognise that their activities are drivers of this problem and feel compelled to step up and take responsibility for their impact on the climate.

Common approaches to address this responsibility – such as shadow carbon pricing or the concept of offsetting – are challenging to implement in a way that ensures transparency and effective climate impact in-line with the Paris Agreement objectives.

Our “Climate responsibility” approach addresses our own climate footprint in a transparent and constructive way.

Together with clients and project partners, NewClimate works towards a sustainable zero-GHG emission future. Through our work we help governments, the international community and other stakeholders to identify opportunities and appropriate policies to transition towards zero-GHG emission strategies.

We advocate for a rapid and deep decarbonisation of societies, in a manner that allows for sustainable development. We are convinced that our work contributes to mitigating climate change. However, in conducting some of our project activities and through our procurement we recognise that we are also, in part, causing GHG emissions. Some of our activities do not come with a feasible zero-emission solution at the moment. This includes, most importantly, air travel, but also some of our office operations and related services.

The following steps outline our approach to address our Climate Responsibility. We recognise challenges in the approach and the solutions that we identify, and seek to transparently document the full details of our approach on an annual basis, including these uncertainties. We aim to establish a transparent approach that can be adopted by others.

1 We maintain an overview of our GHG emissions on an annual basis and continuously strive to improve our understanding of the impact that we have.

NewClimate Institute performs a transparent ongoing analysis of the organisation’s GHG emissions, reporting on an annual basis.

The scope of the company’s own emissions accounting is reviewed and publicly communicated on an annual basis, with the intention to continuously improve our understanding of our climate impact and measures available to mitigate this.

The estimation of GHG emissions includes the estimated equivalent climate impact of non-carbon climate forcers from aviation, such as condensation trails, ice clouds and ozone generated by nitrogen oxides.
Details on the scope of our emissions accounting are included in Chapter 1 of our annual implementation report found here.

2 We aim to reduce our own emissions as much as possible, with a vision of zero emissions as soon as possible.

NewClimate Institute has a vision to operate with zero GHG emissions as soon as possible.

We regularly assess the options for reducing our own emissions from each emission source, based on the results from step 1 and taking account of the best available knowledge on emission reduction opportunities.

We derive an action plan for reducing emissions each year. The internal price for carbon applied in Step 3 of this approach also supports driving decision making towards low-carbon solutions.

For important sources of emissions where we cannot make significant emission reductions in the near future, we transparently communicate the challenges we face in tackling those emission sources, to encourage a dialogue on finding solutions for the future.

Details on the current action plan for reducing emissions are included in our annual implementation report found here.

3 We impose a price per unit of emissions, based on a price signal aligned with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, for our GHG emissions we cannot yet avoid. Based on this price level, we generate funds which represent the actual costs of this approach. 

Although our vision is to operate at zero emissions as soon as possible, there are technical and economic reasons why it is not yet feasible for NewClimate Institute to reduce all of our emissions to zero. In particular, alternative technologies do not yet exist commercially to significantly reduce emissions from necessary flight activity.

Although a useful concept in the era of the Kyoto Protocol, we consider the approach of “offsetting” emissions to have limitations against the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and not ambitious enough for an organisation that understands the need to move towards full decarbonisation in the first half of the century.
As such, we do not seek to offset our emissions or to claim “carbon neutrality”. Rather, we apply a price per unit of GHG emissions estimated in Step 1. We determine the price level based on the best available scientific evidence on the carbon price signal required for alignment with the Paris Agreement objectives. We review this price level each year in the light of new evidence. We communicate our determined price level and rationale in our annual implementation report found here.

Based on this price level and the emissions from step 1, we annually generate funds which represent the actual costs of this approach.

4 With the funds from step 3, we support initiatives for transformational action to address climate change that advance progress towards the achievement of the Paris Agreement objectives for mitigation and adaptation.

The funds from our internal pricing of unavoided emissions are used to support high impact projects for action to address climate change, with a particular focus on mitigation and adaptation, through grant donations.

Since we do not intend to claim carbon neutrality, we do not actively seek to buy certified credits for emission reductions, although we do not rule out providing support to project types that could also potentially be financed in-part or fully through carbon credits.

We recognise that some of the activities with the highest transformation potential – and therefore with high suitability for supporting the objectives of the Paris Agreement – may be at early stages of development and/or may carry a risk of not delivering attributable emission reductions.

We engage in dialogue with other stakeholders, including existing platforms within the voluntary carbon markets, to identify and continuously improve the available options to channel our resources in line with our objectives. We believe there is a significant role for existing voluntary carbon market actors, including those that have previously administered crediting programmes, to consider new approaches that can address this current gap in the market.

We transparently communicate details on the approach pursued for the use of these funds in our annual implementation report found here.

5 We aim to mainstream the pricing of our climate impact through our accounting processes, to raise awareness and integrate these costs into decision making processes both internally, as well as with funders and partners.

NewClimate pursues the following measures to mainstream the pricing of our GHG emissions and wider climate impacts throughout our accounting and decision-making processes, internally and with our funders and partners:
     
  • Emissions from project-specific activities, such as project-related travel, are attributed as cost items to their respective project cost lines.
  • Staff travel expense reports include the costs of the emissions associated with the travel, alongside the quantification of the climate impact from that travel. This serves to raise awareness and also provide evidence of our costs that can be made available to clients.
  • We aim to communicate GHG emissions that can be attributed to specific projects, and their associated costs, to clients. We also aim to explore options to include these in the costs that we report to the client for the payment of our services or reimbursement of our expenses. We anticipate that some of our clients may not initially agree to cover these costs, but through our communication we attempt to raise awareness and convince them to adopt climate responsible procurement practices.
  • We attempt to foresee costs associated with our climate impact and aim to include them in our proposals for new projects. We aim to raise awareness with our funders of the need to recognise and seek to address climate impacts associated with their service procurement to minimise the risk of eroding our cost competitiveness. Likewise, we will attempt to have the recognition of these costs included in all new contracts with clients and partners.

6 We transparently communicate the details of this approach and its implementation on a regular basis.

Transparent communication is a key foundation of this approach. Constructive, collaborative dialogue is required to overcome challenges and share lessons learnt in order to identify and address issues that can support enhanced action and accelerated decarbonisation.

Through our communication, we aim to prompt discussion and encourage replication amongst other organisations. We solicit feedback to continuously improve and ensure the relevance of our approach.

NewClimate documents and publishes the full details of the approach including the following aspects:
  • Introductory explanation of the Climate Responsibility approach.
  • Annual implementation reports including 6 chapters to communicate progress on the 6 steps:
    • Overview of the organisation’s own emissions, as per Step 1.Details of actions identified for reducing own emissions in the following year, and key challenges faced, as per Step 2.
    • The price level determined per unit of emissions, including explanation for this choice, as per Step 3.
    • Details on how the funds have been used to support climate change action, and the expected impacts, as per Step 4.
    • An update on the extent to which mainstreaming of our emissions’ pricing in our own accounting process has been successful, including information on whether clients have accepted the costs, as per Step 5.
    • A checklist summary of what has been communicated and published to report on implementation of the approach during the past year.

Limitations of claiming carbon neutrality through offsetting in the context of the Paris Agreement

NewClimate Institute’s Climate Responsibility approach provides an alternative approach to claiming carbon neutrality through offsetting which, although a useful concept historically, has a number of limitations and risks under the global governance framework of the Paris Agreement.

Claiming carbon neutrality through offsetting may divert attention from the fact that, to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement, we need to reach zero GHG emissions worldwide. A climate responsibility approach needs to first and foremost incentivise and facilitate the reduction of one’s own emissions.

Carbon neutrality claims that significantly depend on use of offsets are not conducive to the achievement of the Paris Agreement objectives, which require the full decarbonisation of all economies, and transparent dialogue to support that achievement.

The Paris Agreement highlights the importance of transparency and facilitative dialogue for ambition raising. In this regard, we consider that a transparent communication of an organisation’s own emissions and the plans and challenges faced in reducing emissions further, is more constructive than a subjective claim to carbon neutrality delivered through offsets.

Industries, organisations and individuals who have built brand recognition on the claim of carbon neutrality may find it an unattractive prospect to divert from this approach. However, consumer awareness on responsible climate action is increasing. Over time, consumers may recognise that carbon neutrality claims do not necessarily represent high ambition for decarbonisation and do not always advance the objectives of the Paris Agreement through transparency and facilitative dialogue.

The prospect of generating investment through offset credits could present countries with a perverse incentive to limit the extent to which they ratchet-up their own ambition in reducing emissions. The integrity of credited emission reductions for their buyers is now far more uncertain in the context of the Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement requires all countries to set self-determined emission reduction targets (Nationally Determined Contributions – NDCs), which are to be revised at least every five years to reflect each country’s highest possible ambition level.

Emission reduction credits that are sold for offsetting purposes should not be counted towards the achievement of a host country’s GHG emission reduction target, to avoid that those emission reductions are double counted. As such, the prospect of potential revenues from emission reduction credits associated with offsetting programmes may present countries with a perverse incentive to restrict the extent to which they ratchet-up the ambition of their unilateral action during NDC revision cycles.

In order to maximise the amount of foreign investment, countries may limit their own national GHG emission reduction targets so that more of their mitigation potential can be tapped by international offsetting mechanisms.

This situation also entails a risk for buyers of offset credits related to the integrity of those credits. A key condition for determining the integrity of offset credits is the additionality of the emissions reduction project; that is, the guarantee that credited emission reductions are additional to what could be achieved without the offsetting programme.

In historical mechanisms, additionality could be proven by showing that the activity was not required by local legislation and that offsetting revenues could help overcome barriers that would otherwise prevent implementation.

Since, under the Paris Agreement, all countries now have their own emission reduction targets and the requirement to regularly ratchet-up their ambition levels, this situation calls for the re-definition of the concept of additionality: additionality should imply complete certainty that the project supported could not realistically have been implemented otherwise, through unilateral ambition enhancements on the part of the host country.

Stringent safeguards would be needed to avoid or reduce the effects of such perverse incentives and to ensure additionality. Offsetting programmes would need to ensure that they only tap highly ambitious mitigation options, which are beyond the reasonable reach of the host country’s unilateral action and which do not represent a conflict with the country’s own mitigation targets. Such stringent safeguards would be technically and politically difficult to establish. Even then, perverse incentives would remain to push the boundaries of those safeguards and seek loopholes.

Since emission reduction projects registered under crediting programmes to date have been mostly developed in the context of cost-saving, rather than ambition-raising mechanisms, we understand that there are very few, if any, examples of existing credited projects that represent those high-hanging fruits, and which could be considered truly additional in the context of the Paris Agreement.

Given the difficulty in objectively determining additionality in line with this definition, we consider that only a niche and ever reducing number of activities could count for this, and that this does therefore not represent a viable option for rapidly increasing demand volume of the market.

Financial support can have a greater impact for ambition raising in developing countries, if ownership of the emission reduction outcomes remains with the host country.

Developing countries need more financial support to ramp up their mitigation action, and voluntary action is a vital channel of such support. However, a more constructive environment is required in which this finance positively reinforces ambition raising efforts, rather than providing perverse incentives.

In contrast to offsetting approaches, if the financial support from voluntary action results in emission reductions that are owned by the host country, this represents no conflict with the host country’s GHG emission reduction target, but rather can provide support for reaching and ratcheting up those targets.

Offset credits are not necessary for the achievement of the Paris Agreement, but climate finance to support climate change mitigation in developing countries – also from voluntary sources – is critical and must be significantly ramped up.

Whilst we do not recognise a need for credited projects or carbon neutrality claims to advance the objectives of the Paris Agreement, we do recognise the importance of continued and rapidly increasing volumes of climate finance for many potential emission reduction initiatives in developing countries.

Through the Climate Responsibility approach in which the determined price per tonne is based on a price signal aligned with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, the volume of climate finance flows from voluntary action could vastly exceed that which would flow under the continuation of credited market approaches.

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(AU) Australia’s Path To Net-Zero Emissions Lies In Rapid, Stimulus-Friendly Steps

The Guardian

The opportunity to meet the target by 2035 is within our grasp – thanks to much cheaper technology – but we must be ready

ClimateWorks’ report finds progress and fall in cost of clean technology has been more rapid than expected, with renewable energy becoming cheaper than fossil fuels and the cost of batteries plunging 80% in a decade. Photograph: Lisa Maree Williams/Getty Images

Nearly two years ago, ClimateWorks Australia set out to test whether the implied goal agreed by world leaders at the Paris climate conference – cutting greenhouse gas emissions to “net zero” by 2050 – was still possible in Australia. They weren’t certain it would be. They were pleasantly surprised by the result.

“We found not only is it not yet out of reach in Australia, but it can be achieved using technologies that are mostly already mature and available,” says Anna Skarbek, the chief executive of the not-for-profit that was established in 2009 to fill a gap between climate research and action.

Net-zero emissions targets have been adopted by 121 countries responsible for a quarter of CO2, asset owners worth $4tn and an expanding list of major companies. The Morrison government is yet to join them, having promised a long-term strategy later this year, but all Australia’s states and territories have net-zero goals for mid-century.

ClimateWorks spent 18 months examining each part of the Australian economy in detail to consider what would be involved in getting there. The resulting report, Decarbonisation Futures, is an update of similar work in 2014. It found net-zero emissions were possible not just by mid-century but by 2035 – soon enough for Australia to play its part in an effort to limit global heating to 1.5C.

The report lands as the coronavirus crisis has, in a best-case scenario, postponed 2020’s expected focus on climate change. The year-end UN meeting in Glasgow has been delayed until next year. It is considered the most important since Paris in 2015, with countries being exhorted to ramp up commitments as promised in the French capital.

ClimateWorks’ analysis was completed before the pandemic hit, but Skarbek says the need to recover from the economic shock once the survival stage passes will also provide an opportunity to make the sort of investment required to respond to the climate crisis.
It’s a lot of relatively small transactions that get this job done. That’s why it is stimulus-friendly
Anna Skarbek
The former will demand a substantial stimulus program. The latter requires an “all-in” approach from governments, business and individuals in what the report calls “the transformational decade” before 2030. After that, the window for Australia to do its bit towards the Paris targets and prepare for a coming global zero emissions economy may have closed.

Skarbek says it means a “make or break moment” is coming. The good news, she says, is many transformational climate-friendly steps are stimulus-ready.

“If we get this right, we can meet Australia’s international climate change commitments, create jobs in sustainable industries, and set ourselves up for a smoother and speedier shift to a zero-emissions economy,” she says.

“If we miss the moment of the stimulus injection to also accelerate on climate, the downturn will make it even harder to do what is needed over the next decade. I do worry we might miss this chance forever if we don’t seize it now.”

The report finds the progress and fall in cost of clean technology since the last analysis six years ago has been faster than expected, with renewable energy becoming cheaper than fossil fuels and the cost of batteries plunging 80% in a decade. It says much of the shift needed now could be rolled out quickly by rapid and large-scale deployment of familiar technology.

It would include upgrading homes and commercial buildings to boost energy efficiency and run on solar power; building more large-scale clean energy plants and storage; installing electric vehicle charging stations; boosting the use of recycled goods in supply chains; and supporting more carbon forestry by planting and protecting trees to store CO2.

“It’s a lot of relatively small transactions that get this job done,” Skarbek says. “That’s why it is stimulus-friendly.”

To achieve a goal of 1.5C by 2030, three out of four cars in 2030 would have to be electric, the report says. Photograph: Uwe Meinhold/EPA



The analysis found the difference between making cuts consistent with 1.5C and 2C of heating were noteworthy, but not always that great. The lower goal was likely to mean renewable energy providing 79% of power by 2030, compared with 73% for 2C and 48% if we continue on the current path without governments introducing further policies.On electric vehicles, a 1.5C path could require three out of every four new cars sold in 2030 being electric, compared with one out of two on a 2C path. The government has projected EVs will make up one in five new sales by then.

Deployment of available tech to make rapid cuts in electricity, buildings and transport is easier than in heavy industry, agriculture and the land, but Amandine Denis-Ryan, ClimateWorks’ head of national programs, says there are emerging solutions in those areas.

One may be hydrogen, which governments are backing as a potentially plentiful clean energy source for use in transport and industry, and to export. While the report acknowledges green hydrogen is likely to have a part to play, it does not assume how big that role will be, given it is a relatively new industry and there is little data to back it up.

But Skarbek says it is a potential answer to two big questions: what can be done in those parts of the economy, particularly in heavy industry, that cannot easily shift to running on clean electricity? And what industries can fill the gap created by Australia’s reliance on fossil fuel exports?

Denis-Ryan stresses the report reveals both what is possible and the urgency of the task. Achieving the Paris goals will require national emissions being cut in half by 2030 at the latest.

“We now know we have enough technological capacity in the Australian economy to get there,” she says. “But we need to get these technologies out the door at every opportunity.”

▶Electricity
The analysis found electricity is key – getting to 100% clean energy will help clean up other parts of the economy. It suggests no significant increase in storage is needed to get from where we are today, at about 25% clean energy, to 50%. Pumped hydro and batteries are mature and available technologies for when that boost is required.

Hydrogen may play a role, and demand-response programs, microgrids and inertia control technology are all considered at demonstration stage and could be rapidly scaled up to improve grid security. But the key factor determining the pace of the electricity transition is the speed at which coal and gas plants are closed.

The analysis suggests over-building renewable energy to 200% capacity – double what the country needs – could be more cost-effective than building to 100%, and would spark new clean export opportunities.

As with electricity, the technology for zero-emissions building already exists.

It would involve improving energy efficiency through insulation and draught sealing and by installing LED lighting, solar hot water and efficient heating, cooling and appliances. It could mean the introduction of passive house design standards to conserve energy, the use of electrochromic windows that allow owners to control the amount of light and heat that passes through them, and smart systems that optimise when and how power is used. But much of it would be driven by a shift to clean energy, replacing gas-fired heating and cooking with heat pumps and induction stovetops.

▶Transport
Transport is not as easy to tackle as electricity and buildings, but the analysis found it could reach near zero emissions by 2050 through improving travel practices (using more electrified mass public transport and video-conferencing for business), shifting to electric vehicles and replacing fossil fuels with biofuels, and possibly renewable hydrogen and ammonia.

▶Industry
Industrial emissions have been rising rapidly in Australia, effectively cancelling out reductions in electricity generation and drought-affected agriculture before the coronavirus pandemic. They are harder to cut and would leave considerable “residual” emissions by 2050 based on existing technology.

Improved efficiency, fast-tracking a circular economy in which metals, plastics and timber are recycled and reused and 3D printing plays a bigger role, electrifying mines and steel operations where possible, and shifting to renewable fuels are (to varying degrees) available solutions that could lead to deep cuts.

▶Agriculture
Immediate cuts are possible through better use of energy, including onsite renewables at farms, substituting some meat products for plants and better management of waste and fertiliser. Other changes such as using vaccines to limit methane from livestock, and shifting to lab-grown meat, are emerging technologies and need greater support for rapid rollout.

▶Forestry
Reaching net-zero emissions in the medium-term would involve expanding use of forests to store carbon to offset the sector where, based on today’s technology, the complete eradication of CO2 is not yet possible. But the report warns this is a temporary solution. The country cannot reforest land forever, and trees are vulnerable to bushfires, drought and heatwaves, which are exacerbated by climate change.

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07/04/2020

As Himalayas Warm, Nepal’s Climate Migrants Struggle To Survive

New York TimesBhadra Sharma | Photographs 



Most families in the Himalayan village of Dhye, Nepal, have left in recent years as the land has gone dry.



In the village of Dhye, crops are stubby, dead stalks. Water is scarce. The only school closed a few years ago. With dwindling food, most families have packed their belongings and left, driven out by a faceless, man-made enemy.

They are Nepal’s climate-change migrants, and there will be more.

“I love this village,” said Sonam Chhiring Gurung, 76, one of the final holdouts, “but I can’t survive here much longer.”

Climate change is remaking the Himalayan region, putting at risk millions of South Asians who depend on its water resources and pushing mountain dwellers in northern Nepal, home to the world’s highest peaks, to build new settlements at lower altitudes.

Glacial melt has accelerated in the 1,500-mile-long Himalayas. Land once used for growing vegetables has become barren. Yak herders say they are struggling to find grazing patches for their animals. Scientists have found that rising temperatures could spread malaria and dengue to new areas of the Himalayas, where mosquitoes have started to appear in the highlands.

Sonam Chhiring Gurung, 76, is one of Dhye’s few residents now. “I love this village, but I can’t survive here much longer,” he said.

Around the world, tens of millions of people have already been displaced as a result of a warming planet. Researchers estimate that the number of climate-change migrants — those fleeing natural disasters, droughts or other calamities — could reach a billion by the end of the century.

South Asians are among the most vulnerable. Last year, after an unusually weak monsoon, water nearly ran out in Chennai, one of India’s biggest cities. In Bangladesh, up to 18 million people face displacement by 2050 from sea rise alone, according to the Environmental Justice Foundation. Extreme heat is making people sicker and poorer, and could sharply diminish the living standards of 800 million people in the region if goals for mitigating climate change are not met.

Warmer Himalayas could have disastrous consequences for the subcontinent.

Last year, in one of the most complete studies on mountain warming, scientists warned that even if the world’s most ambitious climate change targets were met, at least one-third of Himalayan glaciers would melt by the end of the century.

If global warming and greenhouse gas emissions continue at their current rates, the region could lose two-thirds of its glaciers by 2100, according to the report, the Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment.

“In the long term, the impacts will be profound for hundreds of millions of people in the plains,” said David Molden, the director general of the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development in Kathmandu. “If we overlay significantly changed rain and river flow patterns, it will be a mess for people depending on Asia’s big rivers for irrigation and drinking water.”

Collecting pond water in Dhye last month, where supplies are increasingly scarce. With so many people’s livelihoods dependent on agriculture, the lack of water seems an insoluble problem.

In a country where nearly 70 percent of people work in agriculture, an acceleration in extreme weather may “reverse and undermine decades of development gains and potentially undermine all our efforts to eradicate poverty,” said Ayshanie Medagangoda-Labé, the United Nations Development Program’s representative for Nepal.

“Nepal is ground zero for the impacts of climate change,” she said. “As a country with one of the most fragile ecosystems — the Himalayas — and an economy that is heavily reliant on favorable climate conditions, Nepal is probably one of the most exposed.”

Glimpses of a warmer future are everywhere.

In 2016, Nepal’s army drained a lake near Mount Everest after rapid glacial melting threatened to cause a catastrophic flood downstream. A study released last year found that the size of ponds on top of glaciers in the region — which can both signal melting and accelerate it — had rapidly increased over the past three years, far outpacing the rate of change from the first decade and a half of the 2000s.


The number of climate change migrants in Nepal’s Himalayas is unknown, though local officials in mountain towns estimate it to be in the thousands.

Min Bahadur Shahi, a member of the government’s commission for development work, said officials planned to track the impact of warming temperatures for the first time through coming census questions. “Our first priority should be helping those displaced from the climate crisis,” he said.

Take the case of Dhye, in the remote Mustang region of Nepal, about 12,000 feet above sea level.

More than a decade ago, the village’s families gathered for a meeting to ponder a heavy question: Should they stay?

People who left Dhye resettled nearly a mile downhill, near a stream that was still flowing.

They looked around their landscape, a brown, dehydrated expanse that could barely sustain barley anymore. They weighed soil degradation, newly erratic rainfall and fears of starvation against centuries of lived history — the huts they had built with their hands, the pockets of earth where parents had buried each newborn’s umbilical cord.

By the end of the meeting, 17 of 26 families, about 90 people, vowed to leave.

“I couldn’t stay,” said Tsering Lamke Gurung, 54, a village leader and father of eight, four of whom have died. “My children and I were not able to survive from crop failure.”

The leavers have trickled out of Dhye in groups over the past few years. They strapped bundles of food and clothing to their backs and hiked nearly a mile down to the banks of a still-flowing stream. They called their new community Dhye Khola, a local name for the water body.

There were some moments of triumph. One resident sent pictures of the uncultivated land to a French aid agency, which agreed to plant fruit trees in the village and help build sturdier concrete homes for families.

But the longer-term settlement process was fraught, illustrating the challenges migrants face in procuring resources for unrecognized villages where residents have no legal right to the land.

Mr. Gurung, who took the lead in building Dhye Khola, said he approached a former prime minister of Nepal for guidance and aid. He met prominent lawmakers, a Nepal-based leader of the World Wildlife Fund and representatives from foreign embassies.

“They didn’t support us,” Mr. Gurung said. “They wouldn’t help us get a land ownership certificate.”

Sonam Sangma Gurung, one of the residents of the new community, Dhye Khola.

When a government conservation group backed away from its promise of providing apple seedlings for Dhye Khola, Mr. Gurung said he marched into its office and threatened to burn it down. He said the group eventually relented and sent about 275 seedlings.

“To those who say climate change is fake and criticize us for occupying public land, I ask them to come visit our village,” Mr. Gurung said. “I am a victim of climate change.”

Some wondered how long it would take before their next move, pointing out that broader warming trends were impossible to escape.

To protect against flooding during the summer monsoon, residents of Dhye Khola have started building embankments near the stream. They strategized about what to do if their apple orchards were marauded by locals from other struggling villages.

Tsering Bitik Gurung, 52, a farm laborer with a sun-creased face, said the stress was getting to her.

Ms. Gurung, who is not related to Tsering Lamke Gurung, agonized over the recent death of her husband from cancer and her diminishing money. The well near her home has gone dry. She cursed local police officers who prevented her from selling wild herbs in one of the bigger cities — retribution, she said, for villagers’ persistent efforts to get Dhye Khola recognized.

Sitting next to her stove, Ms. Gurung sighed. The apple orchards are bountiful for now, she said, but “our future is dark.”

“We came here after hardship, not for fun,” she said. “I pray that God will save us.”

A Buddhist prayer flag in Dhye Khola.



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Betio Is Facing A Population Crisis, And A Sea Wall Could Be Its Only Hope Of Survival

ABC News - Carly Learson

Esther, who resides in Betio, says she lives under constant threat of disease outbreaks. (Carly Learson/UNFPA)

Carly Learson is in the Pacific supporting UNFPA, the UN's sexual and reproductive health agency, which seeks to ensure that women, girls and young people have access to essential services, with a special focus on areas impacted by the climate crisis.
On a sandy islet engulfed by greenery, Esther lives under constant threat.
But it's not violence she's most concerned about — it's disease.
Not coronavirus — Kiribati is one of the few countries without a single case. But the threat of disease hounds Betio, the most populated section of South Tarawa, an island in Kiribati, where there are around 15,000 inhabitants per square kilometre.
To put it into perspective, that's 2.5 times the density of Tokyo.
"The beach used to be way back there — I don't know how many houses have been lost but it's a lot," says Esther, who moved to Betio from a remote island with her family.
"Now everyone is crowding into this area. There's no privacy, people are going to the toilet on the beach, and there's the constant threat of disease outbreaks."
In Betio, the most populated section of South Tarawa, there are 15,000 inhabitants per square kilometre. (Carly Learson/UNFPA)

Here, families live in open shacks on around four square metres of land, where the distance between houses is a matter of centimetres.
These sorts of crowded conditions contribute to some of the worst health outcomes in the Pacific: tuberculosis and leprosy are rife in Betio, with thousands of cases detected and treated each year.

A constant scramble for a place to live
Few countries are more vulnerable to the effects of global warming than the Pacific islands of Kiribati.
A group of atolls spread across millions of square kilometres of ocean, the islands have lost more than 10 per cent of their land in just two years.

Kiribati could soon be a memory as sea levels rise but its President has a 20-year plan to turn it into the next Dubai or Singapore.

Kiribati is made of sand and reef rock, materials that easily erode, causing houses built close to the water to collapse when there's a strong storm.
There's no basis to build strong foundations, and those families who become homeless due to erosion have to find a new block of land further inland.
"There's currently no provision for land lost to erosion, and while we have ordinances for land use in places like Betio, they're not being enforced," says Taneka Redfern from the Office of the President.
The constant scramble to find a place to live has meant that parts of South Tarawa have the among the highest population density in the world.

'We need a sea wall that will last 20 years'
In the absence of other options, residents of Kiribati are putting their faith in sea walls.
All over the island, young people are bringing in cement and rocks to build up new walls that will stop the tides from reaching their houses, however temporarily.

There's also a plan to dredge up millions of tons of sand from the lagoon and move it to a section of the island that can be built up to three metres in height, in theory providing space for 35,000 people to live.
In the meantime, people are living with the everyday reality that their land is disappearing.
"The President doesn't want us to move, and the only place we could go would be Ocean Island (a remote island only accessible by ship), but that won't work," says Teakamatang, a community leader in Tebikenikora, or Golden Beach.
"We need a sea wall that will last at least 20 years... Hopefully by then we'll have a better idea about what we can do."
'The water came all the way into the hospital'
For younger people, who can't remember the way the island used to be, there's a greater degree of complacency.
Christina, from Tebikenikora, says that while young people build sea walls, they're mostly doing it because they're told to by their elders.

The 28-year-old adds that she can't see a future for her and her husband in Kiribati, although she doesn't know where else she would go.
"The sea wall will protect us, but everyone will only work hard when there's an emergency — it's really hard work," she said.
"It's the elderly people who are angry — they can remember a time when they could live off the land."
For those that have felt the effects of the growing crisis, however, the need for action cannot be understated.
After Betio hospital — which handles up to 60 births each month — found itself at the mercy of the elements four years ago, the concrete sea wall proved a lifeline.

"We had a storm and the water came all the way into the hospital. We had women giving birth, or recovering with their newborns, and they all just had to run," says midwife Makita.
"There were three new mums asleep in the clinic when a massive wave bashed against the window. It was really frightening for them."

'If nothing is done, we will disappear'
With finite land on Kiribati, the country's woes demonstrate the challenging nexus of climate change and overpopulation.
And it's not a problem likely to end anytime soon.

According to the World Meteorological Organisation and climate scientists globally, extreme weather events are becoming much more frequent.
For Kiribati, this means extreme storms and droughts. Storms cause flooding, and on such flat land, floods can devastate thousands of homes very quickly.
There have already been two floods this year.
Teakamatang, who has witnessed the waters rising over the past 30 years, does not mince words.
"If nothing is done, we will disappear."

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(UK) We Need Health Warning Labels On Points Of Sale Of Fossil Fuels

BMJ‎ (British Medical Journal) - Mike Gill | Kristie L. Ebi | Kirk R. Smith | Lorraine Whitmarsh | Andy Haines

Mike Gill and colleagues explain how the implementation of fossil fuel labelling could have a significant impact on the awareness of climate change. This article is part of The BMJ’s Health in the Anthropocene collection.

Photo credit: “The Swedish Association of Green Motorists / Martin Prieto Beaulieu”


Authors
  • Mike Gill, former Regional Director of Public Health, South East England.
  • Kristie L. Ebi, Professor of Global Health, Center for Health and the Global Environment, University of Washington, USA.
  • Kirk R. Smith, Professor of Global Environmental Health, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley, USA; Director, Collaborative Clean Air Policy Centre, India.
  • Lorraine Whitmarsh, Professor of Environmental Psychology, Centre for Climate Change & Social Transformations, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, UK.
  • Andy Haines, Professor of Environmental Change and Public Health, Centre for Climate Change and Planetary Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK
The use of fossil fuels should be rapidly reduced to keep the global mean temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels—a core goal of the Paris Agreement on climate change. Emphasising the risks to health of fossil fuel use, now and in the future, could motivate action.

We propose a low cost, scalable intervention to facilitate change in individuals’ and society’s views and behaviour: warning labels at points of purchase of fossil energy or services dependent on large amounts of fossil fuel, for example at petrol stations, on energy bills, and on airline tickets. They should state clearly that continuing to burn fossil fuels worsens the climate emergency, with major projected health impacts increasing over time.

Since 1969, increasing numbers of countries have required cigarette packets to carry health warnings.118 countries now require cigarette packets to include graphic pictures alongside stark health warnings. These warnings can change attitudes and behaviour, providing a critical contribution to effective tobacco control policy.

Smoking is no longer viewed as a normal lifestyle choice, but as an addiction which harms the individual and those around them through exposure to second-hand smoke. Fossil fuel use also harms others through ambient air pollution that accounts for about 3.5 million premature deaths per year, as well as through climate change, which increasingly threatens the health of current and future generations.

In many countries, fossil fuel use is already the subject of government intervention, through fuel and carbon taxes, vehicle emissions standards, and other legislation, but these are insufficient to prevent dangerous climate change and do not reflect the full economic costs of burning fossil fuels.

Even if the nationally determined contributions for greenhouse gas emission reductions in the Paris Agreement are implemented, the global mean temperature increase is likely to exceed 3°C by the end of the century. For this reason there is growing acceptance that the world faces a climate emergency demanding urgent action at scale.

Nevertheless, vested interests continue to create doubt about the robustness of climate science, a cause of the inadequate scale and perceived urgency of investments in renewables.

Other barriers to shifting consumer behaviours towards zero-carbon options include low awareness, habit, perceived cost, inconvenience, and “psychological distance”—the perception that the issue affects other people, places, or times, or is uncertain.

Continuing to burn fossil fuels worsens the climate  emergency, with major projected health impacts increasing over time. Photo: Matt Rourke / AP
Warning labels connect the abstract threat of the climate emergency with the use of fossil fuels in the here and now, drawing attention to the true cost of fossil fuels (the externalities), pictorially or quantitatively. They sensitise people to the consequences of their actions, representing nudges, designed to encourage users to choose alternatives to fossil fuels, thus increasing demand for zero-carbon renewable energy.

Implementing warnings will face challenges. For example, in North Vancouver, Canada, pictorial designs denoting biodiversity loss were ‘co-opted’ by the Canadian fuel industry and incorporated into a national ‘Smart fuelling’ initiative, with any threats to health omitted. In Sweden, eco-labels will be mandatory from this May. The labels will show ‘climate impact’, the raw materials used for the fuel, and their origin.

They are part of a package to reduce fossil fuel use, including tax on new high emission cars and subsidy for low emission ones, but without direct reference to health. In contrast, Cambridge, Massachusetts voted in January to make information about the environmental and human health impact of fossil fuel use mandatory on all self-service fuel pumps. This explicit reference to health is likely to increase the labels’ effectiveness, because messages about the climate emergency framed around health tend to be more persuasive than environmentally framed messages.

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06/04/2020

A History Of FLICC*: The 5 Techniques Of Science Denial

Skeptical ScienceJohn Cook



In 2007, Mark Hoofnagle suggested on his Science Blog Denialism that denialists across a range of topics such as climate change, evolution, & HIV/AIDS all employed the same rhetorical tactics to sow confusion. The five general tactics were conspiracy, selectivity (cherry-picking), fake experts, impossible expectations (also known as moving goalposts), and general fallacies of logic.

Two years later, Pascal Diethelm and Martin McKee published an article in the scientific journal European Journal of Public Health titled Denialism: what is it and how should scientists respond? They further fleshed out Hoofnagle’s five denialist tactics and argued that we should expose to public scrutiny the tactics of denial, identifying them for what they are. I took this advice to heart and began including the five denialist tactics in my own talks about climate misinformation.

In 2013, the Australian Youth Climate Coalition invited me to give a workshop about climate misinformation at their annual summit. As I prepared my presentation, I mused on whether the five denial techniques could be adapted into a sticky, easy-to-remember acronym. I vividly remember my first attempt: beginning with Fake Experts, Unrealistic Expectations, Cherry Picking… realizing I was going in a problematic direction for a workshop for young participants. I started over and settled on FLICC: Fake experts, Logical fallacies, Impossible expectations, Cherry picking, and Conspiracy theories.

When I led a 2015 collaboration between the University of Queensland and Skeptical Science to develop the free online course Denial101x: Making Sense of Climate Science Denial, we made FLICC the underlying framework of the entire course. An important component of our debunking of the most common myths about climate change was identifying the denial techniques in each myth.

common comment we received from students was how much they appreciated learning about FLICC.

LARGE IMAGE

Since moving to the Center for Climate Change Communication at George Mason University, I’ve continued to build the FLICC taxonomy. In my collaboration with critical thinking philosophers Peter Ellerton and David Kinkead, I was introduced to reasoning fallacies that we hadn’t included in Denial101x.

As I begun developing the Cranky Uncle game, I began a series of fallacy quizzes where I gradually built the taxonomy up as I introduced people to an ever-growing collection of denial techniques (note the differing difficulty levels between quiz #1 and quiz #8).

When Stephan Lewandowsky and I published The Conspiracy Theory Handbook, we added seven traits of conspiratorial thinking. Here is the latest version of the FLICC taxonomy (with all the icons freely available and shareable on Wikimedia):

LARGE IMAGE

When I visited Brisbane in December 2019, I asked the University of Queensland if I could record a video explaining the updated FLICC taxonomy. They agreed but once they saw my script, including explanations and definitions of each denial technique, they suggested I divide the video into a three-parter. Always a sucker for a trilogy, I agreed – here are the three videos:





As well as the videos, this post includes written definitions and examples of each denial technique. I will continue to update this table as the taxonomy evolves in the future.

TECHNIQUE DEFINITION EXAMPLE
Ad Hominem Attacking a person/group instead of addressing their arguments. Climate science can’t be trusted because climate scientists are biased.”
Ambiguity Using ambiguous language in order to lead to a misleading conclusion. “Thermometer readings have uncertainty which means we don’t know whether global warming is happening.”
Anecdote Using personal experience or isolated examples instead of sound arguments or compelling evidence. “The weather is cold today—whatever happened to global warming?”
Blowfish Focusing on an inconsequential aspect of scientific research, blowing it out of proportion in order to distract from or cast doubt on the main conclusions of the research. “The hockey stick graph is invalid because it contains statistical errors.”
Bulk Fake Experts Citing large numbers of seeming experts to argue that there is no scientific consensus on a topic. “There is no expert consensus because 31,487 Americans with a science degree signed a petition saying humans aren’t disrupting climate.”
Cherry Picking Carefully selecting data that appear to confirm one position while ignoring other data that contradicts that position. “Global warming stopped in 1998.”
Contradictory Simultaneously believing in ideas that are mutually contradictory.  “The temperature record is fabricated by scientists… the temperature record shows cooling.”
Conspiracy Theory Proposing that a secret plan exists to implement a nefarious scheme such as hiding a truth. “The climategate emails prove that climate scientists have engaged in a conspiracy to deceive the public.”
Fake Debate Presenting science and pseudoscience in an adversarial format to give the false impression of an ongoing scientific debate. Climate deniers should get equal coverage with climate scientists, providing a more balanced presentation of views.”
Fake Experts Presenting an unqualified person or institution as a source of credible information. “A retired physicist argues against the climate consensus, claiming the current weather change is just a natural occurrence.”
False Analogy Assuming that because two things are alike in some ways, they are alike in some other respect. Climate skeptics are like Galileo who overturned the scientific consensus about geocentrism.”
False Choice Presenting two options as the only possibilities, when other possibilities exist. “CO2 lags temperature in the ice core record, proving that temperature drives CO2, not the other way around.”
Immune to evidence Re-interpreting any evidence that counters a conspiracy theory as originating from the conspiracy. “Those investigations finding climate scientists aren’t conspiring were part of the conspiracy.”
Impossible Expectations Demanding unrealistic standards of certainty before acting on the science. “Scientists can’t even predict the weather next week. How can they predict the climate in 100 years?”
Logical Fallacies Arguments where the conclusion doesn’t logically follow from the premises. Also known as a non sequitur. Climate has changed naturally in the past so what’s happening now must be natural.”
Magnified Minority Magnifying the significance of a handful of dissenting scientists to cast doubt on an overwhelming scientific consensus. “Sure, there’s 97% consensus but Professor Smith disagrees with the consensus position.”
Misrepresentation Misrepresenting a situation or an opponent’s position in such a way as to distort understanding. “They changed the name from ‘global warming’ to ‘climate change’ because global warming stopped happening.”
Moving Goalposts Demanding higher levels of evidence after receiving requested evidence. “Sea levels may be rising but they’re not accelerating.”
Nefarious intent Assuming that the motivations behind any presumed conspiracy are nefarious. Climate scientists promote the climate hoax because they’re in it for the money.”
Overriding suspicion  Having a nihilistic degree of skepticism towards the official account, preventing belief in anything that doesn’t fit into the conspiracy theory.  “Show me one line of evidence for climate change… oh, that evidence is faked!”
Oversimplification Simplifying a situation in such a way as to distort understanding, leading to erroneous conclusions. “CO2 is plant food so burning fossil fuels will be good for plants.”
Persecuted victim Perceiving and presenting themselves as the victim of organized persecution. Climate scientists are trying to take away our freedom.”
Quote Mining Taking a person’s words out-of-context in order to misrepresent their position. “Mike’s trick… to hide the decline.”
Re-interpreting randomness Believing that nothing occurs by accident, so that random events are re-interpreted as being caused by the conspiracy. NASA’s satellite exploded? They must be trying to hide inconvenient data!”
Red Herring Deliberately diverting attention to an irrelevant point to distract from a more important point. “CO2 is a trace gas so it’s warming effect is minimal.”
Single Cause Assuming a single cause or reason when there might be multiple causes or reasons. Climate has changed naturally in the past so what’s happening now must be natural.”
Slippery Slope Suggesting that taking a minor action will inevitably lead to major consequences. “If we implement even a modest climate policy, it will start us down the slippery slope to socialism and taking away our freedom.”
Slothful Induction Ignoring relevant evidence when coming to a conclusion. “There is no empirical evidence that humans are causing global warming.”
Something must be wrong Maintaining that “something must be wrong” and the official account is based on deception, even when specific parts of a conspiracy theory become untenable. “Ok, fine, 97% of climate scientists agree that humans are causing global warming, but that’s just because they’re toeing the party line.”
Straw Man Misrepresenting or exaggerating an opponent’s position to make it easier to attack. “In the 1970s, climate scientists were predicting an ice age.”

And lastly, a bit of fun. Every year, Inside the Greenhouse hold a competition inviting people to submit climate comedy videos. In 2019, I submitted Giving Climate Denial the FLICC, which received an honorable mention.



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Lethal Heating is a citizens' initiative